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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Human behavior flows from 
three main sources: desire, 
emotion and knowledge” 
 
Plato, The republic, ~380 BCE  
 
 
 
The idea that motivation constitutes the primary engine of human 
behavior dates back at least to ancient Greece, where the philosopher Plato 
assigned to “desire” a cardinal role in his theory of soul. This component 
was also described as appetite, which encompasses a number of basic human 
urges, from hunger to sexual needs, as well other non-biological goals which 
entail pleasure, like money, political activity or even physical exercise 
(Wagner, 2001). In this perspective, appetite was considered as a strong 
driver of  human behavior, independent of reason and possibly interfering 
with rational behavior. 
Since this early intuition, the study of motivation has evolved across 
multiple theories, constructs and applications, capturing the interest of 
several disciplines, like philosophy, psychology, economics and more 
recently neuroscience and machine learning (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 
2008). The scope of this dissertation embraces the most recent steps of these 
developments, with a particular focus: how motivational drive is embedded 
in the human brain, and how this shapes adaptive behavior. 
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THE QUEST FOR VALUE 
 
The study of motivation relies on the principle that animals’ behavior 
is guided by the pursuit of extrinsic or intrinsic benefits, such as rewards, 
pleasure and satisfaction (Berridge, 2004). Pursuing benefits requires the 
ability to track benefits, their probability of occurrence, and possibly other 
associated features (e.g., costs). In the literature, the term value is used to 
indicate how such features are combined. Classic decision theory posits that 
expected value of an option or object is an additive function of its possible 
reward outcomes, each outcome weighted by its probability of occurrence. 
This influential concept was formulated in the 17th century by the 
mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal and dominated economic 
models for two centuries (Schoemaker, 1982). In 1979, Kahneman and 
Tversky expanded this idea, by formulating the prospect theory. This theory 
postulates that the value of an option or object is also influenced by 
contextual and cognitive factors, which shift a reference point. As a result, 
value may vary depending on the circumstances and on the state of the 
agent. This theory succeeded in predicting a number of human behaviors, 
deviating from the classic decision theory predictions, and gave a strong 
impulse to the cross-disciplinary investigation of value-based decision 
making (D’Acremont & Bossaerts, 2008; Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Rangel 
et al., 2008; Takahashi, 2012; Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005).  
The influence of value on behavior has been investigated focusing on 
two types of rewards. On the one hand, some objects are endowed with 
intrinsically rewarding properties, as they respond to human adaptive needs, 
such as food. These rewards are called primary reinforcers. In other words, 
these objects are intrinsically appetitive, which means they elicit approach 
behavior. On the other hand, such a value can also be attributed to a neutral 
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stimulus, via learning. A long tradition of behavioral experiments in animals 
described the phenomenon of conditioning (Skinner, 1953) which implies 
that a neutral stimulus can be assigned with a rewarding value, when this 
stimulus predicts a reward. This line of research gave a substantial 
contribution to the understanding of learning mechanisms which occur in 
presence of reward, with or without action, in a simple or complex context 
and with or without punishment. What is relevant to the current work, is that 
this laid the basis for reinforcement learning theories (learning via 
reinforcements, that is the receipt of a reward, Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998) and their application to animal and human behavior. 
These theories provided a promising framework for understanding how 
value drives adaptive behavior (Matthew M Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; 
Maia, 2009).  
 
Neural correlates of value and reward prediction 
 
The neural correlates of value have been investigated since the 20th 
century. In 1954, Olds and Milner showed that electrical stimulation of 
specific brain region in rats had rewarding properties. If given the chance of 
controlling the stimulation, the animals would keep on self-delivering the 
stimulation. Subsequent studies determined that these regions were part of 
the dopaminergic (DA) network, including the Ventral Tegmental Area 
(VTA) and the nucleus Accumbens (nAcc, Corbett & Wise, 1980; Phillips, 
Brooke, & Fibiger, 1975). 
Since then, studies have proliferated trying to determine how value 
and reward-related behavior might be associated with this neural substrate. 
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In a seminal study in 1998, Schultz showed that VTA can actually encode 
not only reward receipt, but also reward prediction (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1:   Recordings from dopaminergic (DA) neurons in the VTA. The top graph 
represents DA firing at reward receipt, when no prediction was formulated. The 
middle graph shows DA firing when the reward predicting stimulus (conditioned 
stimulus CS) occurs. This illustrates the DA shift, as no response is detected at 
reward receipt (R). The bottom graph shows DA firing pattern in presence of a 
violation of the prediction: CS predicts a reward, and this is associated with 
increased firing; no reward is delivered (no R), and this results in a drop in DA 
firing (adapted from Schultz, 1998). 
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When a stimulus is reliably associated with a reward, the firing of 
VTA neurons is initially coupled with reward delivery, but then shifts to the 
predictive stimulus instead. In other words, VTA-DA neurons encode the 
expectation of the reward. This phenomenon is often referred to as 
dopaminergic shift. Furthermore, the same neurons fire when the 
experienced outcome diverges from the learned prediction. This signal is 
named prediction error, and can encode both a positive and a negative 
violation of the expectation (positive prediction error and negative prediction 
error, respectively). These findings opened the way to a conjoint research 
effort across the fields of neurophysiology, neurobiology and psychology to 
determine how VTA-DA input to cortical and subcortical brain areas 
contributes to neural encoding of value and reward prediction. 
VTA-DA input reaches a widespread cortico-subcortical network 
(Figure 2). Direct targets are for example the ventral and dorsal striatum, the 
Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc), the hippocampus, the amygdala and the medial 
Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC, Haber & Knutson, 2010; Lisman & Grace, 2005). 
All the nodes in this network have been shown to contribute to reward-
related behavior in humans in a wealth of studies using functional 
neuroimaging (Knutson & Cooper, 2005; Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 
2011; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Vassena, Krebs, Silvetti, Fias, & Verguts, 
2014).  
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Figure 2: Schematic illustration of the reward circuit and the pathways linking the 
different regions. The bottom part represents the brainstem, with Ventral Tegmental 
Area (VTA), Substantia Nigra (SN), Raphe nucleus and Pedunculupontine Nucleus 
(PPN). The central structure represents Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc), part of the 
Ventral Striatum, where s is a specific part of the NAcc, called shell. On the top of 
the figure, the cortical targets are represented: Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
(DLPFC), dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC), and ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex (vmPFC). On the sides, other interconnected structures are represented, with 
respective projections: Amygdala (Amy), Hippocampus (Hipp), Thalamus (Thal), 
Ventral Pallidum (VP), Subthalamic Nucleus (STN), Lateral Habenula (LHb), and 
Hypothalamus (Hypo, adapted from Haber & Knutson, 2010). 
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The ventral striatum (including the nucleus Accumbens) plays a 
pivotal role in appetitive behavior, encoding value at reward delivery and 
driving value-based learning (Diekhof, Kaps, Falkai, & Gruber, 2012). 
Striatal activation typically correlates with individual preferences and with 
the value attributed by subjects to a specific stimulus (Berridge, Robinson, & 
Aldridge, 2010; Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; 
Sabatinelli, Bradley, Lang, Costa, & Versace, 2007). The mPFC has also 
been implicated in different aspects of value processing, including reward 
prediction and outcome value coding. However the functional architecture 
within the mPFC remains debated. One main question concerns the 
hypothesis of a functional segregation of value coding and reward prediction 
coding across the main sub-regions, that is the Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(ACC) and the ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC, Rushworth, 
Behrens, Rudebeck, & Walton, 2007). 
 
Computational accounts of value and reward prediction 
 
The dopaminergic shift and prediction error coding in the VTA 
demonstrated by Schultz (1998) inspired fruitful computational work, aimed 
at gaining a mechanistic understanding of value-based neural computations. 
Montague, Dayan, and Sejnowski (1996) exploited the principles of 
Reinforcement Learning (RL, Sutton & Barto, 1998) to model VTA 
dopaminergic signaling. Specifically, they formulated the Temporal 
Difference (TD) reinforcement learning algorithm. This model formalizes 
the concepts of reward prediction as a value that is updated over time on the 
basis of experienced outcomes. Strikingly, this model succeeded in 
simulating both dopaminergic shift and prediction error signals, giving rise 
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to a wealth of studies applying RL principles to investigate value-based 
learning and decision-making  (Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013). Building 
on this foundation, recent work focused on bridging the gap between single-
neuron simulation and higher level cognitive effects (Alexander & Brown, 
2011; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011). For example, Silvetti and 
colleagues implemented the Reward Value and Prediction Model (RVPM, 
Figure 3). This model simulates meso-limbic interactions borrowing the 
actor-critic architecture in the RL framework (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Put 
simply, the critic is the unit that stores value information associated to a 
certain stimulus, which is updated on the basis of outcomes to formulate 
future predictions similarly to previous computational RL models (Sutton 
Barto, Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996). The authors also formulate a 
neurobiologically plausible architecture,  hypothesizing the critic functions 
to be implemented in the ACC. The innovative contribution of RVPM 
resides in its ability of simulating a number of higher level well-known 
cognitive effects, including response conflict (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
2004; van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001) and volatility 
effects (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007) in the ACC. 
Importantly, these effects arise from the behavior of the model, without 
explicit implementation of conflict and volatility. The model also 
accommodates a number of previous fMRI results, and in a later model-
based fMRI study the same authors demonstrated the role of mPFC 
(especially the ACC) in encoding reward prediction error (Silvetti, Seurinck, 
& Verguts, 2013). This work provides a framework to study value-based 
goal-directed behavior (Silvetti, Alexander, Verguts, & Brown, 2013), also 
in pathological conditions where DA signaling is impaired (Silvetti, 
Wiersema, Sonuga-Barke, & Verguts, 2013). 
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Figure 3: Reward Value and Prediction Model (RVPM). C1 and C2 represent the 
possible stimuli to choose among. Every choice is associated with an action 
producing an effect on the environment. This results in an outcome, evaluated via 
dopaminergic VTA input, which provides ACC with a reward signal (RW) and a 
temporal difference signal (TSN), reproducing the dopaminergic shift effect.  In the 
ACC module, value V is represented, together with δ units. δ+ units encode positive 
violations of the predicted reward (positive prediction errors). δ- encode negative 
violations of the predicted reward (negative prediction errors). On the basis of 
environmental outcomes, ACC computes new expectations, leading to new choices 
(adapted from Silvetti et al. 2013). 
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BEYOND VALUE: WHEN REWARD COMES AT A COST 
 
Despite the substantial role played by value in motivating goal-
directed behavior, this construct alone does not exhaustively address all real 
life situations. In a natural environment outside the laboratory setting, 
earning a benefit usually entails some cost. For example, the benefit of a 
wage only comes in exchange of a month of a hard work. The breathtaking 
view from the summit of a mountain requires hours of effortful climbing. As 
a more ancestral example, a predator will have his dinner served only upon 
running after (and faster than) his prey. Clearly, pursuing a reward often 
requires a certain amount of effort. Not surprisingly, this exerts a powerful 
influence on decision-making behavior and motivation in a number of 
contexts.  
In 1989, the social psychologist Jack Brehm defined motivation itself 
as the amount of effort one is willing to exert to achieve a goal, such as the 
receipt of a reward (Brehm & Self, 1989). More specifically, in Brehm’s 
theory, motivation is the result of a joint function of potential motivation 
(need, outcome value) and the difficulty of the required behavior. From then 
on, the relationship between potential reward and effort implied in obtaining 
it, received considerable attention in economics. For example, in the labor-
supply theory (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012) value is represented as a utility 
function combining amount of work, wage and extra unearned 
compensations. Interestingly, this framework powerfully predicts apparently 
irrational human behaviors, such as the effect of an income-compensated 
wage decrease. When workers are given a non-earned payment upfront, but 
their wage (earned income) is reduced, they will choose to work less, even if  
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by working the same number of hours as before they would have managed to 
reach the same total amount of money. 
To sum up, motivation sustaining effortful behavior has been mostly 
investigated in the field of economics and social psychology. Only recently 
cognitive psychologists became interested in this topic, discovering the 
applicability of previous theories to a wider range of behaviors, also outside 
the working environment. Kool and Botvinick for example (2012), replicated 
the income-compensated wage decrease effect in laboratory settings,  when 
the involved factors were candies, as a reward for performing cognitively 
demanding tasks. These authors also discuss the application of the labor-
supply theory in the broader perspective of decision-making. This cross-
disciplinary evidence provides empirical support for the intuition that 
humans estimate the effort involved in the pursuit of a certain appetitive 
goal, and that this shapes their decisions.  
 
Neural correlates of effort estimation 
 
If required effort influences behavior as a function of attainable 
reward, prospective effort needs to be encoded by the brain as reward is. The 
first evidence for this claim comes from animal research. Salamone and 
colleagues showed in several studies that dopaminergic neurotransmission is 
essential in this process (Cousins, Atherton, Turner, & Salamone, 1996; 
Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007; Salamone, Correa, Mingote, & 
Weber, 2005; Salamone, Correa, Nunes, Randall, & Pardo, 2012). Animals 
show effort avoidance, unless effort exertion leads to a reward. In that case, 
more effort is exerted as a function of available reward. However, this effort-
overcoming behavior is impaired if DA structures are lesioned or if DA 
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levels are pharmacologically depleted. This has been shown in a T-maze 
setting: control rats would normally choose to climb a barrier when this 
would lead to higher amount of food. DA-impaired rats however, would 
choose the easier (no-barrier) less rewarding option instead.  
 
 
Figure 4: On the left, the typical T-maze setting. The animal is placed in the start 
box. When the trial starts, the animal can choose to go to the left (high density arm), 
where more food will be available, but the animal must climb over a barrier. Going 
to right offers a lower amount of food, but no (climbing) effort is required. On the 
right, behavioral results are reported, with on the y axis the number of choices for 
the high effort/high reward arm. Importantly, when striatal dopamine is impaired via 
6-hydroxidopamine lesion, the number of choices for the high effort/high reward 
arm drops dramatically (right panel, 4th column in each test week, adapted from 
Salamone et al. 1984). 
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This evidence that DA network is essential in supporting effortful 
behavior received support from neuropsychological studies in humans. 
Patients with a mesio-frontal lesion (including the mPFC) show a deficit in 
initiating motivated behavior. Moreover, depressed patients, known to have 
DA-alterations, show decreased willingness to exert effort in exchange for 
rewards as compared to controls (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 
2012). This indirect evidence in humans is backed up by experimental 
studies investigating the correlates of effort estimation with fMRI. Some 
studies report a crucial contribution of the ventral striatum and the ACC in 
effort-discounting tasks (Botvinick, Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Croxson, 
Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009). In such tasks, participants 
are confronted with different rewards, entailing different amount of efforts. 
Apparently, the value of the prospective reward is discounted (i.e. decreased) 
by the amount of effort implied in obtaining it, thus resulting a net-value 
signal. This net-value signal would then drive choice adaptively. However, 
contrasting perspectives remains on how prospective effort is anticipated 
(i.e. estimated in advance), especially concerning its direct encoding by the 
ACC and striatum, and how this is linked to effort-related decision-making 
and preparation for effort exertion. 
 
Computational accounts of effort estimation 
 
The wealth of results from animal research stimulated a mechanistic 
understanding of effort estimation and exertion via computational modeling. 
A first interesting model was proposed by Niv, Daw, Joel and Dayan (2007), 
who operationalized effort coding as a combination of a vigor cost and an 
opportunity cost. The vigor cost was associated with energizing behavior, 
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that is initiating an action. The opportunity cost referred to the worth of 
allocating a certain amount of time to a specific task, thus avoiding 
alternative tasks. Hence, value resulted from a combination of reward and 
the two related costs. However, this model was specifically applied to 
physical effort, thus without considering possible influence of cognitive 
factors. Moreover, the model did not account for difference in effort 
allocation in other dimensions than time (e.g., allocating attention).   
Recently, a new theoretical framework has been proposed, which has 
the potential to go beyond this limitation. Shenhav, Botvinick and Cohen 
(2013) incorporated effort cost in the computation of value, postulating that 
the brain estimates the value of exerting control, in terms of cognitive effort. 
In other words, exerting effort is valuable as it leads to a reward. This type of 
encoding would allow overcoming the otherwise aversive effort, but only 
when this is considered worth. This new theoretical perspective opens 
interesting computational possibilities, and calls for a better specified 
functional understanding of effort anticipation. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
As emerged from the overview in this introduction, some crucial 
questions are left open with respect to the neural basis of reward prediction, 
value encoding and effort anticipation. The goal of this dissertation was to 
tackle these issues, using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) as neuroscientific tools for 
investigating the architecture of motivation. 
As a first step, we addressed the neural representation of value and 
reward prediction, coupled with decision-making. In Chapter 2, we discuss 
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the debate concerning the functional specialization within mPFC. This 
region is clearly implicated in both value coding and reward prediction 
(Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). Hypotheses of functional segregation have 
been put forth, with respect to two sub-regions of mPFC, namely vmPFC 
and ACC. These hypotheses suggested a primary role for vmPFC in value 
coding (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011) and a primary role of ACC in reward 
prediction (and prediction error, Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti, 
Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011). However, this had never been systematically 
tested in the same experimental settings in the same subjects. The goal of 
this chapter was to investigate this hypothesis. Moreover, the potential 
influence of decision-making processes on value coding and reward 
prediction had never been questioned. This additional experimental question 
was integrated in the design, aiming at better profiling the mPFC functional 
architecture. This region is indeed implicated in choice and action selection 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007; Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006). To 
address these questions, a gambling paradigm was implemented, where 
participants could choose between a gamble and a sure (but smaller) win. 
Participants were exposed to two types of gamble, a risky one (low 
probability, high payoff) and a safe one (high probability, low payoff). This 
allowed to target reward prediction and prediction error coding, as in a 
number of cases the outcome would be unpredicted. On top of this, in half of 
the trials, a forced choice was imposed, thus targeting the specific influence 
of free vs. imposed choice on value and reward prediction coding. This 
experimental design provided the opportunity to investigate one additional 
question on the same dataset, namely the neural underpinnings of individual 
differences in risky choice behavior. This is reported in the Appendix to 
Chapter 2, where we show that risk preference is associated with decreased 
anterior Insula activation during gambling, supporting the role of this area 
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not only in risk estimation (Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009), but also 
in explaining inter-individual variability in risky choice. 
After clarifying the neural underpinnings of value and reward 
prediction, we moved to the next step, that is the neural representation of 
costs. In Chapter 3, we implemented an fMRI paradigm investigating the 
anticipation of a specific cost, cognitive effort. This cost was chosen for its 
central role in motivated behavior, and for its ubiquity in everyday life, as 
well as in typical experimental settings. Specifically, we targeted the 
anticipation of effort, comparing it with the anticipation of a reward. 
Importantly, the delay confound was controlled, keeping execution time 
constant across easy and hard effort levels. In this experiment, we showed 
that anticipation of higher effort and greater reward is associated with 
activation of the same cortico-subcortical network, involving ACC and 
striatum. This network seems to support engagement towards successful task 
completion, resulting in reward delivery, thus suggesting a motivational role 
for these regions. Despite the convergence with recent fMRI as well as 
neuropsychological evidence (Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; Németh, 
Hegedüs, & Molnár, 1988), this result stands against the dominant net-value 
account of ACC function (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008; Silvetti et al., 2011). According to this theory, these regions 
encode the net value associated with a specific stimulus, that is the attainable 
reward discounted by the cost (in our case effort). One clear prediction 
arising from this framework is that higher net value would be associated 
with higher ACC activation, and vice-versa lower net value (deriving from 
higher cost) would be associated with lower activation. Our results however, 
showed that anticipating a higher effort elicited increased activation, thus 
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seemingly incompatible with a net value perspective, and instead more 
compatible with a motivational coding.  
The result from Chapter 3 called for further investigation of neural 
encoding of effort, with special attention to the role of ACC in this process. 
Disentangling this issue was the goal of Chapter 4. In this fMRI 
experiment, we aimed at identifying effort encoding type, directly 
contrasting the hypothesis of net value coding against the hypothesis of a 
motivational coding. A first crucial point characterizing previous studies was 
that decision-making processes were not controlled for. In fact, ACC is 
involved in action selection and decision-making (Brass & Haggard, 2007). 
However, studies investigating anticipation of value and effort did not 
systematically control for this factor. Some studies presented cues to the 
subjects, associated with upcoming, and unavoidable, effortful and 
rewarding tasks. Other studies involved the possibility for the subjects to 
choose effortful and rewarding tasks, according to their own preference. 
ACC has been associated with both  anticipation of effort when no choice is 
required, as well as with decision-making situations (both involving effort 
and not), and therefore considering this factor is crucial. However the role of 
decision-making was never investigated systematically in the same setting 
with the same participants, thus preventing from pinpointing specific 
contributions of ACC to the different processes. Our paradigm was design to 
answer these needs. We implemented an fMRI task where participants were 
confronted with some cues, each proposing a combination of prospective 
effort and potential reward. In a first phase, they would see all these cues, 
and choose which one they were willing to accept (in comparison with a 
baseline cue). The accepted cues would then come back in a second phase, 
associated with a cognitive task, entailing the selected effort and potentially 
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granting the announced reward upon correct completion. This allowed to 
simultaneously target the type of encoding (net value vs. motivational), and 
the influence of decision-making on this encoding. Additionally, effort was 
manipulated parametrically across four different levels, thus providing finer-
grained information. As a result, we showed that ACC supports effort 
encoding during both effort-related decision making as well as during 
anticipation of effortful performance. We also show how this is modulated 
by phase, showing that during decision-making parametric encoding of 
effort is better explained by a quadratic trend. This is particularly relevant, as 
it seems to be consistent with the previously illustrated theoretical account of 
ACC function, formulated by Shenhav et al. (2013). These authors suggested 
indeed that the ACC computes the value of allocating a certain amount of 
cognitive resources to pursue a certain goal. In fact, this might go beyond the 
dichotomy between net value coding and motivational coding, as ACC might 
be integrating both effort and value information, including the value of 
exerting the required effort, as it leads to a final reward. As a results, ACC 
activity seems to support goal-directed (reward-driven) behavior, both in 
estimating value and sustain effortful actions towards the goal. The 
importance of this result resides in its ability to provide a framework that 
reconciles seemingly contrasting findings. This hypothesis should further be 
tested, with broader ranges of effort, as for example situations in which the 
tasks is unsolvable and the goal unreachable, to tackle the role of ACC in 
prompting engagement and disengagement.  
Having unraveled the neural computations subserving reward and 
effort coding, the following question was how these signals influence actual 
behavioral policies. A first step in this direction was made in Chapter 5, by 
testing the hypothesis that reward and effort anticipation would influence the 
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motor system. To this end, we chose to use Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS), as a tool to stimulate the primary motor cortex (M1), in 
order to measure the excitability of the motor system via recording motor-
evoked potentials (MEPs) on the hand muscles during task preparation. 
Previous research showed that motor excitability is influenced by a number 
of cognitive factors, including reward expectation (Gupta & Aron, 2011; 
Klein-Flügge & Bestmann, 2012). In this experiment, we manipulate both 
reward expectation and cognitive effort required by task. Both features are 
signaled by a cue prior to task onset. At this time, the TMS pulse on M1 is 
delivered. MEPs are recorded on the hand muscles, to test for a modulation 
of reward and effort. Strikingly, we show that both reward and cognitive 
effort anticipation modulate motor excitability  in a non action specific way. 
This might reflect an increase in motor readiness to boost performance to 
achieve successful task completion. Interestingly, this effect is strongly 
modulated by individual differences in Need for Cognition, a trait measuring 
effort-related preferences and behaviors. This result is a promising first step 
in linking neural computation underlying value and effort with their 
behavioral consequences. Moreover, it shows that high level cognitive 
factors can exert a combined effect at the motor level. This opens exciting 
possibilities in investigating how more sophisticated computations can drive 
behavior, such as for example incorporating the effect of probability of 
success, and investigating how this is integrated with effort requirements and 
potential reward. Moreover, the potential effect of decision-making on the 
value-based modulation in M1 provides another interesting hypothesis to be 
investigated. 
Finally, in the General Discussion we summarize the findings across 
the chapters, discussing implications for future research. Moreover, we 
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illustrate a new neuro-computational model of adaptive effort allocation, 
developed in parallel with our empirical research and partially derived from 
it. This model resolves the controversy between net-value and motivational 
accounts of cortico-limbic structures, by implementing motivation for effort 
as an adaptive behavior, which can be learned via reinforcement learning. 
The explanatory power of the model is illustrated, as well as its empirical 
predictions, yet to be tested. To conclude, the implications of our work for 
future research are discussed, as well as the potential relevance in clinical 
settings. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
DISSOCIATING CONTRIBUTIONS OF ACC AND VMPFC IN 
REWARD PREDICTION, OUTCOME AND CHOICE 1 
Acting in an uncertain environment requires estimating the probability and the 
value of potential outcomes. These computations are typically ascribed to 
various parts of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), but the functional 
architecture of this region remains debated. The anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) encodes reward prediction and outcome (i.e. win vs lose, Silvetti, 
Seurinck, & Verguts, 2012). An outcome-related value signal has also been 
reported in the ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC, Rangel & Hare, 
2010). Whether a functional dissociation can be traced in these regions with 
respect to reward prediction and outcome has been suggested but not 
rigorously tested. Hence an fMRI study was designed to systematically examine 
the contribution of ACC and vmPFC to reward prediction and outcome. A 
striking dissociation was identified, with ACC coding for positive prediction 
errors and vmPFC responding to outcome, irrespective of probability. 
Moreover, ACC has been assigned a crucial role in the selection of intentional 
actions (decision-making) and computing the value associated to these actions 
(action-based value). Conversely, vmPFC seems to implement stimulus-based 
value processing (Rudebeck et al., 2008; Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck, & 
Walton, 2007). Therefore, a decision-making factor (choice vs. no choice 
condition) was also implemented in the present paradigm to distinguish 
stimulus-based versus action-based value coding in the mPFC during both 
decision and outcome phase. We found that vmPFC was more activated during 
the outcome phase in the no-choice than in the choice condition, potentially 
confirming the role of this area in stimulus-based (more than action-based) 
value processing.  
                                                     
1 Vassena E., Krebs R.M., Silvetti M., Fias W. & Verguts T. (2014). Dissociating 
contributions of ACC and vmPFC to reward prediction, outcome and choice. 
Neuropsychologia, 59, 112-123. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans constantly face Hamlet’s dilemma in everyday life. Would you 
prefer a reliable job with a steady income over working on commission for high 
bonuses? Would you invest your savings in a pension fund or buy high-
leveraged derivatives at the risk of a considerable loss? Adaptively choosing 
between an uncertain high profit versus a certain but smaller one involves 
predicting the probability of the profit, selecting one of the options, and 
verifying the outcome.  
Foreseeing and detecting benefits are adaptive skills, essential in driving 
goal-directed behavior. In the human and in the non-human primate brain, these 
computations are mediated by the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC, Haber & 
Knutson, 2010). The mPFC computes the expectation of an upcoming reward 
(i.e. reward prediction), as well as the violation of this expectation (Amiez, 
Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Jessup, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2010; Knutson & 
Cooper, 2005; Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007; Silvetti et al., 
2012). This violation is often termed prediction error and it occurs when an 
outcome is better (positive prediction error, PPE) or worse than expected 
(negative prediction error, NPE) (Sutton & Barto, 1998). However, several 
other related functions have been ascribed to the mPFC besides reward 
prediction and prediction error, such as integrating reward with potential 
associated costs, driving decision making (selecting among different available 
options) and computing the value of possible outcomes (Nee, Kastner, & 
Brown, 2011; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008).  
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A major point in this debate concerns the functional architecture of the 
mPFC (Bush et al., 2002; Shackman et al., 2011). On the one hand, the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) plays a critical role in reward prediction and prediction 
error coding (Jessup et al., 2010; Kennerley, Behrens, & Wallis, 2011; Silvetti 
et al., 2012). On the other hand, a complementary role in outcome coding has 
been hypothesized for ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC, Kennerley & 
Wallis, 2009; O’Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002; Rushworth, 
Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011), which seems to establish 
stimulus-outcome associations and encode rewarding features (i.e. value) of a 
stimulus (Bartra, Mcguire, & Kable, 2013; Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & 
O’Doherty, 2009; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Sescousse, Caldú, Segura, & 
Dreher, 2013). This suggests a regional specialization within the mPFC with 
respect to reward prediction, prediction-error computation and outcome coding 
(Hare, Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008). However, this hypothesis 
has not been directly tested in humans.  
Another core aspect of decision making is action selection, and it also has 
been attributed to the mPFC (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2008; 
Venkatraman & Huettel, 2012). Often this process is modulated by reward 
prediction, as selecting riskier options (low probability of reward) seems to be 
associated with increased mPFC involvement (see Platt & Huettel, 2008 for a 
review). However, how action selection is linked to reward prediction and 
outcome computation across different phases of the decision-making process 
still lacks a systematic account. 
To tackle these issues, the present fMRI experiment manipulated reward 
prediction, outcome, and choice to systematically characterize the functional 
architecture within the mPFC. In a gambling task, participants were confronted 
with two options in each trial, namely a gamble and small sure win. The gamble 
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induced a reward prediction that would be sometimes violated, causing 
prediction errors. In half of the cases, participants could select the preferred 
option (choice condition) while in the other half, one option would be selected 
by the computer (no-choice condition).  
A whole-brain analysis was performed to identify prediction-error- and 
value-related signals. A subsequent set of ROI analyses aimed at disentangling 
regional specificity of this signal throughout the mPFC across different 
conditions and different phases. Further analyses also elucidated the 
contribution of mPFC to action selection by comparing choice and no-choice 
conditions during both decision and outcome phase.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-three healthy volunteers participated in this experiment (12 
females). Two subjects were excluded from further analyses due to excessive 
head motion (more than 3 mm motion in either rotation or translation). One 
subject was excluded from further analysis due to poor task performance: This 
participant never selected the gamble options in the choice condition, thus 
failing to provide data for the prediction error conditions of interest (see 
Experimental Procedure section for a detailed description of the paradigm). The 
reported results are thus based on 20 participants with a mean age of 21.9 (range 
20-26). The experimental protocol was approved by the Ethical Committee of 
the Ghent University Hospital. All participants signed an informed consent form 
before the experiment, and confirmed they had no neurological or psychiatric 
history. 
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Experimental Procedure 
A gambling task was designed (Figure 1), adapting the paradigm used by 
Jessup et al. (2010).  
 
Figure 1: Task structure. During the decision phase, two options are presented on the 
screen. Each option represents the probability of winning (in grey; but in orange in the 
actual experiment) a certain amount of money (in cents, written in the grey slice). The 
complementary (in black; but in blue in the actual experiment) part of the pie is the 
probability of not winning on that trial. After 2800 ms, a go signal is presented, and the 
participant can choose one of the two pies. Subsequently the outcome is presented (win 
or lose). a. Example of a trial in the choice condition: when the central arrows are 
pointing in the opposite direction, the participant can freely decide which option to pick. 
In this example, the gamble option is risky (low probability of winning) with a high 
pay-off. Note though that the factor gamble type (low / high winning probability) was 
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systematically crossed with factor choice / no choice. b. Example of a trial in the no 
choice condition: the participant is forced to select the option indicated by the two 
arrows. In this example, the gamble option is safe (high probability of winning) with a 
low pay-off. c. Trial timing: the Inter-trial Interval is jittered in a pseudo-exponential 
fashion, ranging from 600 to 9000 ms (mean 4000). The duration of the decision phase 
is 2800 ms. As the go signal appears, the participant is allowed to respond. A randomly 
jittered interval precedes the outcome (range 2000/4000 ms, mean 3000 ms). The 
outcome presentation concludes the trial and its duration is 2000 ms. 
At the start of every trial, two options were presented on the screen, 
namely a gamble and a sure win. Both options consisted of probability pies, 
where the grey slice indicated the probability of winning while the black slice 
showed the probability of not winning anything (defined from now on as losing 
for simplicity). Within the grey slice a number was presented, indicating the 
current amount of money at stake. One option was always the “sure win” pie, 
which was completely grey. The participants were informed that the size of the 
color pies indicated the probability of the events of winning or losing, without 
explicitly mentioning the exact probabilities. Thus the gamble pies were used to 
produce different prediction-error conditions.  
Two types of gamble were presented: a risky gamble with a low 
probability of winning but a very high pay-off; and a safer gamble with a high 
probability of winning but a lower pay-off (Figure 1). Importantly, the expected 
value of the gamble (amount of money at stake multiplied by the probability) 
was in each case approximately equal to the sure win option. In order to 
introduce some variability to make the task more engaging, in the risky gamble 
the potential win varied between 110 and 114 cents with a 5% probability of 
winning. In the safer gamble it varied between 12 and 16 cents with a 80% 
probability of winning. As a consequence, winning a risky gamble would 
produce a positive prediction error (unexpected win) while losing a risky 
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gamble would represent a fulfilled prediction (expected loss). Conversely, 
winning a safe gamble would reflect an expected win while losing a safe 
gamble would evoke a negative prediction error (unexpected loss). The 
probability indicated by the safer gamble pie was always reliable. The 
probability indicated by the risky gamble pie was in fact slightly higher (shown 
probability 5%, actual probability 10%), in order to allow the participant to 
experience the positive prediction error situation in a sufficient number of trials. 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked if they found the 
probabilities shown by the pies reliable, which was the case for everyone. 
On top of the prediction error manipulation, choice was introduced in the 
design as additional factor. In half of the trials, participants were given the 
possibility to select their preferred option (choice condition), while in the 
remaining trials one of the options would be randomly selected by the computer 
(no-choice condition, with half of no-choice trials giving the automatic selection 
of a gamble, and half of a sure win). In order to maximize visual similarities in 
the two conditions, a no-choice trial was signaled by two arrows presented 
between the pies pointing in the same direction, indicating the option to be 
selected, whereas in a choice trial two arrows pointing in opposite directions 
were displayed on top of each other (Figure 1). The presentation was 
randomized and the conditions were fully crossed (each gamble type appeared 
the same number of times in the choice and in the no-choice condition). 
In order to keep the timing of the motor response as comparable as 
possible in both choice and no-choice condition, participants had to wait for a 
go-signal after the presentation of the pies. The response execution was 
followed by a randomly jittered interval (2 to 4 seconds, mean 3 seconds). 
Subsequently, the outcome was displayed, indicating the respective win or loss. 
The post-outcome inter-trial interval was also jittered (pseudo-exponential 
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distribution ranging from 600 milliseconds to 8 seconds, mean 4 seconds). The 
entire experiment consisted of 288 trials divided in three blocks, for a total 
duration of 60 minutes. The different trial types were randomly interleaved to 
be suitable for event-related analysis. During the break between blocks, the 
participants were asked via headphones to estimate how well they thought they 
were performing, in order to keep subjects focused on the task. 
fMRI Data acquisition 
Structural and functional images were acquired through a 3T Magnetom 
Trio MRI scanner (Siemens), using a 32-channel radio-frequency head coil.  
First, an anatomical T1 weighted sequence was collected, resulting in 176 high-
resolution slices (TR = 1550 ms, slice thickness = 0.9 mm, voxel size = 0.9 × 
0.9 × 0.9 mm, FoV = 220 mm, flip angle = 9°). Subsequently, functional images 
were acquired using a T2* weighted EPI sequence (30 slices per volume, TR = 
2000 ms, slice thickness = 3mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size = 3.5 × 3.5 × 
3.0 mm, FoV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°). On average 550 volumes per run 
were collected during 3 runs. 
fMRI Data analysis 
The first 4 volumes of the functional scans were discarded to allow for 
steady-state magnetization. The data were preprocessed with SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images were realigned to the first image of 
the run. The structural T1 image was coregistered to the functional mean image 
to allow a more precise normalization. The unified segmentation and nonlinear 
warping approach of SPM8 was applied to normalize structural and functional 
images to the MNI template (Montreal Neurological Institute). Functional 
images were then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width half 
maximum (FWHM).  
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Subsequently a General Linear Model (GLM) was applied in order to 
identify each subject’s condition-specific activation. Three factors were 
manipulated, namely probability of winning (low, high), outcome (lose, win), 
and choice (choice, no choice). This was applied to both decision phase and 
outcome phase. Hence, sixteen different conditions were modeled, crossing 
probability of winning (low / high), outcome (win / lose), choice (choice / no 
choice), and phase (decision / outcome). The factors probability of winning and 
outcome together define expected loss (low probability of winning+lose), 
positive prediction error (low probability of winning+win), negative prediction 
error (high probability of winning+lose), and expected win (high probability of 
winning+win). 
Trials in which participants selected the sure win were modeled 
separately and were not considered for further analysis (as in Jessup et al. 
2010). One regressor of no interest was added to model trials in which errors 
were made, namely when in the no-choice condition the response did not match 
the instructed response, thus excluding error-related activation from the 
analysis. Six subject-specific regressors were added modeling motion 
parameters obtained from the realignment. The resulting stimulus functions 
were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. To account 
for low frequency noise a 128 s high pass filter was included. To account for 
serial auto-correlation, an autoregressive model was applied.  
At the second level, we first concentrated on the outcome phase. A 
random-effects analysis was performed. A 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design was 
modeled, with choice (choice / no choice), outcome (lose / win) and probability 
of winning (low / high) as factors. All the reported whole-brain results where 
subjected to a voxel-level threshold of 0.001 uncorrected and survived a cluster-
level family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons with a p-
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value of 0.05. First, the main contrasts were computed, namely main effect of  
choice, main effect of outcome, main effect of probability, and outcome by 
probability interaction (prediction-error-related activity, cf. Jessup et al. 2010). 
It should be noted that the focus was on the interaction contrast, in order to 
identify prediction-error signals. The contrast reflecting the main effect of 
probability is in fact not optimized in this design, as it might be confounded 
with reward magnitude. Furthermore, additional pairwise contrasts 
decomposing the interaction were computed. 
Subsequently the main goal of the study was addressed, namely a precise 
identification of the respective contributions of ACC and vmPFC to the 
response to reward prediction, outcome and choice. These areas have often been 
reported to be implicated in one or more of these processes. Therefore, as 
strongly hypothesis-driven approach, two region-of-interest (ROI) analyses 
were performed. First a functional ROI approach was adopted, where two ROIs 
were defined on the basis of previous studies. Importantly this guarantees an 
unbiased selection with respect to the whole-brain significant prediction error 
and outcome signals. The ROI encompassing the vmPFC was defined on the 
basis of a meta-analysis performed on several imaging studies involving reward 
(Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011). In that study, two clusters are reported in 
the medial Orbito-Frontal Cortex (mOFC, left and right) to be activated when 
receiving a positive outcome. As a note, the anatomical definition of mOFC and 
vmPFC in fMRI studies overlap (Rushworth et al., 2011). We centered the 
vmPFC ROI (20 × 10 × 10 mm) on the averaged coordinates from left and right 
mOFC from Liu et al. (2011), in order to encompass both left and right vmPFC 
(MNI coordinates x=0 y=51 z=-10), as no specific lateralization could be 
hypothesized from previous evidence. The ROI targeting the ACC was derived 
from the study of Nee et al. (2011), where a systematic analysis of mPFC was 
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carried out. The ACC ROI was not defined on the basis of Liu et al. because the 
factor probability was not included in that meta-analysis. Conversely, after 
identifying whole-brain effects, Nee et al. defined multiple ROIs from previous 
studies investigating different functions attributed to the ACC, among which 
conflict processing and error monitoring. One area was defined as anterior 
rostro-cingulate zone (aRCZ). This proved to be the area most sensitive to 
unexpected events. For this reason this seemed to be the most appropriate ROI 
selection, as we were targeting prediction-error coding. It should be noted that a 
recent meta-analysis focused on prediction error (Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 
2013), but only studies involving model-based fMRI were included, thus 
making it not the most appropriate comparison for the current paradigm. Further 
research should focus on studies testing prediction error in decision-making 
paradigms (i.e. Jessup et al 2011) and perhaps perform ad-hoc meta-analysis 
(Wager, Lindquist, & Kaplan, 2007), thus granting an even more functionally 
precise ROI selection. To our knowledge, only a small number of studies 
addressed prediction-error under these conditions, thus making a meta-analysis 
currently unreliable. For these reasons the ROI from Nee et al. was selected. We 
centered our ACC ROI (also 20 × 10 × 10 mm) on the coordinates of the aRCZ-
ROI (MNI coordinates x= 0 y=28 z=31). As for the vmPFC, no laterality 
hypothesis could be formulated and therefore the ROI covers symmetrically left 
and right ACC (as displayed in Figure 4a).  
Second, an anatomical ROI approach was adopted, in order to provide 
convergent evidence for the previous analysis, to grant a more systematic and 
extensive sampling of the whole mPFC surface, and to ensure unbiased 
selection. Six box-shaped ROIs (10 mm wide) were anatomically defined 
sampling across the entire mPFC, starting from the posterior boundary of the 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), as defined by the Brodmann area 24. The 
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ROIs were medially centered, in order to sample from both left and right mPFC. 
The subsequent selection of regions was determined by progressively shifting 
the ROI center along the rostro-caudal axis. In order to follow the anatomical 
architecture of the mPFC the center of the two more rostral ROIs was also 
shifted lower on the dorso-ventral axis to cover peri-genual ACC and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC, see Figure 5a). As a result, 6 ROIs 
were obtained, 4 lying within the caudal to medial part of the ACC, one 
covering the peri-genual cingulate cortex, and one encompassing the vmPFC. 
Condition-specific activation (percent signal change) was extracted from 
each ROI (both functional and anatomical) using the Marsbar Toolbox (Brett, 
Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) and submitted to a repeated-measures 
analyses of variance. 
Subsequently, a separate second-level analysis was performed focusing 
on the decision phase, i.e.,  time-locked to the onsets of the display showing the 
pies. Specifically, a random-effects analysis was performed by implementing a 
2 × 2 factorial design, with choice (choice/no choice) and probability of 
winning (low/high) as factors. The probability of winning could be 5% (low), 
leading to a risky gamble; or 80% (high), leading to a safe gamble. The voxel 
level threshold was set to 0.001 uncorrected and FWE cluster-level correction 
for multiple comparisons was applied, with a p-value of 0.05. Moreover, the 
same functional ROI procedure used for the outcome phase, was applied to the 
decision phase, to better characterize contributions of these areas to decision-
making as well.  
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RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
Subjects chose the uncertain option over the sure win on 60% of the trials. On 
average, participants chose 47,05 (±15,82) of the risky gambles (67,14 % of the 
total) and 54 (± 21,78) of the safe gambles (72,97 % of the total, Figure 2a).   
 
Figure 2: Behavioral results. a. Percentage of chosen gambles (over the sure win), for 
the high probability of winning gamble (HIGH PROB) and the low probability of 
winning gamble (LOW PROB). b. Average number of experienced trials per condition. 
In both plots, error bars denote 1 standard error of the mean.  
The frequency of selection of the safe gamble over the sure win did not 
differ significantly from the frequency of selection of the risky gamble over the 
sure win (t(19) =.737, p=.47). As a result, participants experienced on average 
11,8 (± 2,69) low probability + win trials, 17,9 (± 4,41) high probability + lose 
trials, 73 (±18.35) high probability + win trials, and 70,15 (±14,73) low 
probability + lose trials (Figure 2b).  
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Outcome-phase whole-brain fMRI results 
The activation results during the outcome phase are reported in     Table 
1. The outcome contrast (win > lose) activated the vmPFC, ACC, striatum 
bilaterally, DLPFC bilaterally, brainstem, Posterior Cingulate Cortex (PCC) 
(Figure 3a). In the reverse outcome contrast (lose > win), no clusters survived. 
The probability contrast (low probability > high probability) activated the ACC, 
pre-SMA, brainstem, striatum bilaterally and insula bilaterally. The activation in 
this contrast is, however, difficult to interpret  as probability covaries with 
reward magnitude in the present design. The contrasts computed for the main 
effect of probability and the main effect of outcome elicited a widespread 
whole-brain level activation. This resulted in big clusters, potentially 
invalidating the regional validity of the cluster-level inference (Woo, Krishnan, 
& Wager, 2014). For this reason, the voxel-wise FWE (p=.05) corrected results 
are also reported (see Table 1).  
The whole-brain prediction error contrast (whole-brain interaction 
outcome by probability) yielded a consistent activation in the ACC, bilateral 
insula, bilateral striatum, brainstem and pre-SMA (Figure 3b). This pattern 
consistently reflects activity elicited by unexpected outcomes in previous 
studies (Jessup et al., 2010; Nee et al., 2011; Silvetti et al., 2012). 
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Figure 3: Whole brain contrasts  
Outcome phase: a. Outcome contrast (Win > Lose). b. Prediction error contrast 
(outcome by probability interaction). c. Outcome contrast (in red) and prediction error 
contrast showing partial overlap, as well as selectivity for outcome in the vmPFC and 
prediction error in ACC. d. No Choice>Choice contrast. e. Positive prediction error 
contrast (low probability + win>low probability + lose).  
Decision Phase: f. Choice>No Choice contrast. g. Risky gambles >safe gambles contras. 
h. No Choice>Choice contrast. 
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In a next step, in order to explore differences and commonalities in 
outcome and reward prediction coding, the prediction error contrast (outcome 
by probability interaction) and the outcome contrast (win>lose) were plotted 
together in Figure 3c. This showed partial overlap (displayed in violet) of 
outcome (in red) and prediction error (in blue). From this plot one can detect a 
first indication of selectivity for outcome versus prediction error coding along 
the mPFC; however, this claim remains exploratory at the whole-brain level. In 
the following section, the targeted ROI analyses will be discussed, providing a 
systematic and statistically sound investigation of different contributions of 
vmPFC and ACC. 
Furthermore, the pairwise contrasts decomposing the interaction were 
computed (low probability + win > high probability + win, high probability + 
lose > low probability +lose). These contrasts revealed that the interaction 
pattern was mainly driven by the response to low probability + win outcomes 
(Figure 3e), as further clarified by the ROI analysis (see below). This seems to 
highlight a power problem to detect prediction error related activity in the high 
probability + lose outcomes. Jessup et al. (2010), from which our paradigm was 
adapted, found such a pattern for the analogous contrast in the Insula and the 
ACC. The reasons for these discrepancies should be investigated in further 
research.  
Finally, a main effect of choice condition was reported. In particular a 
stronger response in the no-choice condition was observed in the vmPFC 
(Figure 3d) and in the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Note that the main 
effect in the vmPFC was driven by a difference in deactivation (Figure 4e), as it 
is commonly found in this region (Raichle et al., 2001). As further noted by 
Rushworth et al. (2011, p.1057), “activations reported in vmPFC actually 
correspond to different degrees of deactivation”. 
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Table 1: Summary of the activation results 
 
MNI 
Coordinates 
cluster 
level 
cluster 
level cluster peak 
Area x y z  FWE FDR size T 
      
Outcome Phase      
      
Outcome (Win > Lose)      
Left pallidum -12    6  -2  0.000 0.000 43399 9.42 
Right pallidum 12   10  -2     8.79 
Putamen 18    4  -8     8.43 
Inferior temporal gyrus -52 -54 10 0.001 0.001 541 7.43 
Occipital cortex -18 -96 -2 0.002 0.001 507 5.62 
      
Outcome (Win>Lose) voxel-wise FWE     
Left pallidum -12    6  -2  0.000 0.000 5052 9.42 
Right pallidum 12   10  -2     8.79 
Putamen 18    4  -8     8.43 
Left inferior frontal operculum -44    6  26  0.000 0.000 1712 7.98 
Inferior frontal gyrus -38   34  10     6.82 
 -46   44  14     6.64 
Anterior cingulate cortex -6   34   6  0.000 0.000 3355 7.76 
   8   28  14     7.67 
   0   38  -2     7.53 
Right inferior frontal operculum 44   10  26  0.000 0.000 1123 7.55 
Right inferior frontal gyrus 44   36  16     6.18 
Inferior temporal gyrus -52-54-10 0.000 0.000 186 7.43 
Occipital cortex 28  -92  -4  0.000 0.000 527 7.41 
Inferior occipital gyrus 40  -82 -10     6.88 
Right inferior temporal gyrus 56  -52 -12  0.000 0.000 289 7.22 
Poster cingulate gyrus   8  -36  32  0.000 0.000 472 7.14 
Angular gyrus 32  -58  42  0.000 0.000 1185 6.84 
Right precuneus 36  -70  34     6.57 
Right inferior parietal lobule 46  -36  48     5.97 
Left inferior parietal lobule -50  -38  44  0.000 0.000 1347 6.55 
Supramarginal gyrus -42  -44  38     6.06 
Precuneus   8  -56  18  0.000 0.000 277 5.29 
  -8  -50  14     5.09 
Mid-cingulate gyrus -6   -6  32  0.000 0.000 242 6.23 
   6    0  30     6.02 
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   6   10  26     5.62 
Superior frontal gyrus -26   22  56  0.000 0.000 398 6.2 
Middle frontal gyrus -26   12  62     5.94 
 -28   34  48     5.54 
Hippocampus 32  -10 -10  0.004 0.095 25 5.69 
Occipital cortex -18 -96 -2 0.000 0.002 100 5.62 
      
Probability (Low probability > High Probability)    
Right insula 30   24  -6  0.000 0.000 23705 9.35 
Left insula -28   18  -4     8.83 
Anterior cingulate cortex   8   36  14     8.03 
Inferior parietal lobule -30  -50  44  0.000 0.000 4684 5.63 
Precuneus 30  -60  30     5.46 
Supramarginal gyrus 46  -44  30     5.23 
Inferior temporal cortex -44 -58 -10 0.001 0.001 534 5.2 
Fusiform gyrus -36 -64 -8    4.78 
Left occipital cortex -18 -98 -6 0.025 0.015 274 3.99 
Right occipital cortex 30  -88   2  0.035 0.016 250 3.93 
      
Probability (Low probability > High Probability)  voxel-wise FWE   
Right insula 30  24  -6  0.000 0.000 4756 9.35 
Left insula -28  18  -4     8.83 
Thalamus   8  -8   2     7.37 
Anterior cingulate cortex   8  36  14  0.000 0.000 2270 8.03 
  -6  34  14     7.09 
   6  32  24     6.69 
Middle frontal gyrus 48  10  50  0.000 0.000 262 6.8 
Righ precentral gyrus 48  10  34     5.53 
Posterior cingulate cortex -4 -28  28  0.000 0.000 384 6.62 
Middle frontal gyrus 28  56   0  0.000 0.022 60 5.68 
Inferior parietal lobule -30 -50  44  0.000 0.001 150 5.63 
Superior frontal gyrus 22  48  34  0.003 0.101 31 5.46 
Precuneus 32 -70  30  0.000 0.000 164 5.46 
Angular Gyrus 30 -56  44     5.08 
Left precentral gurys -46   2  54  0.013 0.340 10 5.25 
Supramarginal gyrus 46 -44  30  0.004 0.126 26 5.23 
Inferior temporal cortex -44 -58 -10 0.004 0.132 24 5.2 
Inferior frontal operculum 34  20  30  0.000 0.022 60 5.12 
Inferior frontal gyrus 46  26  28     5.07 
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Prediction-error (Outcome by Probability interaction)    
Left insula -32   22  -2  0.000 0.000 2653 8.04 
 -32   14 -12     6.43 
Inferior frontal operculum -40   10  30     4.81 
Right insula 32   24  -4  0.000 0.000 3845 7.79 
Inferior frontal gyrus 46   20   6     5.86 
Middle frontal gyrus 50   12  48     5.15 
Anterior cingulate cortex   6   38  36  0.000 0.000 4453 5.87 
   6   30  18     5.85 
   6   30  38     5.69 
Thalamus 10  -10   2  0.000 0.000 1803 5.46 
Pallidum -10    4   2     5.26 
Midbrain   0  -20 -14     5.25 
Posterior cingulate cortex -6  -26  30  0.001 0.000 564 5.27 
   6  -26  30     4.84 
Left inferior parietal lobule -32  -58  46  0.000 0.000 712 5.09 
Angular gyrus 36  -56  42  0.000 0.000 846 4.95 
  50  -60  46     4.32 
Right inferior parietal lobule 54  -48  52     3.6 
Righ precuneus 12  -68  36  0.005 0.002 401 4.9 
Left precuneus -8  -68  34     3.58 
Middle temporal gyrus 56  -26 -10  0.016 0.005 310 4.38 
  66  -40  -4     4.33 
Angular gurys 56  -50  26  0.019 0.006 298 4.34 
Left inferior parietal lobule -48  -38  44  0.121 0.035 164 4.11 
      
Positive prediction error (Low probability+win>high probability 
+win)   
Left insula -30   20  -4  0.000 0.000 35265   9.12 
Right insula 32   22  -4       8.99 
Midbrain   6  -24 -14       8.52 
Right inferior temporal gyrus 56  -52 -12  0.001 0.000 567   6.60 
Middle temporal gyrus 64  -44  -2       4.63 
  58  -40 -10       4.47 
Left inferior temporal gyrus -52 -54 -10 0.003 0.001 429   6.21 
Occipital cortex 26  -94  -4  0.001 0.000 570   5.61 
      
Positive prediction error (Low probability+win>high probabilit+win) voxel-wise FWE 
Left insula -30  20  -4  0.000 0.000 2094   9.12 
Right inferior frontal operculum -40  10  28       8.23 
68     CHAPTER 2 
Right insula 32  22  -4  0.000 0.000 5214   8.99 
Midbrain   6 -24 -14       8.52 
Left inferior frontal operculum 44  12  26       8.13 
Anterior cingualte cortex   8  36  14  0.000 0.000 3363   7.90 
  -4  38   6       7.81 
Left inferior parietal lobule -30 -56  42  0.000 0.000 1263   7.49 
Angular gyrus 36 -58  42  0.000 0.000 777   7.41 
Right inferior parietal lobule 48 -40  48       5.61 
Posterior cingulate cortex   6 -34  32  0.000 0.000 723   7.22 
      
No Choice >Choice      
vmPFC -6 52 -14 0.044 0.030 234   4.18 
Left superior temporal gyrus -48 -2 -14 0.019 0.030 295   4.82 
Right middle temporal gyrus 64 -10 -8 0.001 0.002 576   4.38 
Right precentral gyrus 48 -18 60 0.036 0.030 249   4.16 
Left TPJ -42 -74 32 0.027 0.030 271   3.94 
      
Decision Phase      
      
Choice > No Choice      
Left and right ACC 8 26 32 0.000 0.000 6291   6.86 
Right superior parietal 28 -62 38 0.000 0.000 2508   6.85 
Right insula 30 26 4 0.000 0.000 582   5.60 
Left Superior  parietal lobule -24 -66 44 0.000 0.000 801   5.46 
Left frontal superior gyrus -24 -2 46 0.003 0.002 338   5.25 
Left Insula -24 20 6 0.000 0.000 685   5.20 
Right middle frontal gyrus 44 36 20 0.012 0.006 259   4.49 
Right inferior frontal gyrus 48 8 26 0.045 0.019 185   4.33 
      
No Choice > Choice      
Left TPJ  -44 -60 16 0.000 0.000 1894   5.94 
Right TPJ  62 -54 26 0.000 0.000 919   5.20 
Left/Right precuneus -4 -56 32 0.000 0.000 478   4.22 
      
Risky Gambles > Safe Gambles      
Bilateral ACC -10 36 20 0.018 0.021 235   4.17 
Right middle occipital gyrus 30 -92 -2 0.001 0.002 424   6.07 
Left middle occipital gyrus -28 -92 -8 0.074 0.043 158   5.03 
Left insula -28 -20 -4 0.079 0.043 155   4.32 
Right fusiform gyrus 40 -60 -12 0.090 0.043 148   3.88 
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Outcome-phase functional ROI analysis 
The planned ROI analysis was performed on the outcome-phase 
prediction-error signal. The goal of this approach was to better characterize the 
whole-brain results, targeting ACC and vmPFC function in reward prediction, 
outcome and choice coding. This analysis was guided by the a-priori hypothesis 
formulated on the basis of previous evidence, that ACC would encode reward 
prediction and prediction error, while the vmPFC would encode the outcome 
(Jessup et al. 2010, Rushworth et al. 2011). With this approach, we were able to 
contrast directly vmPFC and ACC activity by testing the specific hypothesis of 
a functional segregation within the mPFC for prediction error vs. outcome 
coding. The percent signal change scores showed a clear contribution of the 
ACC to the prediction-error signal (Figure 4), where the strongest response was 
elicited by the positive unexpected outcome (Figure 4d). This was confirmed by 
a significant outcome by probability interaction (F(1,19)=15.07. p=.001), 
irrespective of choice (no three-way interaction choice by outcome by 
probability, F(1,19)=.79. p=.39). A main effect of outcome (F(1,19)=37.96. p<.001) 
and a main effect of probability (F(1,19)=67.76. p<.001) were also identified in 
the ACC, but these did not interact with choice either (interaction choice by 
outcome F(1,19)=.08. p=.79,  interaction choice by probability F(1,19)=3.13. 
p=.10). The ACC thus showed the expected prediction error response (Figure 
4d), but this was mainly driven by a positive prediction error signal (low 
probability+win > high probability win in the choice condition  t(19)=4.4, 
p<.001, and in the no-choice condition t(19)=5.03, p<.001; high probability+lose 
>low probability + lose t(19)= -1.59, p=.13 in the choice condition and t(19)= 1.29, 
p=.21 in the no choice condition; cf. Jessup et al. 2010). 
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Figure 4: Functional ROI results  
a. Region of Interest selection across the mPFC, guided by previous evidence (ACC in 
green, from Nee et al. 2011, vmPFC in yellow, from Liu et al. 2010). b. ACC ROI 
plotted on the whole-brain prediction error contrast (outcome by probability). c. vmPFC 
ROI plotted on the whole-brain outcome contrast (win > lose). d. Percent signal change 
analysis in the ACC during the outcome phase: choice-condition is reported in grey, no-
choice condition in white. On the x-axis, the other two conditions are displayed, namely 
outcome (WIN/LOSE) and probability of winning (HIGH PROB/LOW PROB). On the 
y-axis, the percent signal change (psc) is represented. e. Percent signal change analysis 
in the vmPFC during the outcome phase: the choice condition is displayed in grey, the 
no-choice condition in white. On the x-axis, the other two conditions are displayed, 
namely outcome (WIN/LOSE) and probability of winning (HIGH PROB/LOW PROB). 
On the y-axis, the percent signal change (psc) is represented. f. Percent signal change 
analysis in the ACC during the decision phase. g. Percent signal change analysis in the 
vmPFC during the decision phase. In the plots error bars denote 1 standard error of the 
mean.  
As hypothesized, the vmPFC selectively responded to positive outcome, 
irrespective of winning probability, thus showing no sensitivity to prediction 
errors (Figure 4e). Indeed, there was a main effect of outcome in this region 
(F(1,19)=16.79, p=.001) and no significant outcome by probability interaction 
(F(1,19)= .001, p=.98). Interestingly the vmPFC also showed a main effect of 
choice (F(1,19)=13.7. p=.002). 
The differential sensitivity of vmPFC and ACC was confirmed by a 
significant three-way interaction (region by outcome by probability) when 
vmPFC and ACC were both included in the analysis as additional “region” 
factor (F(1,19) =27.634  p<.001). Consistently, this analysis also reported a main 
effect of region (F(1,19)=43.02. p<.001), an interaction region by choice 
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(F(1,19)=36.43. p<.001) and an interaction region by probability (F(1,19)=17.23. 
p=.001). 
 
Outcome-phase anatomically-guided ROI analysis 
The anatomically-guided ROI analysis was performed on the outcome 
phase prediction-error signal. The percent signal change scores showed a 
contribution of the ACC to the prediction-error signal (Figure 5), where the 
strongest response was elicited by the positive unexpected outcome. Along the 
rostro-caudal axis, the rostro-medial portion of the ACC seemed to be the most 
sensitive to prediction errors, especially to the positive unexpected outcome 
(Figure 5b). A significant interaction between outcome and probability was 
detected in the medial ACC (ROI 2, F(1,19)=6.66, p=.018), in the rostro-medial 
ACC ( F(1,19)=12.964, p=.002) and in the rostral ACC ( F(1,19)=13.910, p=.001), 
irrespective of choice. These regions showed the strongest prediction error 
response, as one can see in Figure 5c, where the prediction error size (as 
computed on the percent signal scores) is plotted as a function of anatomical 
location from caudal to rostral. This differential sensitivity within the ACC was 
confirmed by a significant three-way interaction between region, outcome and 
probability across the different ROIs within the  ACC (F(4,16)=7.597, p=.001). 
None of the regions showed a three-way interaction. 
Strikingly, the vmPFC showed no sensitivity to prediction errors, but 
selectively responded to positive outcome instead, irrespective of winning 
probability (Figure 5b). Indeed, there was a main effect of outcome in this 
region (F(1,19)=15.049, p=.001) and no significant outcome by probability 
interaction (F(1,19)= .131, p=.721). 
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Figure 5: Anatomical ROI analysis 
a. Anatomically-guided Region of Interest selection across the mPFC during outcome. 
b. Percent signal change analysis in the six ROIs (from caudal to rostral) during the 
outcome phase: choice condition is reported in black, no-choice condition in grey. On x-
axes the four prediction error conditions are listed: Expected Loss, Positive Prediction 
Error (PPE), Negative Prediction Error (NPE), Expected Win. On the y-axes the signal 
change is represented. c. Prediction error size: intensity of the prediction-error-related 
activation in the six ROIs, from caudal to rostral, during the outcome phase. The 
intensity corresponds to the interaction size computed on the percent signal change 
scores ((low probability + win – low probability + lose) – (high probability + lose -  
high probability + win)). In black the choice condition is reported and in grey the no 
choice condition is reported. The intensity is maximal in the mid-ACC, mid-rostral 
ACC and rostral ACC.  
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Decision-phase whole-brain results 
The results of the decision-phase analysis are summarized in Table 1. A 
main effect of choice was detected in the striatum (Figure 3f) and ACC, with a 
stronger response in the choice condition, confirming the role of these regions 
in action selection (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2008). Increased 
activation in the left and right TPJ was observed in the no choice condition 
(Figure 3h). 
A main effect of gamble type was also identified in the ACC (Figure 3g), 
in that it was more strongly activated when participants chose the risky (i.e., 
low winning probability) gamble as compared to the safe gamble (high winning 
probability), suggesting a contribution to risk estimation as well as risk-taking 
behavior. 
Decision-phase functional ROI  analysis 
An additional ROI analysis of the decision phase was performed, based 
on the two functionally defined ROIs used in the outcome phase. It should be 
noted that in this analysis the trials where the sure thing was selected were not 
included (as in the outcome ROI analysis). ACC showed increased activity (in 
terms of percent signal change) for the low probability condition as compared to 
the high probability condition (main effect of probability, F(1,19)=15.38, p=.001, 
see Figure 4f). Moreover, ACC showed a main effect of choice versus no choice 
(F(1,19)=42.54, p<.001) but no interaction (F(1,19)=1.15, p=.297). This 
corroborates the whole brain effect during the same phase. This activation might 
reflect ACC contribution in undertaking risky behaviors, as it is associated in 
this case with choosing (voluntarily or imposed by the computer) the risky 
option (over the sure win). In this case it is not possible to draw conclusions 
regarding reward prediction, as in this design the expected value was kept 
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constant, and this should be addressed in future research. No significant effect 
of choice or probability was reported in the vmPFC ROI (Figure 4g). 
DISCUSSION 
The current study investigated the functional architecture of the mPFC by 
targeting its contribution to reward prediction, outcome coding, and decision-
making during a gambling task. A striking dissociation emerged between the 
ACC, being involved in reward prediction and (positive) prediction-error 
response, and the vmPFC, selectively coding for positive outcomes irrespective 
of probability. These findings support the hypothesis of a functional 
dissociation between ACC and vmPFC in prediction error and outcome coding. 
This idea received convergent indications from previous research but was to 
date not directly verified. We now discuss these and other results in the light of 
the current literature. 
The pivotal role of mPFC in implementing and monitoring higher-order 
cognitive processes has been widely documented. A striking variety of different 
functions has been attributed to this area, ranging from reward prediction 
(Amiez et al., 2006; Silvetti et al., 2012), outcome coding (Rangel & Hare, 
2010), reinforcement learning (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti, Seurinck, & 
Verguts, 2011), conflict monitoring and cognitive control (Blais & Bunge, 
2010; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; 
Nee et al., 2011), to emotional regulation (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011), 
prompting effortful behavior (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Vassena et al., 2014), 
and processing aversive and painful stimuli (Rainville, 1997). 
Despite a wealth of research, no unifying comprehensive account has 
been formulated yet. The present study encompasses some elements that are 
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traceable in most, if not all, of these different domains. Specifically, prediction 
errors, outcome coding, and choice are cardinal components of all goal-directed 
behavior, yet they have not been manipulated in the same experiment in a 
systematic fashion. Our design allowed investigating the role of subparts of 
mPFC in each of these processes, thereby contributing to a comprehensive 
understanding of mPFC function. 
Prediction-error signals were observed in the ACC, confirming previous 
reports (Jessup et al., 2010; Silvetti et al., 2012), as well as in the midbrain, 
striatum, pre-motor supplementary area (pre-SMA), supplementary motor area 
(SMA) and insula (see Figure 3b). The percent signal change analysis in the 
ACC revealed a sharp selectivity towards positive prediction errors, which 
elicited the strongest response (see Figure 4d). In contrast to one previous 
finding, negative prediction errors did not induce significant activity increases 
(cf. Jessup et al. 2010). As a matter of fact, single cell recordings in monkeys 
highlighted a difference in the distribution of prediction-error responses in the 
ACC, with a significantly smaller number of neurons producing a negative 
prediction-error signal (Kennerley et al., 2011). Furthermore, slight differences 
in the experimental paradigm could account for different activation patterns in 
our study compared to the Jessup et al. report , as the reward amounts in the 
current experiment were overall higher (while still respecting the proportions 
between conditions, and keeping the expected value constant across different 
options; cf. Jessup et al. 2010). The absence of negative prediction error signal 
might also be due to a power problem. The reward magnitude associated with 
the positive prediction error condition was indeed higher then in the negative 
prediction error condition (as in the original design of Jessup et al. 2010). A 
possible influence of reward magnitude cannot be completely excluded, even 
though the pattern emerging across different analyses (whole brain, functional 
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ROIs, anatomical ROIs) seems to suggest a magnitude effect in the vmPFC 
rather than in the ACC. This issue should be addressed in further research. 
ACC was involved in encoding reward prediction (see Figure 4d and 
Figure 5b). This region consistently overlaps with clusters most commonly 
reported in previous studies (cf. Jessup et al. 2010, Nee et al. 2011, Silvetti et al. 
2012). Importantly, prediction error signals  in the ACC during the outcome 
phase were independent of the origin of the event (i.e., the choice condition). 
Specifically, the selectivity for  positive prediction errors persisted irrespective 
of whether the option was selected by the person or by the computer. This is 
consistent with the findings of Kool et al. (Kool, Getz, & Botvinick, 2013). In 
an investigation of the behavioral “illusion of control” phenomenon, these 
authors did not find any modulation of intentionally accepting an option on 
neural prediction-error activity.  
In contrast, the vmPFC was insensitive to prediction errors. Instead, the 
vmPFC displayed an outcome coding pattern, responding more strongly to the 
positive outcomes, irrespective of the winning probability that was tied to the 
selected option (see Figure 4e and Figure 5b). The role of vmPFC in reward 
prediction, especially with respect to the outcome phase, had not been clarified 
yet. The vmPFC is indeed assigned a crucial function in computing outcome 
expectancies (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007), which might rely on a 
reward prediction (or prediction error) computation. However, similar responses 
have been observed for obtained as well as omitted rewards in this region 
(Kennerley & Walton, 2011). Although it has been argued that no prediction-
error signal is computed by this area, to date opposing results have also been 
reported  (O’Doherty et al., 2002; Schoenbaum, Roesch, Stalnaker, & 
Takahashi, 2009; Sul, Kim, Huh, Lee, & Jung, 2010).  
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However, vmPFC contributions in outcome coding have been widely 
documented (Noonan, Kolling, Walton, & Rushworth, 2012; Rushworth, 
Kolling, Sallet, & Mars, 2012). Specifically, activity in the vmPFC has been 
shown to correlate with the subjective value attached to the stimulus by the 
agent (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2008; 
Plassmann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2007) and to reflect the value of a chosen 
option (Boorman, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; 
Kennerley et al., 2011). Furthermore, this region has been hypothesized to be 
the merging locus of value coding, where rewarding attributes of stimuli would 
be encoded in a common currency (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). Accordingly, 
vmPFC activity seems sufficient to decode the combined value of multi-
attribute objects (Kahnt, Grueschow, Speck, & Haynes, 2011) and has been 
reported for both monetary and primary rewards (Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 
2011). The current finding is consistent with this notion, but for the first time 
clarifies its strong dissociation with ACC in humans. It shows that its 
computation is independent of whether the positive outcome was predicted or 
not, and of whether the option had been intentionally selected or randomly 
assigned. Besides providing systematic insights on differential ACC and 
vmPFC functions, these results bridge human functional to primate 
neurophysiological results  (Kennerley et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, a main effect of choice was observed in the vmPFC during 
the outcome phase. The vmPFC was more active for outcomes following 
actions instructed by the computer (no choice > choice), without interacting 
with the value coding.  This focus on the stimulus (i.e., no choice) features in 
absence of intentional action (i.e., choice) is in line with what has been 
proposed as a specialized encoding for stimulus-based value coding, 
implemented in the vmPFC, as opposed to action-based value coding, processed 
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by the ACC  (Camille, Tsuchida, & Fellows, 2011; Rudebeck et al., 2008; 
Rushworth et al., 2007). The increased action in the vmPFC in this condition 
across all outcome types might thus derive from the absence of action selection. 
The potential functional role of this activation might be attentional in nature, 
with the purpose of underlying that the currently obtained outcome was not a 
consequence of an intentional choice, and therefore should not influence 
subsequent strategies (i.e. subsequent intentional choice). Albeit interesting, this 
interpretation is speculative and should be further addressed in future research. 
A possible alternative explanation would consider this activity to be Default 
Mode Network (DMN, Raichle et al. 2001) related. This region is indeed known 
to be part of the DMN. Moreover one can assume that the No Choice condition 
is less engaging, and this would justify DMN involvement. However, DMN 
activity would not coherently explain the outcome-value effect (increased 
activation for positive outcome). We therefore consider this second option less 
likely.  
Increased activity in the no-choice condition was also observed in the left 
TPJ. A TPJ contribution is typically detectable whenever an action is performed 
by an external agent, such as a computer, as compared to when it is internally 
generated (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009; Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati, 
& Nadel, 2011). This may correspond to the same distinction between stimulus-
based versus action-based value coding; however this interpretation remains 
speculative and requires further investigation. 
Concerning the decision phase, the involvement of the ACC is evidently 
increased in the choice condition, as compared to the random (i.e., no choice) 
assignment. This is in line with studies on intentional action, where the ACC is 
reported as being more active while deciding between two options as opposed to 
an externally-driven selection (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Demanet, De Baene, 
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Arrington, & Brass, 2013; Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; 
Mueller, Brass, Waszak, & Prinz, 2007). The striatum was also more active in 
the choice condition. This has been previously related to the affective value 
associated with the possibility of choosing. Leotti and Delgado (2011) reported 
increased activation in the ventral striatum, while participants were exposed to 
cues predicting a trial where they could choose. This could potentially explain 
striatal involvement in our study as well.  
The ACC also showed a stronger activation during the decision phase 
when a risky gamble was selected (low winning probability, high pay-off) as 
compared to a safe gamble (high winning probability, low pay-off). In other 
words, a stronger ACC involvement was triggered when people decided to 
choose a risky gamble over a sure small win, as compared to choosing a safe 
gamble over the sure small win. This suggests a role for ACC in undertaking a 
risky behavior. Notwithstanding the speculative nature of this hypothesis, 
understanding the neural mechanism underlying intentional selection of risky 
situations (low probability of reward) might provide useful insight with respect 
to pathological conditions, such as pathological gambling. 
Interestingly, the no-choice condition in the decision phase also elicited a 
bilateral activation in the TPJ, again consistent with agency studies (Farrer & 
Frith, 2002; Spengler et al., 2009). However, the TPJ activation was mostly 
unilateral (right) in these studies.  This difference may be explained by the 
increased relevance of our stimuli due to the reward manipulation. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The current study systematically investigated mPFC function in encoding 
three crucial components characterizing goal-directed behavior, namely reward 
prediction, outcome evaluation, and choice. A striking functional dissociation 
was detected within the mPFC: While ACC activity reflected reward prediction 
by signaling positive prediction errors, irrespective of whether the outcome 
derived from an intentional choice or a randomly selected option, the vmPFC 
selectively responded to positive outcomes, irrespective of the probability they 
were linked to. Although this dissociation did not interact with choice condition, 
vmPFC also carried a neural signature distinguishing between randomly 
selected (no choice) and intentionally chosen (choice) options. These findings 
provide new evidence for how complementary but dissociable information that 
is necessary to drive optimal goal-directed behavior is processed by different 
subregions within the mPFC. 
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APPENDIX I.  NEURAL CORRELATES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN 
RISKY DECISION-MAKING 
In Chapter 2, the contribution of mPFC to reward prediction, outcome 
value and choice was investigated. For these purposes, the analysis mainly 
focused on the outcome phase, that is when reward prediction is compared with 
the actual outcome by the ACC, and whose value is then encoded by the 
vmPFC. Some insights were also provided by a whole-brain analysis and region 
of interest analysis of the decision phase. This last analysis showed how mPFC 
is implicated not only in decision-making, but potentially also in encoding 
reward probability of a chosen option, which in the decision phase might be 
interpreted as uncertainty or risk. In fact, decision-making under uncertainty 
received considerable attention in neuroscientific research, given its relevance 
in several daily life situations, as well as in deviant behaviors such as 
pathological gambling. ACC activity has been consistently associated to risk 
estimation, and especially to undertaking risky behaviors, such as selecting a 
risky option over a sure win (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & 
Schultz, 2009; Fukunaga, Brown, & Bogg, 2012; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 
2005). 
The behavioral results revealed a considerable variability in decision-
making behavior across participants (See Chapter 2, Behavioral Result section, 
p. 61). Therefore our data were suitable to address one further question, 
concerning the underlying mechanisms of risk-preference in the current task. A 
better understanding of neural mechanisms underlying individual differences in 
risk-related behavior could provide useful insights on possible causes of 
pathological conditions, where risk estimation and risk preference play a pivotal 
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role. In fact this issue has been investigated in several studies, with different 
approaches, including neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies, and 
behavioral and personality studies (Bell, 2009; Gowin, Mackey, & Paulus, 
2013; Leeman & Potenza, 2012; Llewellyn, 2008; Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 
2013; van Holst, van den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010). 
When targeting the neural substrate of this variability, a potential 
candidate is the region of the anterior Insula (aInsula). This region is implicated 
in risk estimation (Bossaerts, 2010; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). 
Preuschoff and colleagues reported in a number of studies that aInsula shows 
increased activation as a function of risk, defined by the authors as outcome 
variance. (Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008; Rudorf, Preuschoff, & 
Weber, 2012). Furthermore, according to these results, aInsula seems to encode 
not only the predicted risk, but also a prediction error response, signaling when 
the experienced risk deviates from the expected risk. Other studies suggest that 
aInsula encodes skewness instead (i.e. asymmetry in the predicted reward 
distribution, (Burke & Tobler, 2011; Symmonds, Wright, Bach, & Dolan, 
2011). Recent evidence is also provided by studies investigating risk preference 
in substance abusers. These studies reported decreased activation of aInsula 
during risky decisions (Claus & Hutchison, 2012; Crowley et al., 2010). 
Importantly, it has also been hypothesized that aInsula mediates not only risk 
estimation, but also risk avoidance (Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Rudorf et al., 
2012). Taken together, these results support a crucial role of the aInsula in risky 
decision making. Hence, aInsula might mediate individual differences in risk 
preference. However, this hypothesis has not been tested in healthy subjects. 
Our task involved making a series of choices between risky gambles and sure 
wins, thus providing suitable data to test this hypothesis. More precisely, the 
goal of this analysis was to investigate neural correlates of individual 
differences in risk preference, targeting neural activation associated with 
DISSOCIATING CONTRIBUTIONS OF ACC AND VMPFC 
 IN REWARD PREDICTION, OUTCOME AND CHOICE  91 
choosing a gamble. In this context, risk is operationalized as probability of 
losing (not winning anything in this experiment). 
For these reasons, a new analysis was performed on the data collected for 
Chapter 2, (for the methods used in the original analysis, see Chapter 2, 
methods section, p. 56).This new analysis focused on the decision phase. A new 
first level GLM was set up, modeling all trials, irrespective of whether the 
gamble or the sure win was chosen (in contrast to the GLM in Chapter 2, where 
only the gambles were modeled). This resulted in 8 regressors of interest  
crossing 3 factors, namely choice (choice / no choice),  gambling (choosing the 
gamble / choosing the sure win), and probability (low probability gamble / high 
probability gamble). Outcomes were also modeled, as in the previous analysis, 
resulting in 8 outcome-related regressors. Additionally, one regressor was added 
to account for breaks and erroneous responses, and  6 regressors were added to 
account for motion. A random-effect analysis was then performed, with the goal 
of isolating activity associated with choosing a gamble (entailing risk) over a 
sure win. The whole-brain contrast for the main effect of gambling was then 
computed, with a voxel-level threshold of p=.001 uncorrected and a cluster-
level family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons of p=.05.  
Next, a behavioral measure of risk-preference was computed, calculating 
how many times participants selected the gamble over the sure win. 
Subsequently, the main analysis targeting individual differences was performed. 
A whole-brain regression analysis was carried out, with the gambling contrast 
as a dependent variable, and risk preference as a covariate. To this contrast, a 
voxel-level threshold of p=.001 uncorrected was applied, with a cluster-level 
FWE correction for multiple comparisons of p=.05. Importantly, in the current 
experiment the expected value of the two options was kept equal, as the primary 
goal of the experiment was to target value coding and prediction error in the 
outcome phase. This implies that activity during the decision phase cannot be 
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associated with value encoding, as both options have the same expected value 
(reward magnitude x probability). As a consequence, it is possible to 
disentangle activity specifically associated with choosing a gamble, that is 
choosing to take a risk. 
 
On average, participants gambled in 68.34 %  of the cases. The inter-
individual variability in choices was substantial (standard deviation of 21.07). 
However, three participants  did not show any variance in their choice behavior 
(either they chose the gamble in every trial, or the sure win in every trial). The 
data from these participants were excluded from this analysis, as the first level 
GLM could not be fit, given that not all conditions were represented in the data. 
The whole-brain analysis targeting the main effect of gambling showed motor-
related activity, but no activation in the aInsula. This might be due to a power 
problem, given the frequency of occurrence of gambles and sure win (see 
Chapter 2, Figure 2). The individual differences analysis however (gambling 
contrast with risk-preference as a covariate) yielded activation in the right 
aInsula. Interestingly, aInsula was the only reported activation cluster (Figure 
A1, cluster size  317 voxels, T= 6.46, cluster-level p-value=.001, MNI 
coordinates of the local maximum x= 34 y = 24 z = -6).  
More specifically, this revealed a negative correlation, thus showing that 
activity in the aInsula differentiated better between choosing to gamble and 
choosing a sure win in participants with lower risk preference. For illustrative 
purposes, the average percent signal change (psc) in the aInsula functional 
cluster was computed using the MARSBAR Toolbox (Brett, Anton, 
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  This is plotted in figure A2 as a function of risk-
preference.  
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Figure A1: Whole-brain Gambling contrast, with risk-preference as a covariate. The 
sagittal and coronal view show an activation cluster in the right aInsula  
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Percent signal change in aInsula in the Gambling contrast predicts actual 
gambling (risk-preference).  
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In the whole-brain analysis, the covariate predicts the difference between 
the two conditions composing the contrast, that is Choosing the gamble > 
Choosing the sure win. To better characterize this relationship, we checked if 
this effect was driven by choosing the gamble. The psc for the Choosing the 
gamble condition alone was indeed correlated to risk preference (r= -.62, 
p=.008). This was not the case for the Choosing the sure win psc (r=.34, p=.18). 
This result shows that increased aInsula activation when choosing a gamble was 
associated with lower risk-preference. In other words, people who gambled less, 
showed increased aInsula activation when gambling, while people who gambled 
more showed decreased aInsula activation when gambling. This result confirms 
a pivotal contribution of aInsula to risk-preference. In fact, this is in line with 
the results of one recent study, showing decreased aInsula activation in risk-
seekers, even though in that study risk was quantified as outcome variance, and 
not as probability of losing (Rudorf et al., 2012). Further studies should keep 
this heterogeneity in the definitions of risk into account. One open question for 
instance is  if the aInsula would similarly encode inter-individual variability in 
risk preference also when the alternative option would be a sure loss, instead of 
a sure win. As for the relevance of the current results, speculatively, decreased 
aInsula during gambling in people with higher risk preference might provide a 
potential etiopathogenetic mechanisms for the development of deviant 
behaviors. Choosing more often the risky option might be driven by an 
underestimation of the risk attached to this action. On the one hand, this altered 
risk estimation process might reflect a vulnerability, promoting risk-prone as 
opposed to risk-averse tendencies. On the other hand, hyper-activation of the 
same region might be associated with excessive behavioral inhibition. Given the 
potential relevance for clinical assessment and treatment of behavioral 
disorders, these hypotheses should be further investigated in future research. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
OVERLAPPING NEURAL SYSTEMS REPRESENT COGNITIVE 
EFFORT AND REWARD ANTICIPATION 1 
Anticipating a potential benefit and how difficult it will be to obtain it are 
valuable skills in a constantly changing environment. In the human brain, the 
anticipation of reward is encoded by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and 
Striatum. Naturally, potential rewards have an incentive quality, resulting in a 
motivational effect improving performance. Recently it has been proposed that an 
upcoming task requiring effort induces a similar anticipation mechanism as 
reward, relying on the same cortico-limbic network. However, this overlapping 
anticipatory activity for reward and effort has only been investigated in a 
perceptual task. Whether this generalizes to high-level cognitive tasks, remains to 
be investigated. To this end, an fMRI experiment was designed to investigate 
anticipation of reward and effort in cognitive tasks. A mental arithmetic task was 
implemented, manipulating effort (difficulty), reward, and delay in reward 
delivery to control for temporal confounds. The goal was to test for the 
motivational effect induced by the expectation of bigger reward and higher effort. 
The results showed that the activation elicited by an upcoming difficult task 
overlapped with higher reward prospect in the ACC and in the striatum, thus 
highlighting a pivotal role of this circuit in sustaining motivated behavior.  
                                                     
1 Vassena E., Silvetti M., Boehler C.N., Achten E., Fias W. & Verguts T. (2014). 
Overlapping neural systems represent cognitive effort and reward anticipation. PLoS 
ONE, 9(3), e91008 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reward processing has been investigated by several disciplines, ranging 
from economics to psychology and machine learning (Rangel, Camerer, & 
Montague, 2008). An established finding is that animals typically strive for the 
most beneficial consequences of their action, and that they do so via optimizing 
the net reward they can obtain from the environment (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). This complex skill relies on reward estimation, which is precisely encoded 
in the primate and in the human brain (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Knutson & 
Cooper, 2005; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011, 
2013). This consists in anticipating the value of the potential benefit. 
Nevertheless, benefits seldom come for free. They usually entail some cost, and 
this cost is taken into account by the brain to calculate the net value of each 
available option (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Kennerley, 
Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009; Park, Kahnt, Rieskamp, & Heekeren, 2011; 
Walton, Rudebeck, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2008). Usually, obtaining a 
benefit requires a certain degree of effort, either in terms of cognitive demand 
(Boksem & Tops, 2008) or physical energy expenditure (Kurniawan et al., 2010; 
Schweimer & Hauber, 2010; Walton, Kennerley, Bannerman, Phillips, & 
Rushworth, 2006). The more effortful the task, the less the animal values the 
respective reward (Assadi, Yücel, & Pantelis, 2009; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, 
& Dolan, 2011). Humans also discount reward by effort (Matthew M Botvinick, 
Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & 
Rushworth, 2009), meaning that subjective reward value decreases as a function 
of the effort required to obtain it. Hence, also effort needs to be estimated when 
calculating reward value, and a major role in this process has again been 
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attributed to the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and the striatum. These 
structures would integrate predicted cost and reward in a net value signal (Basten 
et al., 2010; Walton et al., 2008).  
Besides estimating reward and cost, expecting to earn a reward is a 
powerful motivational factor per se (Berridge, 2004). This can improve 
behavioral performance (Hübner & Schlösser, 2010) and influence learning and 
memory, according to a concept known as incentive-salience (Berridge, 
Robinson, & Aldridge, 2010; Berridge, 2004). At the neural level, the 
anticipation of a potential reward is associated with increased activation in the 
ACC and striatum (Knutson & Cooper, 2005). 
Recent evidence suggests that facing an upcoming effortful task also 
induces increased ACC and striatum involvement. This might reflect a 
motivational effect towards task performance, comparable to the incentive given 
by a monetary reward (Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & 
Woldorff, 2012; Stoppel et al., 2011). In terms of energy expenditure, this would 
be translated to the invigoration of the optimal behavior, which in turn is required 
to obtain a reward. Several findings in animals support this hypothesis, 
identifying its neural mediator in the fronto-striatal dopaminergic system 
(Salamone, Correa, Mingote, & Weber, 2005). Accordingly, if this circuit is 
pharmacologically inhibited (Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, Points, & Green, 
2009) or lesioned (Walton et al., 2006) the ability of engaging in a high-demand 
task to obtain a reward is blunted. A recent fMRI study in humans (Kurniawan, 
Guitart-Masip, Dayan, & Dolan, 2013) also highlighted the contribution of this 
network in anticipating higher energy expenditure, in terms of a more effortful 
grip.  
Thus, both reward and effort anticipation are core functions ascribed to 
ACC and striatum (Knutson & Cooper, 2005; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Silvetti et 
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al., 2013). How and whether these elements are combined when cognitive effort 
is required, recently received considerable attention (Matthew M Botvinick et al., 
2009; Croxson et al., 2009; Hernandez Lallement et al., 2013; McGuire & 
Botvinick, 2010; Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 
2012). However, findings concerning ACC and striatum are controversial. Krebs 
et al. (2012) made a first attempt towards clarifying this matter, by combining 
reward and effort in an attentional-cueing paradigm in order to probe for shared 
neural activation. In that study, both task demand (effort) and reward were 
manipulated in a perceptual task. The cue predicting the more effortful condition 
elicited a stronger activation of the midbrain and striatum, dopaminergic 
structures that broadly innervate the ACC (Haber & Knutson, 2010). Moreover, 
this nigro-striatal network partially overlapped with the activations elicited by the 
cue predictive of a high reward, and the ACC maximally responded to the high 
reward/high effort condition. These results are interpreted by the authors as part 
of a resource-recruitment process, essential in successfully accomplishing the 
task and hence obtaining the reward. Nevertheless, this result was obtained in a 
perceptual task where during the preparation period the allocation of attentional 
resources was crucial for successful completion. It is unclear if this finding 
extends to tasks requiring higher-level cognitive skills, thus relying on a more 
general preparation effect. This would argue in favor of a motivational effect, 
going beyond attentional-cueing facilitation. The contribution of the ACC in 
preparation for arithmetical tasks (Kong et al., 2005) and in logical-rules tasks 
(Sohn, Albert, Jung, Carter, & Anderson, 2007) would  strongly suggest this 
mechanism to be a more general preparation effect, in line with theories of task-
set preparation (Aarts, Roelofs, & van Turennout, 2008; Sterling, 2012), rather 
than a simple spatial-attention facilitation. However, this hypothesis has never 
been tested in demanding high-level cognitive tasks in combination with reward.  
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Hence, an fMRI experiment was designed where cognitive effort and 
reward prospect were manipulated in order to investigate effort and reward 
anticipation. The goal was to test for the cognitive equivalent of a behavioral 
invigoration signal, especially in the ACC and in the striatum. 
Moreover, a third condition was added, where the delay in reward delivery 
was manipulated. Controlling the time variable is crucial, as effortful tasks 
typically require more time to be performed. Delay estimation is in fact a well-
known mechanism both at the behavioral and the neural level (Green & Myerson, 
2004; Kobayashi & Schultz, 2008; Peters & Büchel, 2011; Roesch, Taylor, & 
Schoenbaum, 2006) which in the light of the current purpose could be a potential 
confound. For these reasons the same task was implemented for both effort and 
delay conditions. Furthermore, this allowed to test the specificity of the 
motivational effect of the effort condition.   
In the experiment, in each trial the cue phase informed about the upcoming 
reward, effort, or delay. The task consisted of solving arithmetic operations of 
different degrees of difficulty. In a first step, the anticipatory encoding of high-
level cognitive effort and reward was tested, as well as their overlap (Krebs et al., 
2012). This aimed at determining the type of encoding of these two variables. A 
motivational encoding would imply higher activation for higher effort and bigger 
reward, as those would serve as incentive to task performance. An alternative 
encoding would be value-related, where maximal response should be reported for 
the condition with the highest net-value (low effort and big reward). This putative 
shared substrate was also tested.  
In a second step, selective response to the anticipation of cognitive effort 
was addressed in an exploratory analysis, to isolate a potential neural mechanism 
specifically supporting cognitive effort exertion, unrelated to reward. 
102     CHAPTER 3 
MATERIALS & METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-five healthy volunteers participated in this experiment (8 males). 
Three subjects were excluded from further analyses due to excessive head motion 
(more than 3 mm motion in either rotation or translation). This left 22 subjects (8 
males), with a mean age of 20 (range 18-24). The experimental protocol was 
approved by the Ethical Committee of the Ghent University Hospital. All 
participants signed an informed-consent form before the experiment, and 
confirmed they had no neurological or psychiatric history. 
Experimental procedure 
An event-related fMRI design was set up, with the main manipulations 
being separated into different experimental blocks. In every block, reward, effort, 
or delay was manipulated, resulting in three different block types (Figure 1). 
Every block type was presented twice, resulting in six randomized blocks in the 
experiment. To avoid sequence effects, a block type was never preceded or 
followed by the same block type. Every block started with a display informing 
the participant about the block type (reward, effort, or delay block). 
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Figure 1: Task structure. Block types. In every block only one trial type is presented, 
where only one feature is manipulated. In a trial in the reward block, the cue informs 
about the final reward being small or big. In a trial in the effort block, the cue informs 
about the difficulty level (low or high). In the delay block, the cue informs about the 
length of the delay between response and reward delivery (short or long). 
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Every trial in a block started with a cue formed by two words, informing 
participants whether the manipulated feature (reward, effort, or delay) would be 
low or high (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Task structure and timing. The cue presentation is followed by a fixation 
symbol. The task follows, consisting of an addition followed by a subtraction. Two 
possible results are presented and the subject has to choose the correct one. After the 
response, a delay can occur. If the response was accurate, the reward is shown.  
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The resulting six cues were “Small Reward”, “Big Reward”, “Low Effort”, 
“High Effort”, “Short Delay”, or “Long Delay”. Within a block, the presentation 
of different trial types (i.e. “Low Effort” and “High Effort”) was randomized. The 
inter trial interval (ITI) was randomly jittered (range 2-5 seconds, mean 3.5) as 
well as the period between cue onset and task onset (range 2-6 seconds, mean 4, 
Figure 2). At task onset, two subsequent arithmetic operations had to be 
performed, an addition followed by a subtraction. Participants had to mentally 
perform the calculation and then select the correct solution from two possible 
results by pressing the corresponding key (Figure 2). Correct responses were 
followed by positive feedback consisting of a picture of a coin representing the 
reward. Errors were followed by the word “incorrect”.  
In the reward condition, the reward could be small or big, leading to a win 
of 1 cent or 50 cents after performing the easy version of the task, with no delay 
in reward delivery. In the effort condition, the task could be easy or difficult. In 
both cases it consisted in single digit calculations, but in the difficult condition 
every single operation required carrying or borrowing, whereas the easy condition 
did not (Imbo, De Rammelaere, & Vandierendonck, 2005). In this case the 
reward was constant at 20 cents, and there was no delay in delivery. In the delay 
condition, the interval between response selection and reward delivery could be 
short (no delay) or long (6 seconds). The task was easy and the reward constant at 
20 cents. The cues were fully predictive of the manipulation, thus ruling out 
uncertainty confounds. Trials in the reward and effort blocks lasted on average 14 
seconds, while trials in the delay block lasted on average 17 seconds. The 
experiment consisted of 180 trials in total (60 trials per condition, 30 trials per 
event), with each condition divided in two blocks. The participants underwent a 
short version of the experiment as training before the scanning session. They 
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were asked to be as fast and as accurate as possible. At the end of the experiment, 
they received the amount of money that they won by performing the calculations. 
We focused our analyses on the cue period activity, thus avoiding potential 
confounds of actual effort, motor response activation, or differential delay. The 
experiment was implemented in E-prime 2.0 (www.pstnet.com/eprime; 
Psychology Software Tool) and presented to the participants using a dual display 
MRI compatible LCD display and mounted in a lightweight headset (VisuaStim 
XGA, Resonance Technology Inc., Northridge, CA; http://www.mrivideo.com/). 
Ratings & questionnaires 
Participants filled in a safety checklist prior to scanning and a post-scan 
checklist after the session. Every block was followed by a short break, in which 
the participant was asked to rate how much attention he had paid to the cues. 
These questions aimed at keeping the participant focused on the cue and avoiding 
potential distractions. At the end of the session participants filled in two more 
questionnaires. One questionnaire queried the pleasantness of each cue type and 
the pleasantness of the effective outcome related to each cue, in order to check 
whether the high cost options were perceived as less pleasant. The second 
questionnaire was the Bis/Bas (Carver & White, 1994), testing reward sensitivity, 
drive and fun-seeking tendencies. 
fMRI data acquisition 
Images were acquired through a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner 
(Siemens), using an 8 channel radio frequency head coil.  First, an anatomical T1 
weighted sequence was applied, collecting 176 high-resolution slices (TR = 1550 
ms, slice thickness = 0.9 mm, voxel size = 0.9 ´ 0.9 ´ 0.9, FoV = 220 mm, flip 
angle = 9°). Subsequently, functional images were acquired using a T2* weighted 
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EPI sequence (30 slices per volume, TR = 2000 ms, slice thickness = 3mm, 
distance factor = 17%, voxel size = 3.5 x 3.5 x 3.0, FoV = 224 mm, flip angle = 
80°). The session was divided into 6 runs. On average 225 volumes per run were 
collected. Run length varied according to the block type, namely 7 minutes for 
reward blocks and effort blocks and 8.5 minutes for delay blocks. 
fMRI data analysis 
After discarding the first 4 volumes of each run to allow for steady-state 
magnetization, data were preprocessed with SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images were realigned to the first image of 
each run and the structural image was coregistered to the functional mean image 
to allow a more precise spatial normalization. The unified segmentation and 
nonlinear warping approach of SPM8 was applied to normalize structural and 
functional images to the MNI template (Montreal Neurological Institute). 
Functional images were then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width 
half maximum (FWHM).  
Subsequently a General Linear Model (GLM) was applied in order to 
identify each subject’s condition-specific activations. Cue onsets were modeled 
as events of interest (2 regressors per run) and two condition-specific task 
regressors (from stimulus onset to response, 2 regressors per run) were introduced 
to account for task- and motor-related activation. Four further regressors were 
added to model trials in which errors were made (2 cue-locked regressors plus 2 
task-locked regressors) in order to exclude them from the contrasts of interest. 
The resulting stimulus functions were convolved with the canonical 
hemodynamic response function. To account for low frequency noise a 128 s high 
pass filter was included; to account for serial auto-correlation, an autoregressive 
model was applied. All group-level effects are based on random-effects analysis. 
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First, contrasts of interest were computed at the group level, generating a 
Reward contrast (big reward > small reward), an Effort contrast (high effort > 
low effort) and a Delay contrast (long delay > short delay). The reversed contrasts 
for effort and delay were also computed, in order to test for preferential activation 
for low cost anticipation (low effort > high effort, short delay > long delay). The 
voxel-level threshold was set to 0.001 uncorrected. A whole-brain cluster-level 
family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparison was applied, with a 
p-value of 0.05. 
Second, we performed a conjunction between single contrasts (strict 
conjunction approach, Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005), (big 
reward > small reward) & (high effort > low effort). The goal of this contrast was 
to test for shared neural activation in reward and effort anticipation. A whole-
brain cluster-level FWE correction for multiple comparison with a p-value of 
0.05 was applied to each component. 
Third, in order to isolate the neural response selective to high effort, the 
following contrast was performed: (high effort – low effort) > (big reward – small 
reward). This would reveal effort-related activity, when controlling for response 
to reward. On the basis of previous findings, reporting a significant contribution 
of the brainstem nuclei in different types of effortful conditions (Boehler et al., 
2011; Krebs et al., 2012; Malecek & Poldrack, 2013; Nakagawa et al., 2013; 
Raizada & Poldrack, 2007; Stoppel et al., 2011) and in response to high-arousal 
situations (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005), a small volume correction (SVC) for the 
brainstem region was applied to this contrast, to test for brainstem involvement. 
Within this volume, we applied a voxel-level threshold of 0.001 uncorrected, with 
a cluster-level FWE correction for multiple comparison (p-value 0.05).  It should 
be noted that this was an exploratory analysis, as the current protocol would not 
grant sufficient spatial resolution to separate different brainstem nuclei. 
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RESULTS 
Behavioral performance 
As predicted, a repeated-measures ANOVA on the reaction times (RTs) 
revealed a significant interaction between condition (reward, effort, delay) and 
cue-type (low, high; F(2, 42) = 47.2, p<.001). 
Pairwise comparisons across participants revealed a significant difference 
in the high effort compared to the low effort condition (t(21)=6.874, p < 0.001, 
Figure 3). In particular, subjects were significantly faster in performing easy than 
difficult calculations (difference of 760 ms). This confirms the effectiveness of 
the effort manipulation. As expected, for the delay and reward condition, no 
significant difference was found between the two cues (long vs. short delay, p = 
0.88; big vs. small reward p = 0.33). 
 
Figure 3: Average reaction times (RTs) in every condition (small reward, big reward, low 
effort, high effort, short delay, long delay).  RT in the high effort condition is significantly 
higher than in the low effort condition (p<0.001). 
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Overall accuracy was very high (average 98%).  In the effort block, 
average accuracy was also calculated for low effort (98%) vs. high effort trials 
(96%). This small difference was however significant (t(21)=2.13, p=.045), 
confirming that the high effort trial were more difficult to perform than the low 
effort trials. Despite being very small, this difference might carry the potential 
confound of uncertainty estimation, as the chance of successful completion of a 
high-effort trial was slightly smaller for some participants. Although it seems 
unlikely that this difference in accuracy might have confounded the anticipation 
of effort, the dissociation between effort anticipation and uncertainty estimation 
should definitely be investigated in future research. 
Ratings 
Pairwise comparisons on the ratings about the pleasantness of the cues 
were performed to ensure that effort and delay costs were actually perceived as 
unpleasant. Indeed at the end of the experiment the participants rated the big 
reward cue as significantly more pleasant than the small reward cue (t(21) = 9.14, 
p<.001), the low effort cue as more pleasant than the high effort cue (t(21) = 6.87, 
p<.001) and the short delay cue as more pleasant than the long delay cue (t(21) = 
5.53, p<.001, see Figure 4). 
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 Figure 4: Average rating of pleasantness for every cue-type (small reward cue, big 
reward cue, low effort cue, high effort cue, short delay cue, long delay cue).	  	  	   
 
Furthermore, the pleasantness ratings for the big reward cue correlated 
with the reward responsiveness scale of the Bis/Bas (r = .49, p < .01), indicating 
that more reward-responsive participants also liked the big reward cue more.  
Participants were asked to provide ratings during every break, quantifying 
how much attention they had paid to the cues during the previous block, on a 
scale from 1 to 10. The goal of these ratings was to keep participants focused on 
the cues.  A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on the scores with cue type as a 
factor (reward, effort, delay) revealed a significant difference (F(2,42)=19.7, 
p<.001). Pair-wise comparisons showed that participants paid more attention to 
the reward cues (M=6.73, SD=2.08) as compared to the delay cues (M=4.59, 
SD=2.53, t(21)=4.36, p<.001) and to the effort cues (M= 7.59, SD= 1.83) as 
compared to the delay cues (t(21)=6.05, p<.001). The difference between reward 
and effort cues was not significant ((t(21)=-1.76, p=.09). These ratings suggest that 
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while reward and effort cues were correctly attended to, overall participants paid 
less attention to the delay cues.  
 
fMRI results 
First, the single contrasts during the cue period were computed (see Table 
1 for a summary). The Reward contrast (big reward > small reward, Figure 5a) 
showed significant activation in the left caudate nucleus, right anterior cingulate 
(ACC) and right posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Then, anticipation of effort 
was addressed (high effort > low effort, Figure 5b). This contrast resulted in 
widespread activation, originating a cluster of 27430 voxels. Such an extended 
cluster-size might hamper the validity of the cluster-level inference (Woo, 
Krishnan, & Wager, 2014), especially concerning regional specificity. For this 
reason a more stringent voxel-level threshold was applied (uncorrected p=0.0001 
instead of the standard 0.001). This resulted in breaking down the massive cluster 
in multiple clusters, thus ensuring a better localization of the significant 
activations.  
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Table 1: Summary of the activation results 
 Local Maxima Cluster Peak 
cluster-
level 
Area 
MNI 
Coordinates size T 
p(FWE 
-cor) 
Big Reward >Small Reward     
Posterior Cingulate Cortex   18  -40  34 3574   5.54 0.000 
Thalamus 0 -18 18  4.31  
Inferior Parietal Cortex -38 -28  30 598   4.33 0.001 
Left Striatum -10  14   2 290   3.78 0.026 
Precuneus 6 -52 62  4.54  
Superior Frontal Gyrus  24  42  16 786   4.19 0.000 
Right Striatum  22  28   2    4.12  
Anterior Cingulate Cortex  20  20  34    4.04  
High Effort > Low Effort(*)      
Left Striatum  -8   6   2  6574   6.43 0.000 
Brainstem   -2 -28 -20     5.94  
Right Striatum   10  10  -2     5.86  
Right primary motor cortex  40  -2  40     5.77  
Anterior Cingulate Cortex   8  12  46     5.35  
Superior Frontal Gyrus  20   8  62     5.29  
Right Precuneus  18 -68  38  1631   5.81 0.000 
Inferior Parietal lobule  32 -50  46     5.09  
Left Precuneus  -8 -72  38  543   5.57 0.000 
Premotor cortex -24   6  60  478   5.28 0.000 
Left primary motor cortex -38   6  36  358   5.19 0.000 
Short Delay > Long Delay     
Orbitofrontal Cortex -22  44  -8 243   4.75 0.047 
Effort-selective contrast (SVC)    
Brainstem  -4 -32 -10 129   4.00 0.010 
     
(*) cluster-forming threshold p=0.0001 uncorrected   
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Figure 5: fMRI Results a. Reward contrast (big reward > small reward). b. Effort contrast 
(high effort > low effort). c. Conjunction of high effort > low effort & big reward > small 
reward.  
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Anticipation of effort significantly activated striatum bilaterally, left 
brainstem, right ACC, supplementary motor area (SMA), primary motor cortex 
bilaterally, left premotor cortex, left Insula, right superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and 
precuneus bilaterally. The Delay contrast (long delay > short delay) did not show 
any significant activation cluster surviving the whole brain FWE threshold 
correction.  
In the reversed Effort contrast (low effort > high effort) no clusters 
survived the whole brain threshold. Concerning the reversed Delay contrast (short 
delay > long delay) the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) proved to be sensitive to 
shorter delay (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Short delay > long delay contrast 
 
Second, the strict conjunction between effort- and reward-related activation 
((high effort > low effort) & (big reward > small reward); incentive conjunction) 
revealed activation in the striatum bilaterally, the precuneus bilaterally and the 
right ACC (Figure 5c, see Table 2 for a detailed list). 
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Table 2: List of the regions resulting from the effort and reward conjunction 
 
As a third step, the effort-selective contrast ((high effort >low effort) – (big 
reward > small reward) showed a selective involvement of the brainstem in effort 
anticipation (Figure 6a, T(21)= 4,00, p=0.01, SVC). No clusters at the cortical level 
survived. For exploratory purposes, the brainstem activated cluster was 
superimposed on a high-resolution proton-density averaged template normalized 
to the MNI space, as this sequence allows identifying the Substantia Nigra (SN, 
Oikawa, Sasaki, Tamakawa, Ehara, & Tohyama, 2002) thereby providing a 
reference for better anatomical characterization of the brainstem (Figure 7a). At 
visual inspection, the location of the activation cluster is not consistent with the 
main dopaminergic nuclei. According to the Duvernoy’s atlas (Naidic et al., 
2009), the location of this cluster might be compatible with other non-
dopaminergic brainstem nuclei, including the serotonergic Dorsal Raphe Nucleus 
(DRN), or the noradrenergic Locus Coeruleus (LC). The parameter estimates for 
every condition for the peak voxel of this cluster are plotted in figure 7b. Paired 
comparisons performed on these scores revealed a significantly higher response 
for high effort as opposed to low Effort (T(21)=-3.73, p=.001) and for long delay 
as opposed to short delay (T(21)= 2.891, p=.009). No differential response was 
detected for high reward as opposed to low reward (T(21)=-1.033, p=.313). Given 
Conjunction   
High Effort >Low Effort  & Big Reward > Small Reward 
 Local Maxima Cluster 
Area MNI Coordinates size 
 x y z  
Left Precuneus -8 -72 38 260 
Right Striatum 10 10 -2 171 
Right Precuneus 8 -54 48 133 
Left Striatum -14 10 -4 97 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 12 14 40 49 
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its potential theoretical relevance, this exploratory result is further discussed 
below, yet one should note the exploratory nature of this result. It should also be 
noted that the resolution of the current fMRI protocol was not optimal to 
distinguish between different small structures in the brainstem. 
 
 
Figure 7: a. Effort-selective activation ((high effort > low effort) > (high reward> low 
reward)), SVC for the region of the brainstem, p value 0.05 FWE correction for multiple 
comparisons, plotted on Proton Density Weighted MRI Template (left image). b. 
Parameter estimates plot at voxel -4, -32, -10 (MNI coordinates), local maximum in the 
activation cluster located in the Brainstem in the effort-selective contrast.  
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DISCUSSION 
The present study investigated the anticipation of high-level cognitive 
effort required to obtain a reward, while controlling for temporal confounds. 
Crucially, both prospective effort and reward anticipation activated the same 
network, involving the ACC and the striatum. This confirms the contribution of 
these areas to incentive-motivation and supports the essential role of this network 
in sustaining task-preparation for cognitive effort. The current results do not find 
support for a value-related encoding, according to which low effort should have 
elicited a stronger response. Moreover, exploratory analyses suggest a selective 
contribution of the brainstem to cognitive effort anticipation.  
Reward-related activation (Figure 5a) was identified in the ACC and 
striatum, principal targets of dopaminergic midbrain projections (Haber & 
Knutson, 2010) and key components of reward circuitry (Amiez, Joseph, & 
Procyk, 2006; Kennerley et al., 2009; Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011; 
Silvetti et al., 2013). Also, the right PCC was activated in this condition, which is 
known to be selectively activated by monetary gain anticipation compared to 
primary reinforcers (Levy & Glimcher, 2011).   
The anticipation of a higher cognitive effort (Figure 5b) activated the 
bilateral striatum, right ACC and left brainstem, among other regions. Preparing 
to perform difficult calculations seems to rely on the same system that subserves 
other demanding cognitive functions, such as conflict monitoring (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Sohn et al., 2007) working memory 
encoding (Engström, Landtblom, & Karlsson, 2013), and top-down attentional 
facilitation (Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012). This converging evidence 
confirms the role of the ACC not only in experiencing effort (Naccache et al., 
2005), but also for effort anticipation during task preparation (Hernandez 
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Lallement et al., 2013; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Schmidt et al., 2012). The 
information of an upcoming demanding task seems to act as a motivational factor 
needed for successful task completion. This would be in line with theoretical 
accounts of task preparation and task-set maintenance (Aarts et al., 2008; Luks, 
Simpson, Feiwell, & Miller, 2002; Sterling, 2012). This preparation effect might 
be mediated via dopaminergic transmission, which would be consistent with the 
hypothesized role of dopamine in invigorating behavior (Krebs et al., 2012; Niv, 
Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007) in effortful tasks. In the context of a task where effort 
is required to obtain a reward, dopaminergic release may enhance motivation for 
performing effortful actions, in order to overcome response cost and reap the 
expected benefit (Kurniawan et al., 2011). A potential mechanism is that 
motivational stimuli, such as the prospect of reward, boost the neuronal signal-to-
noise ratio towards optimal performance (Pessiglione et al., 2007). A similar 
underlying mechanism might be called upon in the case of a prospective difficult 
task.  
This interpretation finds support in animal experiments, where 
dopaminergic depletion induces effort avoidance (Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & 
Mingote, 2007; Salamone & Correa, 2012). A convergent computational 
framework has also been suggested by Niv et al. (2007), where dopaminergic 
neurotransmission would be crucial in mediating response vigor.  
Dopaminergic mediation of behavioral invigoration has also been 
confirmed in a pharmacological study in humans (Beierholm et al., 2013). fMRI 
experiments in humans demonstrated the involvement of the ACC and the 
striatum in the anticipation of physical effort (Kurniawan et al., 2013) or 
perceptual load (Krebs et al., 2012). The current results show that this mechanism 
supports high-level cognitive effort as well, in line with what was proposed by 
Sohn et al. (2007).  
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Accordingly, ACC activity has been proven to be influenced by fatigue 
deriving from sustained effort in cognitive tasks (Lorist, Boksem, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005). Moeller et al. (2012) showed that prolonged performance 
under taxing cognitive requirements is associated with decreased ACC activation 
and as a consequence, reduced error-related responses. This supports a key role of 
this region in successfully enacting cognitive effortful behavior. Interestingly, the 
authors also showed how this pattern is altered in cocaine-abusers, known to have 
abnormal dopamine levels, and how this effect can be reversed by administering a 
dopaminergic-agonist medication. These results together converge on the 
underlying dopaminergic mediation of cognitive demanding task requirements.  
Interestingly, cognitive effort anticipation recruits a cortico-subcortical 
network that partially overlaps with reward-related regions, as shown in the 
conjunction analysis (Figure 5c). This confirms the hypothesized motivational 
effect which might reflect higher engagement induced by both the prospect of a 
greater benefit and the expectation of a difficult task. In this perspective, both 
high effort and high reward cues induce a stronger preparation effect, translated 
into increased neural recruitment of areas coding for incentive. For the first time, 
this result is shown in a high-level cognitive task, suggesting that ACC and 
striatum contribute to an incentive-induced resource allocation. Further 
converging indications are supplied by a recent study  with Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET), that showed a correlation between dopamine release in the 
striatum and subjective willingness to exert effort in exchange of a reward 
(Treadway et al., 2012). The fronto-striatal network seems therefore to be crucial 
in supporting reward-driven effort exertion. The putative dopaminergic nature of 
this mediation is also in line with previous evidence showing the crucial influence 
of dopamine on high-level cognitive processes (Cools, 2011). Moreover, these 
findings are compatible with a recently proposed view of ACC function 
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(Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). Here, the authors formalize the 
contribution of this region as estimator not only of the amount of control to be 
exerted (effort in our case), but also of the value of exerting control, in so far as it 
leads to a rewarding outcome. 
In the same contrast, the precuneus was also activated bilaterally. The 
contribution of this region to the anticipation of both effort and reward offers 
interesting ground for further investigation.  
Subsequently, an exploratory analysis was performed investigating 
selective response to cognitive effort anticipation but not to reward prospect. 
Given previous evidence reporting a contribution of the brainstem and theories 
suggesting a role for brainstem neuromodulatory systems (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005; Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012; Malecek & Poldrack, 2013; 
Nakagawa et al., 2013; Raizada & Poldrack, 2007), an SVC was applied for the 
volume of the brainstem to test for its involvement.  The contrast testing selective 
response to effort ((high effort > low effort) > (big reward > small reward) 
isolated an effort-selective signal in the brainstem (Figure 7a). Definitive 
anatomical inference on this region cannot be performed on the current data, 
given the resolution constraints. It is however possible to speculate on the nature 
of this activation. The cluster location is not consistent with locations usually 
reported for midbrain dopaminergic nuclei in fMRI studies (Boehler et al., 2011; 
D’Ardenne, McClure, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Krebs et al., 2012). The current 
location might be compatible with other brainstem structures, like the 
serotonergic Dorsal Raphe Nucleus (DRN) or the noradrenergic Locus Coeruleus 
(LC; Figure 7a). These hypotheses might deserve further investigation, given that 
previous evidence suggests a potential contribution of these nuclei in aversive 
processing and arousal. On the one hand, a wealth of studies demonstrated 
striking effects of manipulating serotonin levels on processing aversive events 
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(Cools, Roberts, & Robbins, 2008; Cools, Robinson, & Sahakian, 2008; Cools et 
al., 2005; Harmer, Mackay, Reid, Cowen, & Goodwin, 2006; Robinson, Cools, & 
Sahakian, 2012; van der Veen, Evers, Deutz, & Schmitt, 2007). In this 
perspective, expecting an upcoming effort might be considered aversive (as 
confirmed in our task by the ratings) and therefore rely on serotonergic midbrain 
input to blunt aversiveness or related behavioral reactions, and perhaps boost 
prefrontal activity needed for accurate task performance  (Amat et al., 2005; 
Bromberg-Martin, Hikosaka, & Nakamura, 2010; Sterling, 2012). On a 
convergent note, theoretical and computational frameworks of cost and benefit 
encoding have assigned a putative function to serotonergic modulation (Boureau 
& Dayan, 2011; Cools, Nakamura, & Daw, 2011). On the other hand, anticipating 
higher effort might induce an arousal response and therefore elicit noradrenaline 
release (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 
2004), thus suggesting that the present functional result would reflect putative 
LC-noradrenergic activity. Convergent evidence for a putative LC contribution 
during demanding tasks was also provided by Raizada and Poldrack (2008). At 
the current stage, both hypotheses are rather speculative. This result might 
however be informative and fruitful ground for further investigation. 
As for the additional experimental condition, the delay manipulation, the 
expectation of a short delay (short delay > long delay, Figure 6) revealed a value-
related signal in the orbitofrontal cortex, consistent with evidence from delay 
discounting studies (McClure et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004). No significant 
activation was elicited by the prospect of a longer delay. The exploratory analysis 
on the brainstem activation however, shows a stronger response in that region not 
only for greater efforts, but also for longer delays (Figure 7b). With the caveat of 
the localization limitation, it is worth nothing that  a critical involvement of the 
DRN in delay discounting has been recently shown in rats, where serotonergic 
OVERLAPPING NEURAL SYSTEMS REPRESENT COGNITIVE EFFORT  
AND REWARD ANTICIPATION     123 
activity seems to facilitate waiting for a benefit (Miyazaki, Miyazaki, & Doya, 
2011), and to be necessary to tolerate longer delays (7-11 seconds) (Miyazaki, 
Miyazaki, & Doya, 2012). Additional evidence is accumulating supporting the 
hypothesis of serotonin involvement in promoting a more foresighted reward 
evaluation in both animals and humans (Luo, Ainslie, Giragosian, & Monterosso, 
2009; Schweighofer et al., 2008; Schweighofer, Tanaka, & Doya, 2007; Tanaka 
et al., 2004). Considering the methodological limitations of the current 
experiment, this might be fruitful venue for future research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides the first evidence for a shared motivational effect 
induced at the neural level by both reward prospect and the anticipation of 
cognitive effort in complex cognitive tasks. This is associated with activation in 
the ACC and the striatum, supporting behavioral engagement and resource-
recruiting towards a final goal. Moreover, an exploratory analysis identified an 
effort-selective signal in the human brainstem, which suggests potential 
contribution of non-dopaminergic brainstem nuclei to effort anticipation. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
CHOOSING TO MAKE AN EFFORT AND PREPARING TO 
OVERCOME IT: THE ROLE OF THE ANTERIOR 
CINGULATE CORTEX 1 
Benefits typically come with an effort cost. Anticipating potential rewards 
and effort requirements are essential skills in driving adaptive behavior. 
However, the underlying neural mechanisms are still debated. A net-value 
account has been proposed, according to which the value of the reward is 
discounted by the required effort. This computation would be implemented 
by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). However, this theory has been 
recently challenged by incompatible results, showing motivational encoding 
of effort in the ACC instead, where activity in this region is essential in 
prompting and sustaining effortful behavior towards a goal. The purpose of 
the current study was to directly test the divergent predictions arising from 
these accounts, incorporating a crucial factor: decision-making. Previous 
studies did not differentiate between effort-related decision-making and 
anticipation of effort when no choice was required. Given the  contribution 
of ACC to decision-making, controlling for this factor is crucial to 
disentangle effort encoding in the ACC. To this end, a cognitive effort fMRI 
paradigm was implemented, consisting of two phases: a decision-making 
phase and a performance phase. This allowed to systematically investigate 
effort encoding during decision and anticipation in the same subjects. The 
results support the motivational account, showing increased ACC activity as 
a function of required effort, across both phases. A targeted ROI analysis 
revealed a modulation of phase, showing an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between effort encoding during decision and ACC activity in the low reward 
condition. This suggests a role of ACC in prompting engagement in effortful 
behavior only when this is considered worthwhile.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When faced with an effortful and potentially rewarding task, animals 
try to maximize utility (Walton et al., 2006; Schweimer and Hauber, 2010), 
taking both benefits and associated costs into account. For example, rats 
choose to climb a barrier only when this leads to more food pellets than for 
an easier available option (Salamone et al., 2007; Salamone and Correa, 
2012). Maximizing utility drives human behavior as well (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). People find effort per se aversive (Kool et al., 2010), 
showing a tendency to avoid it, in favor of easier options. However, when a 
potential gain is available, the willingness to exert effort increases as a 
function of it (Prévost et al., 2010; Westbrook et al., 2013). When the gain is 
considered worth the effort, a preparation process is prompted which 
mobilizes the resources needed for successful task completion (Mulert et al., 
2005; Kouneiher et al., 2009). 
A number of studies investigated cost-benefit computations and 
resource mobilization. A pivotal role for cost/benefit computation is 
assigned to cortico-subcortical interactions mediated via dopaminergic (DA) 
transmission (Phillips et al., 2007). A main cortical station is the Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC). In vivo electrophysiology in primates showed how 
ACC neurons encode different features of relevant stimuli, including reward 
prediction error (i.e. unexpected receipt of omission of a reward, Amiez et 
al., 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2007) action values (i.e. potential reward 
associate with a particular action, Rudebeck et al., 2008), probability, and 
required effort, Kennerley et al., 2011). All these features can be integrated 
in a net-value signal, which encodes the benefit (i.e. reward) discounted by 
the costs implied in obtaining it. 
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In humans, net-value signals have been identified in the ACC and in the 
striatum at difference stages of effort-demanding behavior. Croxson et al. 
(2009) showed in cancellation task a stronger ACC and striatum activation  
when subjects viewed a cue anticipating a high reward requiring low effort 
(i.e. smaller number of dashes to be clicked on to complete the task). 
However, in this task the more effortful condition was associated with longer 
execution time, thus implicating a potential delay confound in the value 
computation process. Botvinick et al. (2009) reported an increased response 
in the ventral striatum at reward delivery for a high reward, obtained with 
low effort (i.e. higher overall net-value). Prevost et al. (2010) showed that 
activation in the ACC and ventral striatum was also associated to subjective 
value attributed to cues anticipating physical effort, to be exerted to get to 
see erotic pictures. In this last study however, striatal activity encoded 
subjective value of the cue (with higher activity for higher net-value), while 
ACC activity was associated with the anticipation of higher effort 
requirements (lower net-value). 
The result from Prevost et al. already sheds doubt on the generality of 
the net-value coding in ACC. In fact, a series of studies in animals and 
humans challenged the theory that ACC is solely dedicated to net-value 
computation. Instead, they favor a motivational account, according to which 
ACC activity sustains anticipation and exertion of effort. For example,  in 
rodents, inactivation of the ACC induces effort avoidance (Walton et al., 
2009), even when general appetitive behavior is preserved. Vascular or 
neoplastic lesions in humans can lead to clinical conditions, such as akinetic 
mutism (Devinsky et al., 1995) and other disorders, where initiation of 
motivated behavior is impaired (Wacker et al., 2009; Njomboro et al., 2012; 
Rive et al., 2013). 
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In terms of functional activation, the motivational account predicts 
increased ACC activation for the anticipation of higher effort, in sharp 
contrast with the net-value account, which instead predicts lower ACC 
activation for higher effort. Recent fMRI studies found preliminary support 
for the motivational account, showing increased ACC activity when 
anticipating higher physical and cognitive effort (Krebs et al., 2012; Schmidt 
et al., 2012; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Vassena et al., 2014). In some instances, 
the same motivational effect was also induced when the prospect of a higher 
reward was anticipated (Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014). According 
to this line of results, ACC implement the initiation and energizing of goal-
directed actions.  
Recent computational accounts of ACC function are formulated in the 
framework of the net-value perspective. In these frameworks, the ACC is 
implemented as a critic (in the context of an actor-critic architecture, Sutton 
and Barto, 1998), that is a unit keeping track of the value associated with 
certain stimuli in the environment, formulating predictions and updating 
these predictions on the basis of outcomes (Alexander and Brown, 2011; 
Silvetti et al., 2011). A different line of recent theories of ACC function 
seems to be compatible with a motivational account instead. Holroyd and 
Yeung (2012) hypothesize the ACC to be the locus of maintenance of 
behavioral policies (i.e. sequences of actions towards a goal), in the 
framework of hierarchical reinforcement learning theories (Botvinick et al., 
2009b). Weston (2012) suggests this region to be crucial in anticipating 
contingent “requirements” (i.e. mobilizing resources in response to needs). 
Sterling (2012) proposes a role for ACC in predictively preparing for 
environmental challenges in order to maintain homeostasis. 
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To sum up, from both empirical and theoretical lines, two dominating 
views emerge in interpreting ACC contribution to decision making and 
motivated behavior, one favoring a net-value perspective, and the other 
favoring a motivational account. The primary goal of the current study was 
to address the divergent predictions arising from these accounts. As reported 
above,  a net-value perspective predicts decreased ACC activity for higher 
effort (i.e. higher costs entails lower net-value), while a motivational account 
predicts increased ACC involvement for higher effort. However, one major 
issue characterizing previous studies was that decision-making phase was 
not explicitly manipulated. Some of the aforementioned paradigms involved 
making a series of choices between options offering different combinations 
of reward and effort demands. Others examined cue-locked activation 
instead, where only one option was available. These different conditions 
might dramatically affect net-value computation and motivation-related 
processes, and might (at least partially) account for the contradictory results. 
Indeed, net-value computation might be primarily called upon when a choice 
is possible, while upcoming but inevitable effort might prompt motivation-
related processes. Moreover, outside the effort domain, ACC activity is 
commonly associated with making a choice between different available 
options (Brass and Haggard, 2007). Testing for the modulation of decision 
making on effort encoding seems therefore mandatory, to better specify both 
effort encoding and decision-making processes. 
To address these issues, a two-phase task was implemented, 
systematically investigating effort-related decision making and anticipation 
of effortful performance. The goal was to measure ACC response using 
fMRI, in the same task in the same subjects and using the same visual 
stimuli for both phases (decision making and anticipation). We examined the 
138     CHAPTER 4 
type of encoding (net-value vs. motivational) and tested if this was 
modulated by phase (decision-making vs. anticipation). Moreover, this 
allowed to test for a  shared neural encoding across phases. Additionally, the 
experiment was designed to overcome the categorical dichotomy easy vs. 
hard, by investigating parametric effort encoding. This allowed to test for a 
possible modulation of phase on encoding type, and for the linear nature of 
this modulation.  
MATERIALS & METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-three healthy volunteers participated in this experiment (10 
males), with a mean age of 21 (range 19-25). The experimental protocol was 
approved by the Ethical Committee of the Ghent University Hospital. All 
participants signed an informed-consent form before the experiment. They 
filled in a safety checklist as well, to exclude contraindications, as well as  
neurological or psychiatric conditions. 
Experimental procedure 
An fMRI experimental design was implemented, consisting of a 
decision-making phase and a performance phase of the same task. In the 
decision-making phase, participants received a number of cues, that they 
could accept or reject. In the performance phase, participants had to perform 
the actual task. Before the scanning session, the participants were trained to 
familiarize them with the stimuli and the experimental procedure (Figure 1). 
The training also consisted of two parts. The first part entailed exposure to 
the decision-making phase to learn the meaning of the cues. The second part 
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was a short version of the performance phase, to have the participants 
experience all the possible effort levels of the task. The effort manipulation 
was induced by means of arithmetic operation (see below for details). Only 
in this performance-training phase, after every trial participants had to rate 
how difficult and how pleasant they found each trial upon completion. 
 
Figure 1:  Experimental procedure. Participants undergo a training phase, 
familiarizing with both decision-making phase and anticipation of performance 
phase. During the training, they are also ask to rate every trial concerning 
experienced difficulty and pleasantness. Subsequently, in the scanner they perform 
the decision-making phase, followed by the anticipation of performance phase 
In both phases, each trial started with a cue (a grey circle, displaying a 
grid of 4 by 2 lines, on which two lines were black). Every cue indicated a 
combination of a certain degree of effort (horizontal lines, 4 possible 
difficulty levels) and a certain amount of reward (vertical lines, low reward 
of 20 cents or high reward of 40 cents). This resulted in 8 possible cues (4 by 
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2, see Figure 1b). One more cue was included, the reference cue (same 
circle, without black lines). The reference cue would grant the lowest reward 
possible (5 cents) at the lowest effort possible (lower than the other 4 levels).  
 
Figure 2: Cues. Each cue represents a combination of effort and reward. Horizontal 
black lines indicate effort level (from 1 to 4). Vertical black lines indicate reward 
(low/high). The cue with no black line is the reference cue (lowest effort/lowest 
reward).  
This reference cue was introduced in both phases to make sure that its 
appearance in the performance phase would not be unexpected in any 
possible choice-strategy scenario (i.e. if the participants always accepted the 
more difficult option). Participants were alerted that the reference cue would 
sometimes be presented in the decision-making  phase, and that in this case 
their choice (accept vs. reject) would not be relevant, as they would receive 
the reference cue anyway. In both decision-making  and performance phases, 
the cue was preceded by a randomly jittered interval ranging from 2000 to 
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4000 ms (mean 3000 ms) and followed by a variable interval ranging from 
600 to 9000 ms, jittered in a pseudo-exponential fashion (mean 4000 ms). 
The decision-making phase contained 126 trials, each consisting of a 
series of choices (Figure 3). At the beginning of each trial one of the cues 
was presented, and the participant had to accept or reject this particular cue 
(i.e. this combination of prospective effort and potential reward). 
Importantly, first the cue was presented, and only after the jittered interval a 
response display would appear, showing the two options “accept” and 
“reject”. The position of the options was randomized across trials and the 
participants had to produce a left or right response, depending on the 
location of the desired answer. The goal of this procedure was to disentangle 
the decision-phase from response preparation processes.  
 
Figure 3: Decision-making phase. Participants are presented with all the cues. Per 
every cue, they have to decide to accept or reject. If they accept, they are told they 
will receive a trial corresponding to that cue in the performance phase. 
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Rejecting the current cue would mean automatically receiving the trial 
type associated with the reference cue (lowest effort and lowest reward 
possible). Participants were told that their chosen cues would determine the 
actual trials (i.e. combined reward and difficulty level) to be performed in 
the performance phase. To avoid disengagement in both tasks, they were 
also told that errors during the performance phase would cause a loss, 
corresponding to the amount of money at stake in the current trial. At the end 
of the decision-making  phase, the experimenter communicated that only a 
percentage of the trials in the performance phase would correspond to the 
actual choices from the decision-making  phase. The remaining trials would 
be randomly selected by the computer for experimental reasons (i.e. in order 
to make data from different participants comparable). The goal of this 
procedure was to administer the same performance task to all participants. 
None of the participants expressed complaints about this communication.  
In the performance phase, the same number of trials (126 trials) and 
the exact same cues (but in different random order) as the decision-making  
phase were presented (Figure 4). This aimed at making the decision-cue 
(decision-making phase) and the performance-cue (performance phase) as 
comparable as possible. In this phase, each trial started with the cue, 
indicating the upcoming effort level and the reward to be obtained in case of 
correct answer. The cue was followed by a series of 4 calculations, formed 
by single-digit numbers flashing on the screen. Each effort level 
corresponded to an operation implying decade crossing (e.g., 7+8=15). 
Decade crossing requires carrying or borrowing, which is more difficult than 
not crossing (e.g. 7+2=9; Imbo et al., 2005). The calculations were followed 
by a response display, showing two possible results among which the 
participant needed to select the correct response within 500 ms. 
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Subsequently, the feedback would be displayed (the obtained reward, or the 
loss in case of error).  
 
Figure 4: Anticipation of performance phase. Each cue is presented, now followed 
by a calculation of the correspondent effort level. Participants are suppose to 
calculate the result on line, and pick the correct response. After the response, they 
receive feedback.  
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At effort level n, there were n decade crossings (e.g., 2 at effort level 
2). This procedure resulted in a parametric manipulation of effort (four 
levels, from 1 easy, to 4 hard), which allowed testing for this type of neural 
encoding. Importantly, the implementation of the calculation task was 
preceded by a behavioral piloting phase, to tune the overall difficulty 
guaranteeing an overall accuracy above 90%. In this way, we ascertained 
querying effort anticipation rather than risk estimation. 
Behavioral data analysis 
The performance-training phase included 15 trials (3 trials per 
difficulty level (3*4=12) plus 3 reference trials). After completing each trial, 
the participant had to rate the trial on experienced difficulty and experienced 
pleasantness, both on a scale from 1 to 7. These ratings were analyzed as a 
manipulation check. The goal was to ensure that trials entailing higher effort 
would be perceived as more effortful and less pleasant (Kool et al., 2010). A 
linear regression model was fitted to the difficulty ratings of each participant 
separately, with effort level (1-4) as a predictor of perceived difficulty. 
Subsequently a one-sample t-test was performed on the regression 
coefficients, to test the effect at the group level. The same analysis was 
performed on the pleasantness rating dependent variable. 
During the decision-making  phase participants could choose which 
options to accept or reject. Hence, it was possible to analyze choice behavior 
as a function of the effort level and the potential reward offered by the cue. 
A multiple logistic regression model was fitted per every participant, with 
effort and reward as predictors of choice (acceptance of the cue). A one-
sample t-test was then performed across the group coefficients. To analyze 
choice reaction times (RTs), a multiple linear regression was performed for 
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each participant separately, with effort and reward as predictors. A one-
sample t-test was then performed across the group coefficients. Average 
acceptance rate and choice entropy were computed for every condition. A 
repeated-measure analysis of variance (rANOVA) was performed on the 
average percentages of acceptance, with effort and reward as factors. Choice 
entropy was also calculated for every condition, as a measure of uncertainty 
in the choice behavior (Shannon entropy, calculated as  – p log2 (p) – (1-p) 
log2(1-p), where p is the probability of accepting a particular cue, Shannon, 
1948). A rANOVA was performed on the average entropy, with effort level 
and reward as factors. Moreover, choice entropy gives information about 
choice-style of the participants, thus allowing inter-individual differences 
analysis. This is especially relevant when testing effort encoding in the ACC, 
as this region as been associated to choice conflict (Botvinick et al., 2004). 
Excluding choice entropy encoding would be a stronger indication in favor 
of effort encoding.  
Finally, the behavioral data from the performance phase were 
analyzed. Accuracy and RTs were calculated in every condition. Both 
accuracy and RT data were then subjected to rANOVAs, with effort and 
reward as factors. 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Data was acquired using a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner 
(Siemens), using a 32-channel radio-frequency head coil. First, an 
anatomical T1 weighted MPRAGE sequence was collected, resulting in 176 
high-resolution slices (TR = 1550 ms, TE = 2.39, slice thickness = 0.9 mm, 
voxel size = 0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9 mm, FoV = 220 mm, flip angle = 9°).  
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Subsequently, functional images were acquired using a T2* weighted EPI 
sequence (33 slices per volume, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, no inter-slice 
gap, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3mm, FoV = 192 mm, flip angle = 80°). On average 
510 volumes were collected during the decision-making  phase, and 1180 
volumes during the performance phase. 
fMRI data analysis 
The first 4 volumes of the functional scans were discarded to allow for 
steady-state magnetization. The data were preprocessed with SPM 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images were realigned to the first image 
of the run. The structural T1 image was coregistered to the functional mean 
image to allow a more precise normalization. The unified segmentation and 
nonlinear warping approach of SPM8 was applied to normalize structural 
and functional images to the MNI template (Montreal Neurological 
Institute). Functional images were then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 
8 mm full width half maximum (FWHM).  
Subsequently the General Linear Model (GLM) approach was applied 
in order to identify each subject’s condition-specific activation. Two 
different first-level GLMs were set up per every participant, one modeling 
the decision-making  phase and one modeling the performance phase. In the 
decision-making  model, 18 event-related regressors of interest were 
introduced, 9 regressors to model the cues (8 cues for the different 
effort/reward combinations plus one reference cue) plus 9 regressors to 
model the response in each condition (when the participants pressed the key 
to accept or reject the cue). Six more regressors were introduced in the 
model to account for motion-related activity. In the performance model, 27 
event-related regressors of interest were introduced, 9 regressors to model 
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the cues (as in the decision-making  model, one per condition), 9 regressors 
to model task-related activation (from task onset to response display onset, 
separately modeled per every condition), and 9 regressors to model the 
feedback (also separately modeled per condition). Two additional regressors 
were added to account for the short break periods (covering the duration of 
the break) and for the trials where errors were made (covering the entire trial 
length), which were then excluded from the analysis. As in the decision-
making  phase, 6 motion-related regressors were also added. 
At the second level, we focused on cue-related activation.  As a first 
step, a random-effect analysis was performed on both phases separately, by 
implementing two 4 x 2 factorial designs, with effort (level from 1 to 4) and 
reward (low vs. high) as factors. Subsequently a parametric contrast for the 
effort factor was computed in both models, to identify areas encoding effort 
in a parametric fashion in both decision-making  and performance phase. To 
each contrast, a voxel-level threshold of p=.001 uncorrected was applied, 
and cluster-level family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple 
comparisons with a p-value of 0.05. On the resulting images, a conjunction 
analysis was performed (Nichols et al. 2005), to identify potentially shared 
neural substrate in effort encoding across decision-making  and performance 
phase. 
As a second step, the a priori hypothesis of ACC involvement was 
investigated in a targeted Region of Interest (ROI) analysis. The ACC ROI 
was defined on the basis of a previous study on effort processing (Botvinick 
et al., 2009a, figure 3a), guaranteeing unbiased selection. This resulted in a 
sphere with a 10 mm radius, centered on the MNI coordinates  x=2 y=21 
z=40 (see figure 2). Condition-specific activation (percent signal change) 
was extracted separately for decision-making and performance phase using 
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the MARSBAR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002) and submitted to a repeated-
measures analysis of variance. The goal of this analysis was to better specify 
the role of ACC in effort and reward encoding in both phases. 
Finally, a further manipulation check was performed by analyzing 
task-related activation during the performance phase (task-regressor from 
task onset to response). A random-effect analysis was performed by 
implementing a factorial design with effort level and reward as factors. The 
parametric contrast for effort was calculated, to investigated neural 
activation during the task as a function of effort. The negative parametric 
contrast for effort was also computed, to identify regions showing decreased 
activation for increased task effort. 
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
First, the ratings collected during the performance-training phase were 
analyzed. Despite the limited sampling of this phase (only 15 trials), it was 
still possible to test the subjective perception of the different effort levels, as 
a manipulation check. One participant had to be excluded from this analysis, 
as he/she picked always the same rating per every level. Participants reliably 
experienced higher effort trials as more difficult (regression coefficient of 
effort, t(21)= 7.17, p<.001) and less pleasant (t(21)= -4.18, p<.001). Hence, the 
effort manipulation was successful. 
Second, the choice data from the decision-making phase were 
analyzed. Participants accepted less often the more difficult cues (t(22)= -4.19, 
p<.001) and more often the high reward cues (t(22)= 4.69, p<.001). This 
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suggests that participants correctly focused on the cues in the decision-
making phase, as both manipulated factors influenced choice behavior. The 
overall acceptance rate for the proposed cue was 67.39 % ( ± 12.9, Figure 5).  
Both effort and reward levels showed a significant main effect on the 
average acceptance rate per condition (effort F(3,66)=71.06, p<.001, reward 
F(1,22)=37,73, p<.001, see Figure 5), as well as interaction (F=(3,66)=13.25, 
p=<.001). 
 
Figure 5: Average acceptance rate is reported per every effort level (x-axis) and 
reward (grey = low, black = high). 
Choice entropy was also calculated as a measure of uncertainty in 
choice behavior. This was computed per every cue and then averaged across 
participants (Figure 6). Choice entropy was significantly influenced by effort 
(F(3,66)=4.25, p=.008). Importantly, the interaction effort by reward was also 
significant (F(3,66)=4.18, p=.009). Therefore a rANOVA was run separately 
for low and high reward, showing a significant effect of effort on choice 
entropy only in the high reward condition  (F(3,66)=10.86, p<.001). No 
difference in choice entropy for low reward was reported (F(3,66)=.06, p=.98). 
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Figure 6: Average choice entropy is reported per every effort level (x-axis) and 
reward (grey = low, black = high).  
Finally, the behavioral data from the performance phase were 
analyzed. The overall accuracy was very high as planned (92,37 % ± 5,05). 
There was a main effect of effort on accuracy (F(3,66)=6.82, p=<.001) and no 
effect of reward (F(1,22)=.06, p=.81). This confirms that higher effort trials 
were consistently more difficult to perform. It is important to note however, 
that average accuracy was still high in every effort level, suggesting that the 
relevant factor is effort rather than risk. RTs showed a significant, albeit 
small, effect of effort (F(3,66)=14.31, p=<.001), mean difference between 
effort level 1 and 4 of 53 ms). This further confirms the successful effort 
manipulation. The maximum response time was 500 ms, above which the 
trial would be considered as an error. This short time window to respond 
might account for the small size of the effect on RTs and the more prominent 
effect on accuracy. Reward had no effect on RTs (F(1,22)=1.00, p=.33). These 
results, taken together with the ratings collected during the training, confirm 
the efficacy of the effort manipulation.   
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Whole-brain cue-related fMRI results 
A comprehensive summary of the activation results is reported in 
Table 1. At the cue in the decision-making phase, the parametric contrast for 
effort activated the ACC and the Precuneus (see figure 7a). In other words, 
these areas were increasingly activated for cues indicating more effortful 
options, thus showing a motivational encoding. No significant clusters were 
reported in the reversed parametric contrast (which would highlight areas 
increasingly activated for lower effort), thus providing no evidence in favor 
of a net-value encoding. The reward contrast (high reward > low reward) 
activated the extrastriate cortex (see figure 7d ).  
At the cue in the performance phase, the parametric contrast for effort 
activated the ACC, the striatum bilaterally, the right Superior Frontal Gyrus 
(SFG), the Supplementary Motor Area (SMA), the precentral gyrus, the 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex (PCC), the orbital part of the Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus (IFG), the extrastriate cortex, the right Angular Gyrus (AG) and the 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL, see figure 7b). The reward contrast (high 
reward > low reward) activated the cuneus, the extrastriate cortex, the 
precentral gyrus and the Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL, figure 7e). The 
reverse parametric (increased activation for lower effort) contrast for effort 
did not elicit any significant activation.  
A conjunction analysis was performed on the parametric effort 
contrasts from the decision-making cue and the performance cue. This 
yielded overlapping activation in the ACC and in the Precuneus (see figure  
7c, Table 2). 
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Figure 7: Whole-brain activation results. a. Cue-locked parametric effort contrast 
during the decision-making phase (light blue clusters). b. Cue-locked parametric 
effort contrast during the anticipation of performance phase (blue clusters). c. 
Conjunction analysis showing the overlap between the effort parametric contrasts 
during decision making (light blue) and anticipation of performance (blue). d. 
Reward contrast (high reward > low reward) during the decision-making phase 
(yellow clusters). e. Reward contrast (high reward > low reward) during the 
anticipation of performance phase (yellow clusters).   
 
Table 1: Summary of the activation results 
 
MNI 
Coordinates 
cluster-
level 
cluster-
level cluster peak 
Area x y z  FWE FDR size T 
      
Decision-Making Phase      
      
Parametric contrast for effort     
Precuneus   6 -66 36  0.044 0.017 205 4.12 
  18 -60 34     3.44 
ACC  10  30 34  0.019 0.017 260 4.07 
   2  20 42     3.68 
      
Reward contrast (high reward>low 
reward)     
Occipital cortex 18 -94  16  0.000 0.000 537 5.52 
 26 -94  20     5.19 
 20 -78  -4     4.03 
      
Anticipation of Performance Phase     
      
Parametric contrast for effort     
Occipital cortex  16  -94  16  0.000 0.000 4058 6.63 
  -8  -98   6     6.04 
  -6  -76   4     4.82 
Right superior frontal 
gyrus  22   52  16  0.000 0.000 1371 5.31 
ACC  12   28  32     3.90 
Inferior frontal gyrus -24   18 -14  0.000 0.000 913 5.15 
 -30    8  24     4.30 
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Putamen -18   10  -4     4.03 
Mid-cingulate cortex  -2  -18  34  0.001 0.002 531 5.12 
  -6  -38  26     4.10 
   8  -36  28     3.76 
Caudate  16   18  -6  0.001 0.002 532 4.46 
Putamen  24   -4   8     3.82 
  16    4  10     3.78 
Postcentral gyrus -38  -30  32  0.003 0.004 448 4.43 
 -36  -18  30     4.39 
 -38  -10  28     3.76 
Precentral gyrus  48  -16  28  0.004 0.005 423 4.39 
  50   -2  40     4.09 
Postcentral gyrus  54  -18  40     3.58 
Supplementary motor area  -2   -6  62  0.004 0.005 416 4.14 
   4    0  66     3.99 
   6   12  60     3.44 
Angular gyrus  38  -58  36  0.007 0.008 369 4.07 
Inferior parietal lobule 32  -54  48     3.69 
      
Reward contrast (high reward>low 
reward)     
Cuneus  16  -92   8  0.000 0.000 1164 7.91 
Occipital cortex  24  -92  18     6.18 
  16  -70   2     3.95 
Precentral gyrus -44   -8  50  0.006 0.005 378 4.48 
 -36  -14  40  0.007   3.62 
Superior parietal lobule -28  -60  52  0.007 0.005 365 4.01 
 -14  -64  64     3.89 
 
Table 2: List of the regions showing overlap in the conjunction contrast 
 
MNI 
Coordinates cluster peak 
Area x y z  size T 
    
Conjunction contrast     
    
Parametric contrast for effort during decision-making  
 & anticipation of performance   
Precuneus   8 -72 38  67   4.06 
  14 -64 36     3.51 
ACC  12  28 32  54   3.90 
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fMRI cue-related ROI analysis results 
The percent signal change (psc) per every condition in both decision-
making and performance phase is reported in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The 
goal of this analysis was to further characterize the involvement of the ACC 
in effort estimation, especially targeting the type of encoding (net-value vs. 
motivational).  
 
Figure 8: Region of Interest (ROI) in the ACC from Botvinick et al. (2009). 
In the decision-making phase, the whole-brain contrast had revealed a 
parametric encoding of effort in a motivation-related manner, where 
increased activation was associated with higher effort demand. No evidence 
for a net-value encoding was reported. Interestingly, the ROI analysis 
revealed dissociable patterns for high vs. low reward condition. Effort 
encoding is indeed linearly increasing in the ACC as a function of effort 
level only the high reward condition (Figure 9). In the low reward condition 
however, this monotonic increase only reaches effort level 3, then decreasing 
again for effort level 4. This inverted U-shaped pattern is confirmed by an 
effort by reward interaction (F(3,66)=4.85, p=.004). A main effect of effort 
(F(3,66)=3.39, p=.02) and reward (F(1,22)=4.97, p=.04) were also reported in 
this area. When only the low reward condition was included in the analysis, 
the main effect of effort was only marginally significant (F(3,66)=2.71, p=.05), 
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but a significant quadratic trend was reported (F(1,22)=9.47, p=.006), 
confirming again the inverted-U shaped trend. 
 
Figure 9: Percent signal change (psc) during decision-making in the four effort 
levels (x-axis) and two reward levels (grey=low reward, white=high reward).  
In the performance phase, the whole-brain parametric contrast equally 
showed linear encoding for effort in a motivational-related fashion. 
Similarly, no indication for a value-related encoding was reported. In this 
case, the percent signal change extracted from the ROI confirmed that the 
trend was linear for both low reward and high reward conditions (Figure 10), 
showing a main effect of effort level (F(3,66)=3.25, p=.02) and no effect of 
reward (F(1,22)=.36, p=.56) nor an interaction (F(3,66)=.60, p=.62).  
 
CHOOSING TO MAKE AN EFFORT AND PREPARING TO OVERCOME IT:  
THE ROLE OF THE ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX     157 
 
Figure 10: Percent signal change (psc) during anticipation of performance in the four 
effort levels (x-axis) and two reward levels (grey=low reward, white=high reward).  
 
fMRI task-related results 
The goal of this analysis was a further manipulation check, that is 
checking neural activation during task performance in the performance phase 
as a function of required effort. The parametric effort contrast revealed 
increased activation for increased effort in ACC, striatum, Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC), insula, (figure 10, in light blue, see Table 3 for a 
complete report). These regions are typically in effort processing (Krebs et 
al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014). In the same contrast, a number of posterior 
parietal regions were also activated, which are normally involved in attention 
(Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) and numerical 
cognition (Arsalidou and Taylor, 2011). Given that task involved arithmetic 
operations, this further confirms that increasing task difficulty was 
associated with more important recruitment of task-relevant regions.  
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Figure 10: Task-related activation. Parametric effort contrast during task execution 
in the anticipation of performance phase (light blue). Negative parametric effort 
contrast during task execution in the anticipation of performance phase (yellow). 
Conversely, the negative parametric effort contrast highlighted regions 
that were more active for lower effort levels (Figure 10, in yellow). This 
contrast revealed a number of medial frontal and posterior regions, 
consistently reported as being part of the Default Mode Network (DMN, 
Raichle et al., 2001, see Table 3 for a complete report), among which 
ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC), medial Superior Frontal Gyrus 
(SFG) posterior Insula, Posterior Cingulate cortex (PCC). Middle temporal 
activation and lateral posterior parietal activation were also reported in this 
contrast, also consistent with the DMN. 
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Table 3: Summary of the activation results during task execution 
 
MNI 
Coordinates 
cluster-
level 
cluster-
level cluster peak 
Area x y z  FWE FDR size T 
      
Parametric contrast for effort during task execution    
      
Middle frontal gyrus -24   4  56  0.000 0.000 21151 11.93 
Inferior frontal gyrus -44   6  28     10.5 
Precuneus -10 -68  50  0.000 0.000 9466 10.67 
 -26 -70  34     10.44 
Superior parietal lobule -26 -66  44     9.92 
Middle temporal gyrus -50 -56 -4 0.030 0.015 309 8.39 
Superior frontal gyrus  38  40  38  0.004 0.002 519 6.22 
Inferior frontal gyrus  48   6  28  0.056 0.020 253 5.24 
Occipital cortex  38 -82  -4  0.036 0.015 291 4.51 
  30 -90   0     4.39 
      
Negative parametric contrast for effort during task execution   
      
Angular gyrus  52 -64  38  0.000 0.000 2975 7.38 
Inferior parietal lobule  54 -58  46     6.58 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus  60 -16 -20     5.9 
Inferior frontal gyrus -50  36 -14  0.079 0.041 223 6.38 
  50  38 -16  0.012 0.008 392 6.34 
Angular gyrus -54 -62  38  0.000 0.000 2844 6.05 
 -48 -68  44     5.79 
Superior temporal gyrus -58 -64  16     5.33 
Posterior Cingulate   4 -46  32  0.001 0.000 738 5.85 
Paracentral Lobule    8 -26  64  0.000 0.000 1067 5.38 
 -12 -34  68     3.61 
Posterior Cingulate   0 -24  42     3.33 
Superior frontal gyrus  14  50  44  0 0.000 2740 5.29 
Middle frontal gyrus   2  30 -16     4.93 
Superior frontal gyrus  10  62  10     4.89 
Posterior insula  36 -14  18  0,102 0.048 202 4.31 
Rolandic operculum  52  -6   8  0,029 0.017 310 3.93 
Supramarginal gyrus  58 -22  22     3.85 
  46 -30  26     3.50 
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Figure 11: Activation overlap of the parametric effort contrasts during decision 
making (blue), anticipation of performance (violet) and task execution (light blue). 
 
Interestingly, activity during task execution partially overlapped in the 
ACC with activity during decision-making and anticipation of performance 
(Figure 11).  
 
Individual differences analysis 
Across participants, choice behavior during the decision-making phase 
showed considerable variability (see Behavioral Results section). Therefore, 
one further correlation analysis was performed to investigate inter-individual 
differences in effort encoding during decision-making. Interestingly, the 
regression coefficient of the parametric effort contrast in the ACC ROI was 
correlated across subjects to acceptance rate of the cue (r=.57, p=.005, 
Figure 3d). Higher intensity for the parametric contrast reflects a steeper 
linear increase in the response of this region as a function of increasing 
effort. This might be interpreted as more efficient encoding across different 
effort levels (effort encoding). In this case, this higher intensity was 
associated with increased likelihood of choosing to engage in the more 
effortful task. Interestingly, effort encoding in ACC was not correlated to 
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choice entropy (r=.006 , p=.98), thus excluding this potential confound. This 
is also confirmed when both entropy (beta=.06, p=.771) and acceptance rate 
(beta=5.82, p=.006) are introduced as predictors of effort encoding in the 
same linear regression model. 
 
Figure 12: Effort encoding in the ACC during decision making (effort parametric 
contrast, x-axis), plotted as a function of effort acceptance rate (%, y-axis).  
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 DISCUSSION 
Despite the growing interest in the topic, the neural mechanisms 
underlying effort-related decision making and effort exertion remain 
debated. In the current study, we dissociated effort-related decision making 
and anticipation of effortful performance, to investigate effort encoding in 
both situations. We tested divergent predictions of net-value account and 
motivational account of ACC function. We show that effort is encoded by 
the ACC in a motivational fashion, and that this holds across decision-
making and anticipation phases. Furthermore, effort encoding generally 
follows a parametric trend, although it is modulated by phase. The relevance 
of the current results in the light of the literature is discussed below.  
In the decision-making phase, no evidence for  a net-value encoding 
was reported. Higher effort expectation was associated with increased 
activation in the ACC and the Precuneus (see figure 7a). A few studies 
showed an ACC contribution to effort-related decision making (Prévost et 
al., 2010; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Schouppe et al., 2014), and our results 
confirm this pivotal role. Moreover, we show that ACC encodes effort 
parametrically, and in a motivational fashion. Precuneus activation is 
reported in a number of studies across different domains, and seems to be 
involved in default mode network (DMN) activity (Raichle et al., 2001) as 
well as in a variety of tasks (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The potential 
contribution of this region to decision-making certainly deserves to be 
investigated in depth in further research. Reward-related activation during 
the decision-making phase was also addressed (high reward > low reward), 
identifying mainly extrastriate areas. Surprisingly, no significant activation 
was reported in the typical reward-related areas. This might depend on 
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power or saliency, given that only two reward levels were presented, as 
opposed to four effort levels. It is however clear that the reward 
manipulation was effective, as it affected choice behavior (see Behavioral 
Result section). It should be noted that visual activation is often reported in 
reward contrasts (high reward > low reward) (Krebs et al., 2012) , especially 
when visual cues are used. One possible explanation is the increased learned 
relevance of the cue itself, but this should be addressed in further research. 
In the performance phase (Figure 7b), a widespread fronto-parietal 
network was activated, as well as sub-cortical regions. The essential 
contribution of ACC and striatum in anticipating cognitive effort confirms 
the results of our previous study (Vassena et al., 2014). Importantly, also in 
this phase ACC encodes effort in a motivational fashion, showing linearly 
increasing activation as a function of effort level. The current results provide 
no support for a net-value encoding. Anticipation of effort in the 
performance phase also involved a wide fronto-parietal network. Increased 
activity was detected in DLPFC, SMA, AG and IPL. Activity in the DLPF 
and SMA is typically associated with the execution of complex tasks (Kong 
et al., 2005; Sohn et al., 2007). Activity in the AG and IPL is consistently 
reported in tasks involving numerical cognition (Arsalidou and Taylor, 
2011).Given the arithmetic nature of the task, it seems plausible that neural 
activation in this phase would reflect task-preparation, and more specifically 
the recruitment of task-relevant resources recruitment and preparation. In 
this phase, reward-related activation (high reward > low reward) was located 
in the cuneus, extrastriate cortex, precentral gyrus and SPL. As in the 
decision-making phase, no typical reward activation was detected. It should 
be noted that one study on effort describes a similar pattern, where influence 
of reward is reported during the feedback, but not during the anticipation 
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phase (Kurniawan et al., 2013). Again, this issue should be further 
investigated, to identify potential reasons of this variability. 
Subsequently, overlap in effort encoding between substrates involved 
in decision-making and performance was tested in the conjunction analysis. 
Both choosing to engage in an effortful task and preparing to overcome such 
effort elicited overlapping activation in the ACC (figure 7c). Moreover, in 
both conditions ACC shows a motivational-related encoding, with higher 
activation as a function of increasing task difficulty.  This confirms what 
suggested by previous reports (Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014) and 
excludes a pure net-value encoding. Interestingly, while preparing for a more 
effortful task in the performance phase, ACC showed parametric encoding of 
effort, with linearly increasing activation across the different effort levels. 
This highlights the crucial role of ACC in accurate estimation of required 
task engagement, necessary for adequate resource mobilization (Gendolla 
and Brinkmann, 2005; Sterling, 2012). 
Strikingly, decision-making seems to modulate effort encoding, 
revealing a partially divergent pattern. The targeted ROI analysis revealed 
that when expecting a low reward, effort encoding was better explained by a 
quadratic (inverted-U) trend instead, as ACC activity only increased up to 
effort level 3, then dropping for the highest effort level (see figure 9). ACC 
has been shown to play a crucial role in supporting task engagement across a 
number of effort manipulations (Luks et al., 2002; Sohn et al., 2007; Krebs 
et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014). One recent fMRI study reported increased 
activation in the striatum when participant voluntarily chose the option 
entailing more cognitive effort, in a paradigm where no reward was 
delivered (Schouppe et al., 2014). These authors also report a similar pattern 
for the ACC, although only marginally significant. In other words, ACC 
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might also be driving effort engagement, when a voluntary choice is 
required. In the current results, this would be reflected by the quadratic 
trend, thus encoding effort that the participants are willing to exert. 
Potentially convergent evidence comes from the behavioral results, showing 
that (across subjects) increased effort encoding in the ACC predicts higher 
likelihood of engaging in the effortful task (i.e. higher acceptance rate of the 
effortful cue, figure 12). This role of prompting engagement and sustaining 
effortful behavior seems consistent with recent evidence showing that 
electrical stimulation of the ACC causes autonomical arousal, associated 
with what the authors call “will to persevere”, that is a subjective feeling of 
increased motivational drive when dealing with a difficult situation (Parvizi 
et al., 2013). 
Taken together, these results might be interpreted as evidence for a 
recent account of ACC function formulated by Shenhav et al. (Shenhav et 
al., 2013). These authors propose a new theoretical framework, where ACC 
would compute the “expected value of control”,  that is the value of 
engaging in a certain behavior. Consistent with earlier computational work, 
ACC computes value (Alexander & Brown, 2011, Silvetti et al. 2011), but 
not the value of external stimuli. Instead, it would encode the value of a 
more abstract quantity, in particular, exerting a certain amount of cognitive 
effort. Hence, the theory combines elements of the two earlier frameworks, 
as ACC is proposed to calculate the net-value of motivation. In the current 
task, this would be implemented as the worth of exerting a certain amount of 
effort, given the potential reward associated to it. This would imply that 
reward and effort are integrated in the ACC, which determines if 
undertaking a certain degree of effort is valuable and hence prompts the 
appropriate response.   
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One could argue a number of possible alternative explanations for 
ACC involvement in both stages of the task, besides the net-value account. 
Concerning the decision-making phase, increased ACC activation has been 
associated to conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004). In this perspective, 
the quadratic trend in the low reward condition might reflect choice conflict. 
In our case however, there was no significant difference in choice entropy 
across low reward condition. Moreover, the activation pattern does not even 
qualitatively follow that predicted by choice entropy values. Another 
potential interpretation could be a simulation account. While anticipating a 
certain effort, the mechanisms underlying task execution might be pre-
activated in order to facilitate task performance . Similarly, while choosing 
between different effort levels, one might simulate the offered alternative to 
make a decision. This explanation might hold for the performance phase, but 
is not congruent with the activation pattern detected in the decision-making 
phase. A purely simulative process would entail an entirely linear coding of 
effort across the different levels. Lastly, we can also exclude a pure cost 
coding interpretation, as in the decision-making phase, increasing effort 
doesn’t elicit monotonic increase in the activation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The current study shows that during decision-making and anticipation 
of performance, prospective effort is encoded in a motivational fashion, with 
overlap in the ACC. During the anticipation of performance, ACC activity 
linearly increases as a function of effort, while during decision it encodes 
only the effort that’s considered worth engaging in the task, thus driving 
adaptive choice. Speculatively, probability of success (given the exertion of 
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a certain amount of effort) might play a role in process. For example, one 
might expect a drop in ACC activity also in the anticipation phase when the 
required effort outweighs the subject’s capacities, thus prompting 
disengagement. In this perspective, investigating ACC contribution in a 
wider varying range of effort levels (up to impossible tasks), and still 
controlling for decision-making, certainly represent fruitful venue for future 
research direction. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
VALUE-BASED MODULATION OF EFFORT AND REWARD 
ANTICIPATION ON THE MOTOR SYSTEM 1 
Human actions are driven by the pursuit of goals, especially when 
achieving these goals leads to reward. Among other effects of anticipating a 
reward, a striking observation is that it influences the motor systems, 
boosting motor excitability for potentially rewarded actions and increasing 
overall motor readiness. However, attaining a reward mostly requires some 
effort. Neuroimaging research showed that  mental effort requirements are 
encoded by the same brain regions coding for reward expectation. 
Moreover, effort and reward prospect seem to be combined in an integrative 
signal. However, whether mental effort (possibly integrated with reward) 
influences the motor system directly during task preparation, remains 
debated.  To this end, we implemented a mental effort task, where reward 
prospect and effort requirements were manipulated. During task 
preparation, TMS was delivered on the motor cortex and motor-evoked 
potentials (MEPs) were recorded on the right hand muscles to probe motor 
excitability. The results show for the first time that both mental effort and 
reward anticipation influence the readiness of the motor system, in a non-
action-specific way. Moreover, effort and reward interacted, providing  
evidence for an integrative value signal effectively modulating the motor 
system. Interestingly, this effect was strongly modulated by individual 
differences in the Need for Cognition trait,  underlining a pivotal role of 
subjective effort experience in value-driven preparation for action. 
                                                     
1 Vassena E., Cobbaert S., Andres M., Fias W. & Verguts T. (2013). Value-based 
modulation of effort and reward anticipation on the motor system. Manuscript in 
preparation 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans are immersed in complex environments and are constantly 
confronted  with behavioral options to choose among, each entailing 
potential benefits and related costs with respect to achieving goals. 
Identifying actions which can lead to a desirable outcome, such as reward, is 
a core skill in adaptive behavior. The benefit associated with a goal is termed 
value, and encompasses intrinsic value (primary reinforcers like food and 
sex, Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2010), as well as learned value 
(secondary reinforcers like money). A wealth of findings demonstrated that 
human behavior is strongly driven by value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). At the behavioral level, this is evident when 
people need to select a preferred action or stimulus over an alternative. At 
the neural level, value is encoded by a specific network in the brain, 
involving subcortical dopaminergic nuclei, the striatum, and the Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC, Haber & Knutson, 2010; Knutson & Cooper, 2005; 
Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011; Vassena, Krebs, Silvetti, Fias, & 
Verguts, 2014; Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014). 
How value drives decision making and subsequent action selection 
remains an open question. According  to recent theories, value influences the 
motor system during action selection. Motor programs are selected through a 
competitive process, through which cognitive variables (such as the prospect 
of a reward) can contribute to determining the winning action plan (Cisek & 
Kalaska, 2010). This influence might be mediated via top-down modulation 
of the cortico-subcortical network underlying value estimation on the 
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primary motor cortex (M1,Hare, Schultz, Camerer, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 
2011) . 
A direct effect of value computations on the motor system is plausible 
from an anatomical point of view. The ACC and striatum are part of the 
limbic loop which forms the interface between emotion and action 
(Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986; Haber, Kim, Mailly, & Calzavara, 
2006), thereby possibly relating value to action. The neurocircuitry of ACC 
itself has been proposed as being ideally suited for this function (Paus, 
2001), given that this region is part of both the limbic loop and the motor 
loop. Furthermore, ACC might affect the motor cortex (M1) via an indirect 
pathway through the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA). Finally, ACC might 
modulate the final motor output via projections directly innervating the 
motor neurons in the spinal cord. These circuits provide an effective 
pathway for a modulation of value computation on action preparation. A first 
functional evidence of this network effectively mediating value translation to 
M1 is provided by a connectivity study. Hare and colleagues (2011) showed 
increased functional coupling between ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 
encoding stimulus value (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Liu et al., 2011; 
Vassena, Krebs, et al., 2014), dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (dmPFC, of 
which ACC is a part) and Intra-Parietal Sulcus (IPS). The authors 
hypothesize dmPFC and IPS to deal with the comparison between available 
options. Crucially, dmPFC and IPS also showed increased functional 
coupling with M1 at the time of decision. 
An ideal technique to test this hypothesis directly is Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Delivering TMS pulses to M1 and 
simultaneously recording motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) on hand muscles 
allows to measure cortico-spinal excitability (CSE). Hence, by looking at the 
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modulatory effect of value manipulations on CSE, we can have a direct 
measure of the influence of value on the primary motor system. 
Two recent studies used this method to investigate the hypothesis that 
value influences action selection. Klein-Flugge and Bestmann (2012) 
showed that the increase in CSE due to TMS prior to choice correlated with 
the value attributed to the chosen option based on reward magnitude and 
reward probability. Klein and colleagues (Klein, Olivier, & Duque, 2012) 
asked participants to perform left or right key presses depending on a given 
instruction. However, the instruction was sometimes ambiguous, in which 
case either response would be considered correct. The performance was 
rewarded at every trial, but one hand was implicitly associated to larger 
reward. As a result, participants biased their choices in the ambiguous 
condition towards the more rewarded hand. Importantly, more rewarded 
responses were associated with higher MEPs in the preparation phase. 
Hence, these two studies reported an value-driven action-specific increase in 
CSE, thus showing a modulation of cognitive factors on motor selection. 
Whether value can influence the motor system even before a suitable action 
plan can be implemented, was however not clarified. This question was 
addressed by Kapogiannis and colleagues (2008), using paired-pulse TMS  
to probe intra-cortical inhibition in M1. The task consisted of passive 
viewing of a spinning slot machine. Paired-pulse TMS consist in the delivery 
of two subsequent TMS pulses, where the second supra-threshold pulse 
allows to measure the excitatory or inhibitory effect of the first sub-threshold 
pulse on CSE. Increased reward expectation was associated with increased 
paired-pulse inhibition. This effect was amplified in trials preceded by 
reward delivery. Although different from the single-pulse protocol, this 
study shows a modulation of value on CSE, in the absence of action. Using a 
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similar TMS protocol, Thabit and colleagues (2011) reported an influence of 
reward on CSE. This effect was detected at reward delivery, at a moment 
where no upcoming action could be selected. Conversely,  Gupta and Aron 
(2011) investigated the effect of reward before action planning. In a first 
experiment, they confronted participants with pairs of food items, and asked 
them to choose the food that they wanted to eat at the end of the experiment. 
Before the session, participants rated how strongly they wanted each food 
item. MEPs on the hand muscles were recorded while food pictures were 
presented during the task, with synchronized delivery of single-pulse TMS. 
Strongly wanted items elicited stronger MEPs when displayed on the screen, 
prior to participants’ choice. Interestingly, the action to be performed to 
accept or reject the current item was still unknown to the participant at that 
time. Therefore the modulation of reward on CSE was not action-specific. 
The authors define this effect as ‘spill over’ into the motor system of the 
urge for food, that is the motivational drive to obtain food. In other words, a 
wanted item seems to induce a generalized increase in CSE, even when no 
final motor output can be implemented yet. A comparable effect was 
reported by the same authors in a second experiment, where food items were 
replaced by money. To sum up, these studies showed a modulation of CSE 
by reward, irrespective of final motor output.  
An outstanding question is, however, how effort is related to this 
modulatory influence of reward on CSE. Indeed, a crucial aspect of value 
estimation is the effort needed to obtain the reward. The anticipation of 
effort requirements is crucial for optimal performance and is encoded at the 
neural level by the same structures estimating values (Vassena, Silvetti, et 
al., 2014). A first open question is if  effort costs implied in obtaining a 
reward would modulate CSE as well. A second open question concerns the 
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combination of reward and effort information in an integrated value signal. 
Such signal has been reported in ACC and striatum, which seem to respond 
to the net-value of a stimulus, namely its rewarding value discounted by the 
cost implied in obtaining, such as an effort requirement (Botvinick, 
Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & 
Rushworth, 2009; Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009). Therefore, 
effort and reward prospect might interact in influencing CSE to optimize 
preparation for action. Also the direction of the effects of effort and reward 
will be informative. Indeed, besides the net-value account, a motivational 
account of ACC has been proposed. Expecting to perform a more effortful 
task is associated with increased ACC and striatal activation, showing 
overlap with activity during reward anticipation (Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, 
Song, & Woldorff, 2012; Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014). Hence the effect of 
reward and effort might follow a net-value coding (highest CSE for the 
highest net-value option, high reward and low effort prospect) or a 
motivational coding (highest CSE for conditions requiring more 
engagement, high reward and high effort prospect). The goal of the current 
study was to address these questions, using single-pulse TMS to measure 
CSE in a mental effort task, where both potential reward and prospective 
effort were manipulated. To this end, we adapted a mental effort task from a 
previous fMRI study (Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014) to the timing used by 
Gupta and Aron (2011). 
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MATERIALS & METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-two healthy subjects participated in this study, with an 
average age of 25 (range 20-40). All participants were right-handed males, 
with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. The experimental 
protocol was approved by the ethical committee of the University Hospital 
of Gent. Each participant signed an informed consent prior to participation.  
Experimental procedure  
A mental effort task was implemented, adapting a previous version we 
used in an fMRI experiment investigating anticipation of effort (Vassena, 
Silvetti, et al., 2014). In this new version, visual stimuli were introduced as 
cues (Figure 1). Each cue consisted of a grey circle with a superimposed 
grid. The horizontal lines of the grid represented the level of effort, which 
could be low (lower line in black) or high (higher line in black). The vertical 
lines represent the potential reward, which could be low (left line in black) 
or high (right line in black). These type of cues have been successfully used 
to convey combined information about effort and reward (Croxson et al., 
2009). We opted for a 2 x 2 design, resulting in two possible levels of effort 
(easy/hard) and two possible levels of reward (low/high). Thus, there were 
four possible cues, and each cue indicated a combination of a certain effort 
requirement and a potential reward (low effort/low reward, low effort/high 
reward, high effort/low reward, high effort high reward). One additional cue 
was used, where only the gray circle with no black lines was presented. This 
cue represented the baseline condition. In this condition, a series of letters 
was presented on the screen, with the same timing of the other conditions. 
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The participants were told that after the baseline cue they were not supposed 
to perform any task, and that their final response would not matter.  
 
Figure 1: Visual Cues. Five possible cues were presented to the participant. The grey 
circle with no black lines represents the baseline condition. This cue is followed by 
the presentation of letters, on which participants don’t have to perform any task. 
Horizontal black lines represent effort level (low/high). Vertical black lines 
represent reward (low/high). This results in four possible combination: low 
effort/low reward, low effort/high reward, high effort/low reward, high effort/high 
reward 
 
Each cue was presented 21 times, thus resulting in 105 trials in total. 
Every trial consisted of a mental calculation (except for the baseline 
condition trials). Each calculation was  formed by 5 single digit numbers 
flashing on the screen, thus resulting in 4 subsequent operations (Figure 2). 
The last digit was followed by a display showing two possible results, one 
on the left and one on the right. Participants had to select the result they 
thought to be correct.  
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Figure 2: Task structure and timing. Every trial starts with one of the five possible 
cues. The TMS pulse is delivered with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 1500 
ms from the cue onset, and 500 ms before the ready display. At the ready display, 
participants have to press the right key as fast as possible to start the trial, with a 
maximum response time limit of 500 ms. Subsequently, the digits composing the 
calculation are presented. Every digit stays on screen for 1200 ms. Every digit is 
preceded and followed by a blank screen lasting 500 ms. After the last digit, the 
result display appears on screen, and the participant are supposed to pick the correct 
result, by pressing the left of the right key. After the key press, they receive 
feedback (win or lose). 
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The easy task consisted of calculations with no carrying or borrowing, 
while in the hard task each operation required carrying of borrowing. This 
manipulation of mental effort proved effective in our previous study 
(Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014). The low reward was 20 cents and the high 
reward 40 cents. Participants were instructed to try to be both fast and 
accurate. The time limit for responding was 1500 ms. In case of late 
response or wrong response, participants were told that they would lose the 
same amount of money they were playing for (to be subtracted from their 
accumulated budget).   
Each trial started with one of the five possible cues for 500 ms. 
Subsequently, the single TMS pulse was delivered (stimulus onset 
asynchrony from cue 1500 ms). 500 ms after the pulse, a screen appeared 
displaying the word “READY”. Participants were supposed to press the 
right-hand key as fast as possible, within a limit of 500 ms. After this key 
press, the task started.  If the response to this ready display would be too 
slow, they were told that the current trial would not be considered for the 
final calculation of the reward. The timing of the TMS was selected on the 
basis of Gupta and Aron  (2011). In that study, the authors showed that this 
timing is optimal to elicit a value-related MEP. Also, they showed that this 
would not be the case in absence of action (experiment 2). For this reason we 
introduced the response to the ready display to elicit MEPs reliably. 
Importantly, this action was always the same in every trial and was unrelated 
to the task. Crucially, the pulse delivery was far apart in time from the final 
motor response to the calculation result, to avoid the potential confound of 
interference with the final motor response.  
Before administering the task, participants underwent a training phase 
to familiarize with the task . This phase consisted of a short version of the 
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task (9 trials), with no TMS applied. Only in this training phase, each trial 
was followed by two questions, asking subjects to rate difficulty and 
pleasantness experienced during the trial (scale of 1 to 7). 
After the experiment, participants filled in two questionnaires: the 
BIS/BAS scale, measuring behavioral inhibition and activation (Carver & 
White, 1994), and the Need for Cognition scale, measuring the tendency to 
engage in and enjoy thinking (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). The Need for 
Cognition scale was included because several studies reported an influence 
of this trait on effort, both in subjective experience and actual task 
performance (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Coutinho, 2006; 
Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, & Olson, 1988).  
TMS and electromyography 
Single pulse TMS was delivered through a biphasic magnetic 
stimulator (Rapid2 Magstim, Whitland, UK) connected to a polyeruthane-
coated figure-of-eight coil (5.4-cm inner diameter windings). The coil was 
held tangentially over the left hand motor area, with the handle pointing 
backwards and forming an angle of 45° with the sagittal plane. 
Electromyographical (EMG) activity was recorded with the ActiveTwo 
system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Sintered 11x17-mm active 
Ag–AgCl electrodes were placed over the right First Dorsal Interosseus 
muscle (FDI) in a belly–tendon arrangement. The FDI contributes to flex or 
abduct the index away from the middle finger.  
 The hot spot in the hand motor area was established by locating a 
stimulation site where TMS elicited reliable motor-evoked potentials (MEP) 
in the FDI. This position was marked on a closely fitting cap. TMS intensity 
was set at 110% of the resting motor threshold, i.e. the minimum intensity to 
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induce an MEP ≥ 50 µV peak to peak in more than 4 out of 10 trials. The 
average intensity (± S.D.) was 65.2 ± 8.11 % of the maximal stimulator 
output. EMG signal was amplified (internal gain scaling), digitized at 2 kHz, 
high-pass filtered at 3 Hz, and stored on a PC for off-line analysis. The peak-
to-peak amplitude of the MEPs was computed using Matlab. In order to 
control for noise and fluctuations in the signal, EMG data were trimmed 
according to three criteria. Trials were excluded when the root mean square 
of the background EMG signal recorded 500 ms before TMS was higher 
than 50 mV (1,45%).Trials where the MEP amplitude was below 50 µV 
(3,47%) were removed. Trials with MEP amplitude more than 3 standard 
deviations above or below the individual mean (1,35%) were also excluded. 
Data analysis 
First, the behavioral data from the training phase were analyzed. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the difficulty ratings with 
effort (low/high) and reward (low/high) as factors. A second repeated-
measures ANOVA was performed on the pleasantness ratings, with effort 
(low/high) and reward (low/high) as factors. The goal of this analysis was to 
test if high effort trials were actually perceived as more difficult, and if this 
was perceived as unpleasant (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010).  
Subsequently, behavioral data from the task were analyzed. Two 
repeated-measures ANOVA were performed, with accuracy on the 
calculation task and reaction times as dependent variables. In both models, 
the factors were effort (low/high) and reward (low/high).  
MEP amplitudes in the five conditions were computed. For each 
participant the average MEP associated with the baseline was subtracted 
from the average MEPs in the four experimental condition. The goal of this 
procedure was to control for inter-individual variability in MEPs. 
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Subsequently, a repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on this data, 
with effort (low/high) and reward (low/high) as factors. Planned 
comparisons were also performed on the four experimental conditions. Then, 
a median-split analysis was performed, on the basis of the scores at the Need 
for Cognition scale (NFC). The goal of this analysis was to explore the 
influence of individual differences in effort perception on CSE. Participants 
were split in two groups (low NFC/high NFC). The factor group was 
introduced in the previous model, resulting in a rANOVA with effort, reward 
and NFC group as factors. To test for the reliability of possible effects a 
rANOVA was also fit to each group separately, with effort and reward as 
factors. Subsequently, planned comparisons were also performed.  
RESULTS 
Two participants were excluded from further analyses due to technical 
failure of the equipment during the experiment. Subsequently, two more 
exclusion criteria were applied to the MEPs data, on the basis of task 
performance. Trials were excluded when the final response to the calculation 
was incorrect (14,7 %). The reason for this was that cognitive processes that 
lead to an error might differ from successfully completed trials, and this was 
not the target of the current experiment. Finally, trials were excluded where 
participants did not press the key at the ready display within the time limit 
(16,4%). The reason for this was that they were told that in such 
circumstances the current trial would not count anymore and this might 
interact with MEPs. For one participant, only 33 trials in total survived all 
our criteria, especially due to slow response time to the READY display. 
The main analysis was run both with and without this participant, leading to 
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similar results. The data from this participant were excluded from further 
analysis anyway, as in all conditions less then 10 trials per condition were 
left. For the remaining participants, there were on average 14.4 ± 3.35 trials 
in the low effort/low reward condition, 13.75 ± 3.07 trials in the low 
effort/high reward condition, 12.8 ± 3.21 trials in the high effort/low reward 
condition, and 13.4 ± 3.41 trials in the high effort/high reward condition. 
Behavioral data 
First, the rating data from the training phase were analyzed. 
Participants perceived high effort trials as more difficult (main effect of 
effort F(1,18)=22.92, p<.001, ηp2 =.56), confirming the effectiveness of the 
manipulation. No significant effect of reward on perceived difficulty 
(F(1,18)=3.24, p=.089, ηp2 =.15), nor effort x reward interaction were obtained 
(F(1,18)=1.29, p=.27, ηp2 =.07). The pleasantness ratings did not show any 
significant effect (main effect of effort F(1,18)=1.455, p=.24, ηp2 =.08, main 
effect of reward F(1,18)=3.17, p=.092, ηp2 =.15, effort x reward interaction 
F(1,18)=1.12, p=.30, ηp2 =.06). 
Second, the behavioral data from the task were analyzed. The 
accuracy in the calculation task was 81.2 % (±7%).  The repeated-measures 
ANOVA showed a main effect of effort (F(1,18) =8.57, p=.009, ηp2 =.32, and 
no effect of reward (F(1, 18)=.199, p=.66, ηp2 =.01) nor effort by reward 
interaction (F(1,18)=.36, p= .56, ηp2 =.02, see Figure 3). Pairwise comparisons 
showed a significant difference between low effort/low reward and high 
effort/low reward conditions (t(18) = 2.247, p = 037, d=.52), and between low 
effort/high reward and high effort/low reward conditions (t(18)=2.786, 
p=.012, d=.64). Hence, the effect of effort on accuracy confirmed that the 
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effort manipulation was successful, as performance worsened in the high 
effort condition.  
 
Figure 3: Accuracy results. The plot reports the average accuracy in each of the four 
experimental conditions (% of correct responses). The bars represent one standard 
error of the mean.  
 
Figure 4: Reaction times. The plot shows average reaction times (RT) in 
milliseconds in the four experimental conditions. The bars represent one standard 
error of the mean.  
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No significant effect was reported in the reaction times (main effect of 
effort, F(1,18)=2.42, p=.14, ηp2 =.12, main effect of reward, F(1,18)= 2.31, p 
=.15, ηp2 =.11, effort x reward interaction, F(1,18) =.297, p=.59, ηp2 =.02, see 
Figure 4). The absence of effect on RTs could be attributed to the short 
response time limit, making the effect of effort evident in the accuracy data.  
 
TMS-MEP data 
Subsequently, the MEPs data were analyzed. This analysis showed a 
significant effort x reward interaction (F(1,18)=6.63, p=.019, ηp2= .27, see 
Figure 5). No main effect of effort (F(1,18)=1.988, p=.18, ηp2= .099) or reward 
(F(1,18)=.575, p=.46, ηp2= .03) was reported. 
 
Figure 5: MEP data. The plot shows the average difference in MEP signal (mv) in 
the four experimental conditions with the respect to the baseline condition. The bars 
represent one standard error of the mean.  
 
Planned comparisons showed a significant difference between the low 
effort/low reward condition and the low effort/high reward condition       
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(t(18) = -2.40,  p= .027, d=-.55); and between the low effort/high reward 
condition and the high effort/high reward condition (t(18) = 2.29, p = .034, 
d=.52). The difference between the low effort, high reward condition and the 
high effort/low reward condition was not significant, albeit showing a weak 
trend (t(18) = 1.55, p = .139, d=.35). 
The median-split individual difference analysis showed an effect of 
NFC on CSE. When group  (NFC low or high) was added to the model, the 
effort x reward interaction was preserved (F(1,17)=6.25, p=.023, ηp2=.27), but 
importantly, the interaction effort x group was also significant (F(1,17)=17.8, 
p=.001, ηp2=.51). When the rANOVA was fit for each group separately, the 
low NFC group showed a main effect of effort (increased CSE for high vs. 
low effort, F(1,8)=6.26, p=.037, ηp2=.44), a trend for the interaction 
(F(1,8)=3.58, p=.095, ηp2=.31), and no effect of reward (F(1,8)=1.25, p=.295, 
ηp2 =.14, see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: MEP data in the low Need for Cognition group. The plot shows the 
average difference in MEP signal (mv) in the four experimental condition with the 
respect to the baseline condition. The bars represent one standard error of the mean.  
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Planned comparisons showed a significant difference between low 
effort/low reward and low effort/high reward conditions (t(8)=-2.49, p=.037, 
d=-.83), low effort/low reward and high effort/high reward (t(8)=-2.70, 
p=.027, d=-.90) and a marginally significant difference between low 
effort/low reward and low effort/high reward (t(8)=-2.27, p=.053, d=-.76). 
The high NFC group also showed a main effect of effort (increased 
CSE for low vs high effort, F(1,9)=12.7, p=.006, ηp2=.59, see Figure 6), a 
trend for the interaction (F(1,9)=3.63, p=.089, ηp2=.29), and no effect of 
reward (F(1,9)=.006, p=.94, ηp2 =.001). The planned comparisons showed a 
significance difference between low effort/low reward and high effort/high 
reward (T(9)=2.71, p=.024, d=.86); between low effort/high reward and high 
effort/low reward (T(9)=2.33, p=.045, d=.74); and between low effort/high 
reward and high effort/high reward (T(9)=2.77, p=.022, d=.87). 
 
Figure 7: MEP data in the high Need for Cognition group. The plot shows the 
average difference in MEP signal (mv) in the four experimental condition with the 
respect to the baseline condition. The bars represent one standard error of the mean.  
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These analyses show that the main effect of effort is present in both 
groups but in the opposite direction. People with low NFC show higher CSE 
when expecting a high effort trial, while people with high NFC show higher 
CSE when expecting a low effort trial. 
DISCUSSION 
The current study investigated the influence of anticipating mental 
effort requirements and reward prospect on motor excitability during task 
preparation, by measuring CSE while delivering TMS on M1. The goal was 
to probe sensitivity of CSE to value, when this entails an effort cost. Our 
results show that both mental effort and reward information can affect the 
excitability of motor system, even in a non action-specific manner. This 
evidence suggest that an integrative value signal influences CSE in 
preparation for action. Moreover, this is modulated by individual 
differences, potentially suggesting different contributions of neural valuation 
and motivational system to task preparation. 
Traditional theories posited a serial decision process, where first goals 
are set, the corresponding optimal motor program identified, and finally 
transmitted to lower level areas to be implemented (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; 
Sternberg, 1969). The assumption of a motor time separate from decision is 
explicit in the currently popular diffusion model (Mulder, Wagenmakers, 
Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002; Ratcliff, 
1978). In this process, M1 occupies the lowest level of the hierarchy, merely 
translating the received programs into action. However, recent accounts 
reconsidered this functional architecture, postulating that action selection is a 
parallel and competitive process instead, where multiple action programs are 
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simultaneously being evaluated, until the winning program is selected (Cisek 
& Kalaska, 2010). According to these theories, the selection itself happens 
across all the levels of the hierarchy, and cognitive factors can influence or 
bias selection also at the level of M1.  Supporting evidence for this 
hypothesis has been provided by a few studies measuring motor excitability 
via stimulating M1 with TMS and recording MEPs on the hand muscles. 
These studies showed that CSE can be modulated by a high level cognitive 
variable such as the value associated to the specific motor program (Klein et 
al., 2012; Klein-Flügge & Bestmann, 2012). Furthermore, non action 
specific reward-related modulations of CSE by reward has been reported as 
well (Gupta & Aron, 2011; Kapogiannis et al., 2008). Taken together, these 
findings confirm the influence of value and reward information on the motor 
system. The functional role of this modulation might reside in increasing 
readiness when possible actions to be performed carry an incentive value, 
such as leading to a reward (Gupta & Aron, 2011). Reward prospect is 
indeed  known to boost motivation for task performance at both behavioral 
and neural level (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2009; Pessiglione et al., 2007; 
Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014). 
Another key factor is the effort entailed in completing a task. The 
anticipation of an effortful task is associated with increased neural activation 
of cortico-limbic regions. This activation overlaps in the striatum and ACC 
with activation induced by a prospect of a reward (Krebs et al., 2012; 
Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014). These regions are also notably implicated in 
value-based decision making (Rangel & Hare, 2010; Rushworth, Noonan, 
Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Vassena, Krebs, et al., 2014). In fact, 
evidence suggests that both effort and reward information is combined in the 
ACC in an integrative signal termed net-value (Croxson et al., 2009; 
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Kennerley et al., 2009). In the framework of competitive action selection 
theories, this leads to the prediction that anticipating effort might influence 
motor excitability as the anticipation of a reward does (Gupta & Aron, 
2011). Our results provide the first confirming evidence for this prediction, 
showing that motor excitability is modulated by both reward prospect and 
effort requirements. This emerges from the interaction effect, driven by 
increased motor excitability in the low effort/high reward condition,  as 
compared to the high effort/high reward condition. This suggests that both 
effort and reward are evaluated, and presumably integrated in a combined 
signal, which then modulates motor excitability. This computation could be 
mediated by the ACC and striatum, as suggested by neuroimaging evidence 
(Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009; Prévost, Pessiglione, Météreau, 
Cléry-Melin, & Dreher, 2010). Given the high level cognitive nature of this 
computation, this result is line with the hypothesis of competitive hypothesis 
of action selection (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010), confirming that cognitive 
factors actively bias this process. Previous studies showed this modulation to 
be action specific, facilitating actions associated with a reward (Klein et al., 
2012; Klein-Flügge & Bestman, 2012). Our study shows that value can 
modulate motor excitability in a non action specific way, presumably 
increasing readiness for task performance (Gupta & Aron, 2011). 
Furthermore, this effect was strikingly moderated by individual 
differences at the Need for Cognition (NFC) questionnaire. This 
questionnaire measures a trait which has been defined cognitive motivation 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). People with higher NFC tend to engage more in 
thinking or in cognitively demanding tasks. Besides showing a preference 
for demanding tasks, this results in higher exposure to mentally demanding 
situations and in the tendency to actively seek and process more information. 
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Some studies also report this trait to be correlated with task performance 
(Coutinho, 2006), low level visual processing (Fleischhauer, Miller, Enge, & 
Albrecht, 2014), and learning new complex skills (Day, Espejo, Kowollik, 
Boatman, & McEntire, 2007). Recently, Hill and colleagues (2013) showed 
that NFC correlates with measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence, but 
not with working memory capacity. Given the association of this trait with 
different tendencies in effort-related behavior, we hypothesized that NFC 
would predict differences in motor excitability prior to task engagement as 
well. For this reason we split our sample in a low NFC and high NFC group. 
As predicted, NFC group interacted with effort, thus showing a different 
effect of anticipating an effortful task on motor excitability as a function of 
NFC trait (low/high). Strikingly, in both groups the effort x reward 
interaction was preserved, showing that both group kept both effort and 
reward prospects into account. However, the effect of effort on CSE in the 
two groups was opposite. The low NFC group showed increased CSE in the 
high effort condition (irrespective of reward), and in the low effort/high 
reward condition (though marginally significant). The high NFC group 
showed reduced CSE in the high effort condition instead, showing maximal 
increase in motor excitability in the low effort/high reward condition instead. 
Sorrentino and colleagues (1988) showed that perception of cognitive effort 
is modulated by relevance, with people with low NFC reporting more 
experienced effort in highly relevant conditions. This might be the case in 
our task, given that at every trial participants can win or lose money. As a 
result, low NFC people might experience the task as more difficult. 
Moreover, these people tend to avoid engaging in difficult tasks, and when 
they do choose to engage, because of the relevance of the task, they might 
experience greater effort or distress (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Increased CSE 
prior to high effort trials might reflect a motivational effect, in terms of 
VALUE-BASED MODULATION OF EFFORT AND REWARD  
ANTICIPATION ON THE MOTOR SYSTEM 195 
readiness in preparation for the task. More precisely, they might rely on 
anticipatory compensatory mechanisms to increase their chance of 
completing the task successfully, by preparing more. In fact the similar trend 
for the low effort/high reward condition is compatible with this 
interpretation, as previous work demonstrated that both effort and reward 
can induce motivational effects (Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014). A possibly 
convergent explanation might reside in higher emotional arousal associated 
with effortful trials. Negative emotional arousal and even worry have been 
shown to induce increased CSE (Oathes, Bruce, & Nitschke, 2008; van 
Loon, van den Wildenberg, van Stegeren, Hajcak, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). 
Conversely, people with high NFC tend to find effortful tasks simpler, 
as reported in a mental arithmetic task (Dornic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen, 
1991) and in an anagram solving task (Baugh & Mason, 1986). As a 
consequence, the high effort condition might not prompt the same 
motivational CSE increase (in high effort and high reward conditions). In 
our data however, no difference in accuracy across groups was reported, nor 
difference in difficulty perception at the ratings during the training. 
However, the training consisted only of 9 trials, resulting in 2 rating 
questions per cue. Future studies should foresee more extensive testing of 
subjective effort perception, to reliably test the relationship between NFC, 
subjective experience and CSE prior to task engagement. Moreover, it has 
been reported that people with high NFC generally engage more in difficult 
cognitive tasks (Cacioppo et al., 1984). This might result in an expertise 
effect. Being experienced in engaging in difficult tasks, these people might 
not need increased preparation during the anticipation phase, and as a 
consequence they might be more sensitive to the net-value information of the 
upcoming trial. Taken together, these results show that motor excitability is 
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modulated by effort prospect, and that this modulation is mediated by 
individual differences in effort-related behavior.  
Interestingly, the dichotomy opposing net-value coding to 
motivational coding that seems to fit the different CSE profiles of people 
with low vs. high NFC, mimics the debate on ACC function in effort-related 
behavior. A number of studies in animals and humans indeed suggested that 
ACC integrates effort and reward prospects in a net-value signal (Croxson et 
al., 2009; Kennerley et al., 2009). Recent evidence however, showed that the 
anticipation of higher effort induced increased ACC activation, supporting a 
motivational role of this region in supporting effortful behavior. ACC might 
influence motor excitability via cortico-cortical projections, via midbrain 
projections or via direct synapses on motoneurons in the spinal cord. If ACC 
is the driver of this CSE effect, one could derive the prediction that 
previously reported differences in net-value coding as opposed to 
motivational coding might be due to individual differences in experiencing 
effort. This interesting prediction should be investigated in further research.   
To sum up, our results provide support for the influence of high level 
cognitive factors on motor excitability in a non action specific manner. We 
show that both the effort and reward prospect influence the motor system 
prior to task execution in a cognitive task. This influence is likely to be result 
of an integration process, which combines both information in a value signal. 
This signal is strongly modulated by individual differences in NFC, showing 
that this variable should be kept into account in further studies. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This doctoral dissertation investigated the neural coding of reward and 
effort, and how they are integrated to guide adaptive behavior during both 
decision making and task preparation. The goal of the present studies was to 
bridge different theories of value estimation and motivation, to achieve an 
integrated view on how these computations drive adaptive behavior, and to 
unravel the underlying neural mechanisms. 
Goal-directed behavior encompasses all courses of action attaining a 
specific achievement, often represented by a reward, (Rangel & Hare, 2010). 
Engaging in such behavior implies the ability of quantifying the attainable 
benefit, as well as the likelihood of its occurrence to optimally guide 
decisions towards the best available options in the environment. The neural 
implementation of these computations was investigated in Chapter 2. More 
specifically, we tested the contribution of medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) 
to outcome coding and reward prediction coding, targeting the hypothesis of 
a functional dissociation between ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC) 
and Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). Our results show that that vmPFC 
encodes the outcome, irrespective of probability and decision-making. ACC 
was sensitive to reward prediction, with the strongest response to unexpected 
positive outcomes, irrespective of whether a choice was made or not. Given 
that the experimental design involved risky decision, it was also possible to 
investigate in the same data the neural basis of inter-individual variability in 
risk preference.  We therefore also addressed this question (in Appendix), 
showing that decreased activation in the anterior Insula during gambling was 
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associated with higher risk preference. The underlying mechanism might 
consist of an altered risk estimation in this area, potentially driving risk 
taking behaviors in both healthy controls as well as in pathological 
conditions. 
After determining the neural substrate associated with reward 
prediction, outcome coding and choice, we moved to investigate another 
crucial dimension implicated in goal-directed behavior, namely motivation 
for effort. In fact, earning rewards mostly requires exertion of cognitive or 
physical effort. Investigating how effort information is processed at the 
neural level is necessary to characterize mechanisms of motivated behavior. 
For these reasons, in Chapter 3 we manipulated both cognitive effort and 
potential rewards, controlling for temporal confounds, in order to disentangle 
the neural correlates of anticipating a higher reward and a higher effort 
requirement. Strikingly, we showed that during the anticipation phase, the 
same cortico-subcortical network traditionally associated with reward 
encoding was activated by both high reward and high effort prospect. This 
network involved the striatum and the ACC. In fact,  influential theories of 
ACC function associate this area with value processing and reward 
prediction (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & 
Wallis, 2009; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Silvetti, Alexander, Verguts, & 
Brown, 2013). However this view is incompatible with the evidence that 
higher effort requirements equally recruit the ACC. The overlap with 
reward-related activation suggests a motivational nature of this activity, 
necessary in sustaining effortful behavior, as in overcoming a cost to obtain 
the reward at stake. This interesting hypothesis is in line with several more 
recent accounts of ACC functions (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Sterling, 2012; 
Weston, 2012). Moreover, exploratory analyses on our data suggested the 
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possible involvement of brainstem neuromodutalory nuclei in this 
mechanism. To sum up, the results of Chapter 3 challenge the notion of 
ACC as solely dedicated to value computation. In fact, this controversy is 
traceable across different research lines and literatures. Single-unit 
recordings in animals, flanked by neuroimaging evidence in humans and 
computational work supports the net-value perspective, according to which 
ACC directly encodes rewards discounted by the costs (Croxson, Walton, 
O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009; Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & 
Wallis, 2009; Silvetti et al., 2011). Lesion studies in animals, 
neuropsychological evidence and recent neuroimaging studies in humans 
(including our result) support the motivational perspective instead, according 
to which ACC activity supports motivated behavior towards a goal, thus 
showing increased activation when effort requirements become higher 
(Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012a; Krebs, 
Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 2012; Németh, Hegedüs, & Molnár, 
1988; Walton et al., 2009). 
 In Chapter 4 we directly investigated this dichotomy (net-value 
account vs. motivational account) with the goal of determining the nature of 
ACC contribution to reward and effort anticipation, both during effort-
related decision making  and during effort anticipation. In fact, despite the 
pivotal role of ACC in decision making (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2008), several studies investigating neural coding of effort did not 
control for it, testing either choice or anticipation (Croxson et al., 2009; 
Krebs et al., 2012; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, Dayan, & Dolan, 2013; 
Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012). Given 
the contribution of this area to both decision-making and effort anticipation 
phases, combining and controlling for both phases in the same experimental 
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setting was necessary to better characterize this area’s function. For this 
reason, we implemented an fMRI paradigm where effort encoding was 
investigated both during decision and during anticipation of performance. 
Moreover, cognitive effort was manipulated parametrically, to test the 
hypothesis of linear effort encoding in the ACC. The results showed that 
during both decision and anticipation, prospective effort is encoded 
parametrically and in a motivational fashion, with overlap in the ACC. These 
data support the motivational account of ACC function, as higher effort was 
associated with increased ACC activity across both phases. Strikingly, effort 
coding was also modulated by phase. During anticipation of performance 
ACC showed linear increase. During the decision making phase however, a 
finer-grained analysis revealed the same linear trend only in the high reward 
condition, and a quadratic trend in the low reward condition instead. In the 
low reward condition, ACC activity increased only up to a certain effort 
level, then dropping for the highest effort possible. This result shows that 
during effort-related decision making, ACC might encode exclusively the 
effort one considers worth engaging. Converging evidence comes from 
individual differences in choice behavior. Participants who chose to endure 
more effortful trials also showed increased effort encoding in ACC during 
decision. This evidence is compatible with a recent account of ACC 
function, postulating the role of this region in encoding the value of exerting 
cognitive effort, to drive adaptive decision (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 
2013).    
After investigating the neural correlates of value, in terms of effort 
and reward coding, with fMRI, in Chapter 5 we went one step further, 
questioning how these computations actually drive action. To investigate 
how value influences the motor system during task preparation, we used 
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TMS to stimulate M1, while recording MEPs on the hand muscles. With this 
method, a value modulation of motor cortico-spinal excitability had been 
reported in a few recent studies, showing how reward can both facilitate 
specific actions and increase overall motor readiness (Gupta & Aron, 2011; 
Klein, Olivier, & Duque, 2012; Klein-Flügge & Bestmann, 2012). Following 
from these results, we investigated the hypothesis that anticipating cognitive 
effort would modulate motor excitability as well, possibly in combination 
with reward. Moreover, we examined individual differences in effort 
perception measuring the Need for Cognition (NFC) trait (Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Kao, 1984), and the influence on motor preparation. Our results show that 
both anticipation of cognitive effort and reward affects motor excitability in 
a combined fashion. This suggests that value signals computed in cortical 
and subcortical areas modulate M1 to bias motor preparation, providing 
compelling evidence for recent theories of action selection (Cisek & 
Kalaska, 2010). This effect was strikingly modulated by NFC, with both low 
and high NFC groups displaying an effect of effort, but in opposite 
directions. The low NFC group showed a motivational-like pattern, with 
increased motor excitability for high effort conditions and a trend for high 
reward. The high NFC showed a net-value-like pattern, with maximal motor 
excitability for the best value option, namely high reward/low effort. This 
confirms that high level cognitive factors, such as reward, cognitive effort, 
and even differences in a personality trait like NFC can affect the motor 
system modulating motor readiness. Moreover, it is a clear indication that 
further research on effort-related goal-directed behavior should incorporate 
finer-grained measures of inter-individual differences, as these determine 
substantial variability even in low-level processes like motor preparation. 
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Beyond net-value: a model of adaptive effort allocation 
In the empirical chapters, we sought to disentangle the contribution of 
cortico-limbic structures, with particular emphasis on the ACC, to reward 
coding, effort coding, decision-making and finally motor preparation. Along 
this path, we faced the inconsistency of our effort data with the dominating 
view of the net-value account. In Chapter 3 we showed that anticipating 
higher effort was associated with increased ACC activity. This led to further 
investigate this issue, showing in Chapter 4 that direct encoding of effort in 
ACC follows a motivational fashion. In fact, the plausibility of a 
motivational account of ACC function was also backed up by a series of 
animal studies (Salamone, Correa, Mingote, & Weber, 2005; Salamone & 
Correa, 2012) and neuropsychological evidence (Németh et al., 1988). 
However, thanks to parametric manipulation of mental effort, we were able 
to identify a different pattern during decision-making in the low reward 
condition. On the one hand, this quadratic trend suggested that a net-value 
hypothesis could not be completely falsified, given that a drop in activation 
for the highest effort level with the prospect of a low reward could be 
interpreted as a cost-benefit (net-value) computation. On the other hand, the 
linear coding in the high effort condition, as well as  in the anticipation of 
performance phase, strongly supported the motivational account. Moreover, 
the results of Chapter 5 showed that both effort and reward prospect exert 
an integrative influence on motor excitability. The precise nature of this 
integration stays however elusive, as the individual differences analysis 
revealed opposite patterns with respect to effort anticipation, potentially 
mimicking motivational-like activation (low NFC) and net-value-like 
activation (high NFC). 
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These result fostered our theoretical thinking, calling for a framework 
that could consistently account for all these effects, specifically focusing on 
the integration of different features in one value signal. Inspired by the 
empirical results, we adopted a computational modeling approach, aiming at 
a mechanistic understand of neuro-functional architecture of effort-related 
behavior, going beyond the net-value versus motivational dichotomy. For the 
purpose, we employed the reinforcement learning framework (RL, Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). This framework has been successfully applied in investigating 
neural mechanisms underlying value prediction. RL models have proven 
fruitful in simulating ACC function both in reward prediction (Alexander & 
Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011), and in motivated goal-directed behavior 
(Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012b). Hence we 
decided to frame effort-related behavior as an RL problem as well. More 
specifically, we consider exerting effort as an action one can choose to 
perform or not. This action is called boosting. The decision of whether to 
boost or not is driven by the optimization of a utility (value) function, which 
combines reward and cost. This framing allows to explain how adaptive 
effort allocation is learned, in a number of different task contexts. Crucially, 
the same framing can explain how effort is allocated (deciding to boost or 
not) after all information concerning reward and cost has been learned, and 
only the adaptive choice of exerting effort or not needs to be made.  
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Figure 1: Neurobiological model of adaptive allocation of effort (adapted from 
Verguts et al., submitted). 
 
Importantly, the model has a modular structure. The black boxes in 
Figure 1 represent stimulus-response mappings, which have to be learned in 
a certain task context. This can be mediated via changes in parameters (e.g., 
neural network weights) w and is independent from the modules that 
implement adaptive learning of when to boost (white boxes in Figure 1). 
Potentially any task can instantiate these black boxes, from choosing to press 
a lever (like in a typical rodent experiment), to performing mental arithmetic. 
The white boxes represent the machinery that allows the model to learn 
when to boost or not. The units in the ACC represent the value of a certain 
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stimulus s (V(s)), the value of boosting given a certain stimulus Q(s,B), and 
the value of not boosting given a certain stimulus Q(s,noB). The value of 
boosting is thus learned by the ACC per every stimulus. This signal is passed 
on via ventral striatum (VS), ventral pallidum (VP) and thalamus back to the 
ACC, where it activates the boosting unit B. When choosing to boost, the B 
unit will increase the signal-to-noise ratio in the response layer, increasing 
likelihood of a correct response. Note that the correct task-relevant stimulus-
response mapping is learned independently, and that ACC learns when 
boosting is adaptive, via maximization of its own utility function. In 
practice, this means that the model learns when it’s worth boosting, that is 
when exerting effort increases the likelihood of selecting the correct 
response, and thereby the likelihood of reward.  
With this architecture, the model manages to simulate several 
experimental findings. The model simulates the choice behavior of rats in a 
T-maze setting, when one arm of the maze offers more food, but only after 
climbing a barrier (Salamone, Cousins, & Bucher, 1994). The model also 
learns how to allocate effort adaptively when simulating cognitive tasks 
involving effort and reward, such as calculations (Vassena et al., 2014) and 
conflict tasks (Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008). Interestingly, one can 
also bias the behavior of the model towards never boosting or always 
boosting, thus mimicking dopaminergic lesion  or depletion in one case 
(Salamone et al., 1994), and pharmacological dopaminergic enhancement  in 
the other case (Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, Points, & Green, 2009). From 
the behavioral point of view, both cases result in poor performance, as effort 
is not allocated adaptively (eg. no boosting when it would be worth, and 
excessive boosting when it’s not needed). The paper reporting this model in 
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detail is currently submitted for publication (Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 
submitted). 
Besides the explanatory power with respect to existent literature, the 
model also makes an interesting prediction, yet to be tested. For increasing 
task difficulty, activation of the boost unit shows an inverted U shaped 
pattern, dropping when difficulty is too high (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Model simulation. On the y-axis the activity of the boosting unit is plotted. 
On the x-axis, task difficulty is plotted (adapted from Verguts et al., submitted). 
 
The left part of the curve overlaps with our empirical results of 
Chapter 3, where anticipation of high effort was associated with increased 
ACC activity. In our study however, accuracy in the task was very high, thus 
preventing us from sampling from the right side of the curve predicted by 
model (i.e. higher task difficulty) The results of Chapter 4 suggest the 
plausibility of an inverted U shaped pattern, as in the low reward condition 
during the decision phase, ACC activity drops for the highest effort level. 
However, in those results ACC activity in the high reward condition is not 
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consistently higher than in the low reward condition, as opposed to the 
model. The reason for this discrepancy might reside in the parametric 
manipulation of effort, which might have decreased saliency of the reward 
manipulation. This should be investigated in further research.  
One first step for further validation of the model, would be to 
explicitly test the prediction of an inverted U shaped relationship between 
task difficulty and ACC activity. In fact this prediction is also congruent 
with the recent theoretical account of ACC function proposed by Shenhav 
and colleagues (Shenhav et al., 2013). More precisely, the boosting unit in 
our model influences the decision to allocate effort. In terms of behavior, 
this should be applicable to both a decision making situation, as well as to an 
anticipation situation. As a first experiment, one could think of an adapted 
version of the paradigms we used in Chapter 4. Both reward and task 
difficulty should be manipulated, but this time difficulty should be varied to 
its extremes, from very easy to very difficult. According to the model, in 
these circumstances one would predict a drop in ACC activity. As we 
showed that decision making can modulate effort encoding in the ACC, it 
would be interesting to test this hypothesis separately in both a decision 
making and an anticipation context. Following from our empirical results of 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, one might intuitively predict a shift to the right in 
of the curves in Figure 2 in the absence of choice. Concretely, this 
corresponds to linear increase in ACC activity, also for higher levels of task 
difficulty, pushing the activity drop further on the y-axes. In other words, in 
absence of choice, activity drop would happen for higher difficulty levels as 
compared to a choice situation. In the absence of choice, choosing to boost 
represent always the most adaptive behavior, as not doing would imply 
losing the reward anyway. In a decision-making context however, one would 
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be allowed for example to opt for a lower effort/lower reward option. To 
sum up, a possible empirical result would be an inverted-U in both 
anticipation and decision making, but a right-shifted curve in anticipation. In 
the model, however, boosting is always implemented as a choice, so finding 
this predicted result would present yet a further challenge for future model 
development. 
 
Beyond dopamine: interaction with other neuromodulators 
As illustrated in the introduction, reward-related and effort-related 
neural activation has mostly been associated with regions receiving massive 
dopaminergic input from the VTA in the brainstem. The results of our fMRI 
studies confirmed the involvement of the striatum and ACC, dopaminergic 
targets and part of the so-called reward system  (Haber & Knutson, 2010; 
Knutson & Cooper, 2005). Moreover, pharmacological manipulation or 
inactivation of dopamine alters effort allocation (Salamone & Correa, 2012). 
However, dopamine is not the only neuromodulator known to exert 
dramatic influence on brain activity and behavior. Noradrenaline (also called 
norepinephrine), is also known to reach widespread cortical networks. 
Noradrenaline is spread by the Locus Coeruleus, which is also located in the 
brainstem. Noradrenaline is generally associated with arousal, and has been 
proposed to modulate signal-to-noise ratio in neuronal activity in several 
situations (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005), including typical cognitive control 
tasks (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). In fact, in our model boosting is also 
expressed as an increase in signal-to-noise ratio applied on the response 
layer. Hence, one possible future direction would be to try to combine these 
frameworks, for example investigating the effect of arousal on effort 
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exertion, targeting potential noradrenaline-dopamine interactions (Raizada & 
Poldrack, 2007). A first evidence for these systems interacting in effort-
related behavior comes from a recent experiment, where higher arousal 
induced by pictures  influenced physical effort exertions (Schmidt et al., 
2009). Including a noradrenergic modulation in the model, might account for 
these empirical effects. 
Serotonin is another major neuromodulator, released by the Dorsal 
Raphe Nucleus (DRN) in the brainstem, widely reaching cortical and 
subcortical regions. Classically, serotonin-mediated processes are associated 
with behavioral inhibition, stress, anxiety and depression (Daw, Kakade, & 
Dayan, 2002; Graeff, Guimarães, De Andrade, & Deakin, 1996). However, a 
few theoretical attempts have been made, to elucidate interactions with 
dopamine (Boureau & Dayan, 2011; Cools, Nakamura, & Daw, 2011; Daw 
et al., 2002). Complicating these attempts is the fact that serotonergic input 
to the cortex is far less localized than dopaminergic input (Kranz, Kasper, & 
Lanzenberger, 2010), thus making it particularly challenging to both 
measure and modulate with anatomical specificity. Several recent 
experiments in animals however, seem to provide compelling evidence of a 
serotonergic contribution to reward processing (Inaba et al., 2013; Izquierdo 
et al., 2012; Miyazaki, Miyazaki, & Doya, 2012; Nakamura, 2013; Pratt, 
Schall, & Choi, 2012). Pharmacological manipulation of central serotonin 
levels in humans also influences reward-related processing and decision 
making (Cools, Roberts, & Robbins, 2008; Cools, Robinson, & Sahakian, 
2008; Homberg, 2012; Schweighofer et al., 2008; Seymour, Daw, Roiser, 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2012). More specifically, in these studies, altering 
serotonin levels seems to affect processing of negative events (such as 
punishments) and costs (delay). This is compatible with our exploratory 
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analysis in Chapter 3, where we show that both high effort and high delay 
seem to elicit increased brainstem activation in a region compatible with 
DRN. In line with the reported studies, this might reflect serotonergic 
activation in response to costs, which need to be overcome to complete the 
task and achieve the reward. To sum up, extending our model of adaptive 
allocation of effort by including a serotonergic modulation, might help in 
elucidating the contribution of serotonin in reward and cost processing.  
 
Serotonin-dopamine interactions: a possible role for the medial 
Prefrontal Cortex  
 Further insights in the possible contribution of serotonin are provided 
by research in clinical settings. Altered serotonin release in the DRN is 
typically associated with a pattern of behavioral sequelae contributing to the 
development of depression. This phenomenon is named learned 
helplessness, and implies a number of behavioral depressive symptoms 
caused by the exposure to uncontrollable stressors (Seligman & Beagley, 
1975). Although it is not the sole cause of depression, this phenomenon has 
been long studied in rodents, mainly to develop animal models with the goal 
of improving pharmacological treatments (Pryce et al., 2011). The 
underlying neural mechanism resides in an over-sensitization of DRN 
serotonergic neurons, which leads to exaggerated serotonergic release, 
causing the behavioral consequences (Maier & Watkins, 2005). Relevant to 
our model, is the evidence that the mechanism leading to DRN over-
sensitization would be mediated by the mPFC (Amat et al., 2005). This has 
been confirmed in a more recent study, targeting the underlying mechanisms 
of mPFC-brainstem interactions while animal where facing a behavioral 
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challenge (Warden et al., 2012). Crucially, they showed in freely moving 
rats exposed to stressors, that perseverance in the behavior was associated 
with mPFC firing. Moreover, optogenetic stimulation of mPFC neurons 
projecting to the DRN increased this persistence. These results clearly show 
that mPFC modulates stress-related response in the DRN. This might be 
especially relevant when investigating adaptive allocation of effort. The 
mPFC region includes the ACC, which in our model drives effort allocation.  
According to the predictions of the model, extremely difficult tasks would 
induce disengagement (inverted U shaped relationship between difficulty 
and activity of the boosting unit). However, in a situation where 
disengagement is not an option, continuous (and unavoidable) failure due to 
excessive task difficulty might parallel the exposure to an uncontrollable 
stressor. In these circumstances, our model might provide fruitful insights in 
the cortico-subcortical interaction associated with facing a very difficult 
tasks, shedding light on mechanisms favoring persistence and resistance to 
adverse environmental conditions.  
 
Implications for the study of motivation in health and disease 
The empirical results, together with the computational work, prompt a 
theoretical shift in the understanding mPFC function in supporting motivated 
behavior, merging the net-value perspective with the motivational 
perspective. The validity of this framework should be broadly put to test, as 
its explanatory power might account not only for decision-making situations 
involving effortful behavior. In fact, considering the computational accounts 
of reward prediction (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011), it 
seems plausible that this logic would apply to the factor probability as well. 
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It would be interesting then to cross effort, reward and probability under this 
theoretical framework, to test how mPFC processes these factors.  
In addition to this, potential clinical implications might derive from 
this framework. Motivational impairments characterize several psychiatric 
conditions, including depression, anhedonia, ADHD, and obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012; Devinsky et al., 1995; 
Milad & Rauch, 2012; Silvetti, Wiersema, Sonuga-Barke, & Verguts, 2013; 
Treadway & Zald, 2011). Interestingly, these disorders are often associated 
with alteration or dysfunction of the same cortico-subcortical network 
reported in our results and implemented in our computational model. 
Adapting the model to simulate different behavioral and neural activity 
patterns associated with these disorders might provide new insights in the 
etiopathogenenetic mechanisms, as well as the development of new 
pharmacological treatments. Moreover, our empirical results shed new light 
on the neural mechanisms underlying motivation for effort. Understanding 
how mPFC (and especially ACC) actively drives engagement and 
disengagement in motivationally relevant courses of action represents the 
next challenge. Elucidating these mechanisms will provide us with the key to 
disclose the actual drivers of motivated behavior. This would open up 
exciting possibilities of behavioral intervention in people with pathological 
alteration of motivation, as well as in healthy people facing emotional or 
cognitive challenges in their life path.   
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 CHAPTER 7 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Het onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrift richtte zich op de neurale 
basis van beloning en inspanning, alsmede de manier waarop deze aspecten 
betrokken zijn bij het sturen van gepast gedrag tijdens zowel het maken van 
beslissingen als het voorbereiden op een bepaalde taak. Het doel van de 
huidige studies was om verschillende theorieën van waarde-inschatting en 
motivatie bij elkaar te brengen, om zo een integrale visie op de werking van 
deze aspecten te bekomen en de onderliggende neurale mechanismen te 
ontdekken. 
Doelgeright gedrag omvat alle soorten acties die gericht zijn op een 
specifiek doel, vaak weergegeven door een beloning (Rangel & Hare, 2010).  
Het engageren in zulk gedrag geeft aan dat het voor mensen mogelijk is om 
het te bereiken voordeel te kwantificeren, alsook de waarschijnlijkheid van 
het plaatsvinden van dit voordeel, zodat er zo optimaal mogelijk afgewogen 
kan worden wat de best beschikbare opties in de omgeving zijn. De neurale 
basis van dergelijke afwegingen is onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 2. Meer 
specifiek hebben we de bijdrage onderzocht van de mediale Prefrontale 
Cortex (mPFC) aan het coderen van uitkomsten en het voorspellen van 
beloning. Hierbij werd een functionele dissociatie verwacht tussen de 
ventromediale Prefrontale Cortex (vmPFC) en de Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(ACC). Onze resultaten tonen aan dat de vmPFC betrokken was bij het 
coderen van uitkomsten, ongeacht de waarschijnlijkheid van deze uitkomst 
en het daadwerkelijk maken van een beslissing. De ACC was betrokken bij 
het voorspellen van beloning, met name bij onverwachte positieve 
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uikomsten, ongeacht of er wel of niet een keuze gemaakt werd. Omdat 
deelnemers gedurende het experiment risicovolle beslissingen moesten 
nemen, was het mogelijk om tevens de neurale basis van inter-individuele 
variabiliteit in risico-voorkeuren te onderzoeken. Zoals beschreven in de 
Appendix toonden de resultaten aan dat verminderde activatie in de anteriore 
Insula tijdens gokken samenhangt met sterkere voorkeuren voor het nemen 
van risico. Het onderliggende mechanisme bestaat mogelijk uit een 
veranderde risico inschatting in dit gebied, wat zou kunnen aansturen op 
risicovolle gedragingen bij zowel gezonde personen als personen met een 
pathologische aandoening. 
Na het bepalen van het neurale substraat die geasocieerd is met het 
voorspellen van beloning, het coderen van uitkomsten en het maken van 
keuzes, onderzochten we in een volgende stap een tweede cruciale dimensie 
van doelgericht gedrag, namelijk motivatie voor inspanning. Meer bepaald is 
het zo dat het verkrijgen van beloningen vaak gepaard gaat met het moeten 
uitoefenen van cognitieve (mentale) of fysieke inspanning. Om te bepalen 
welke mechanismen ten grondslag liggen aan gemotiveerd gedrag, is het 
nodig te onderzoeken hoe informatie omtrent inspanning op neuraal niveau 
verwerkt wordt. In Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we daarom zowel cognitieve 
inspanning als mogelijke beloning gemanipuleerd, om de neurale basis van 
het anticiperen van hogere beloning en een vergrootte inspanning te 
onderzoeken. Opmerkelijk genoeg demonstreerden de resultaten dat 
hetzelfde cortico-subcorticale netwerk, dat traditioneel geassocieerd wordt 
met het encoderen van beloning, ook actief is gedurende de anticipatie fase 
bij zowel hogere beloning als hogere verwachte inspanning. Dit netwerk 
omvat het striatum en de ACC. Invloedrijke theorieën omtrent de functie van 
de ACC associëren het gebied met het verwerken van waarde en voorspellen 
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van beloning (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, 
& Wallis, 2009; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Silvetti, Alexander, Verguts, 
& Brown, 2013). Deze opvatting is echter niet verenigbaar met recente 
evidentie die aantoont dat hogere eisen qua inspanning eveneens beroep 
doen op de ACC. De overlap met beloningsgerelateerde activatie lijkt erop te 
wijzen dat deze activatie motivationeel van aard is, en noodzakelijk is voor 
het voortzetten van gedrag dat inspanning vergt alsook het overwinnen van 
kosten om toch een beloning te kunnen verkrijgen. Deze interessante 
hypothese sluit aan bij recente ideeën over de functies van de ACC (Holroyd 
& Yeung, 2012; Sterling, 2012; Weston, 2012). Bovendien wezen enkele 
exploratieve analyses van onze data erop dat de neuromodulerende cellen in 
de hersenstam mogelijk betrokken zijn bij dit mechanisme. Samengevat 
betwisten de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 het idee dat de ACC enkel gericht 
is op het bepalen van waarde. Deze controverse is terug te zien in 
verschillende onderzoekslijnen en aanverwante literatuur. Zo wordt de 
zogeheten netto-waarde visie, die stelt dat de ACC beloning rechtstreeks 
codeert (rekening houdend met de kosten), ondersteund door single-unit 
opnames bij dieren, evidentie op basis van fMRI studies bij mensen alsook 
computationele studies (Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 
2009; Kennerley et al., 2009; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011). Lesie-
studies bij dieren, neuropsychologisch bewijs en recente neuroimaging 
studies bij mensen (waaronder ook onze resultaten) ondersteunen 
daarentegen de motivationele visie, die stelt dat de ACC gemotiveerd gedrag 
(in de richting van een doel) aanstuurt, zodat verhoogde activatie zichtbaar is 
wanneer er meer inspanning noodzakelijk is (Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 
1995; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 
2012; Németh, Hegedüs, & Molnár, 1988; Walton et al., 2009). 
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In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzochten we deze dichotomie (netto-waarde visie 
vs. motivationele visie) rechtstreeks, met als doel te bepalen hoe en in welke 
mate ACC bijdraagt tot beloning en het anticiperen van inspanning. Meer 
specifiek werd dit nagegaan zowel tijdens besluitvorming waarbij 
inspanning een belangrijke rol speelt, alsook het anticiperen van inspanning 
zelf. Ondanks de centrale rol die ACC speelt tijdens besluitvorming (Brass 
& Haggard, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2008), werd dit niet gecontrolleerd in 
studies die neurale codering van inspanning nagaan. Meer bepaald werd 
enkel keuze getest, ofwel enkel anticipatie (Croxson et al., 2009; Krebs et 
al., 2012; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, Dayan, & Dolan, 2013; Schmidt, 
Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012). Gezien de bijdrage 
van dit hersengebied aan zowel besluitvorming als fases van anticipatie van 
inspanning, was het noodzakelijk om beide concepten te combineren en 
ervoor te controleren in eenzelfde experimentele proefopzet. Dit had als doel 
de functie van dit hersengebied beter te onderscheiden en duidelijker af te 
lijnen. Omwille hiervan implementeerden we een fMRI paradigma waarbij 
het encoderen van inspanning werd onderzocht, zowel tijdens het maken van 
een inspanningsgerelateerde beslissing als het anticiperen op een 
toekomstige inspanning. Verder werd cognitieve inspanning parametrisch 
gemanipuleerd, om na te gaan of lineaire encodering van inspanning in de 
ACC plaatsvindt. De resultaten toonden aan dat tijdens zowel 
besluitvorming als anticipatie, prospectieve inspanning parametrisch 
geëncodeerd werd en op een motivationele manier, met overlap in de ACC. 
Deze data ondersteunen de motivationele visie met betrekking tot de functie 
van ACC, gezien meer inspanning werd geassocieerd met een toename in 
ACC activiteit overheen beide fases (beslissing en anticipatie). Opmerkelijk, 
het coderen van inspannng was tevens gemoduleerd door fase. Tijdens het 
afwachten van een beoordeling van een prestatie vertoonde ACC een 
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toename op een lineaire manier. Tijdens besluitvorming daarentegen, werd 
deze lineaire trend enkel gevonden in de hoge beloningsconditie. Er werd 
een kwadratische trend bekomen in de lage beloningsconditie: Daar nam 
ACC activatie enkel toe tot een zeker niveau van inspanning werd bereikt, 
waarbij vervolgens activatie daalde bij het bereiken van maximale 
inspanning. Dit resultaat suggereert dat tijdens inspanningsgerelateerde 
besluitvorming, ACC uitsluitend inspanning codeert die men op dat moment 
de moeite waard vindt. Convergerende evidentie hiervoor komt van 
individuele verschillen in keuzegedrag. Participanten die ervoor kozen om 
taken uit te voeren die meer inspanning vergden, toonden ook een 
toegenomen codering van inspanning in ACC tijdens besluitvorming. Deze 
bevinding is compatibel met een recente visie omtrent de functie van ACC, 
die veronderstelt dat dit adaptive besluitvorming ondersteunt door het 
encoderen van de waarde van het uitoefenen van cognitieve inspanning 
(Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013).    
Na het onderzoeken van de neurale correlaten van waarde, in termen 
van het encoderen van inspanning en beloning door middel van fMRI, 
gingen we een stap verder in Hoofdstuk 5. In dit hoofdstuk gaan we na hoe 
deze mechanismes actie aandrijven. Om te onderzoeken hoe waarde een 
invloed heeft op het motorsysteem tijdens taakvoorbereiding, hebben we 
gebruik gemaakt van Transcraniale Magnetische Stimulering (TMS) om de 
motorische cortex (M1) te stimuleren, terwijl gelijktijdig de Motor Evoked 
Potentials (MEPs) werden geregistreerd op de handspieren. Studies die 
gebruik maakten van deze methode, hebben reeds een modulering van 
waarde van motorische cortico-spinale prikkelbaarheid gerapporteerd, die 
aantoont hoe beloning zowel specifieke acties kan faciliteren als algehele 
motorische paraatheid kan doen toenemen (Gupta & Aron, 2011; Klein, 
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Olivier, & Duque, 2012; Klein-Flügge, Hunt, Bach, Dolan, & Behrens, 
2011). Volgend op deze resultaten, onderzochten we de hypothese dat 
anticipatie van cognitieve inspanning motorische prikkelbaarheid ook zou 
moduleren, mogelijks in combinatie met beloning. We onderzochten 
daarenboven individuele verschillen met betrekking tot de perceptie van 
inspanning door middel van de ‘Need for Cognition’ (NFC) karaktertrek 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), en de invloed op motorische voorbereiding. 
Onze resultaten tonen aan dat zowel anticipatie van cognitieve inspanning 
als beloning gecombineerd een invloed hebben op motorische 
prikkelbaarheid. Dit suggereert dat waarde signalen berekend in corticale en 
subcorticale gebieden M1 moduleren om motorische voorbereiding te 
beïnvloeden. Deze bevinding ondersteunt recente theorieën omtrent het 
selecteren van acties (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). Dit effect was verrassend 
genoeg gemoduleerd door NFC, waarbij zowel lage als hoge NFC groepen 
een effect van inspanning weergaven, zij het in tegenovergestelde richtingen. 
De lage NFC groep toonde een patroon in de richting van de motivationele 
visie, met toegenomen motorische prikkelbaarheid voor condities die hoge 
inspanning vereisen en een trend voor hoge beloning. De hoge NFC groep 
daarentegen vertoonde een patroon in de richting van de netto-waarde visie, 
met maximale motorische prikkelbaarheid voor de optie met de beste 
waarde, namelijk hoge beloning/lage inspanning. Dit bevestigt dat hogere-
orde cognitieve factoren, zoals beloning, cognitieve inspanning en zelfs 
verschillen in persoonlijkheid (NFC) een invloed kunnen hebben op het 
motorsysteem door motorische paraatheid te moduleren. Verder is het een 
duidelijke indicatie dat toekomstig onderzoek met betrekking tot 
inspanningsgerelateerd doelgericht gedrag specifieke metingen van 
interindividuele verschillen moet incorporeren, aangezien deze een 
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substantiele variabiliteit meebrengen, zelfs in “lagere-orde” processen zoals 
motorische voorbereiding. 
 
Tenslotte vatten we in de Algemene Discussie de bevindingen samen, 
en bespreken we implicaties voor toekomstig onderzoek alsook beperkingen. 
Verder illustreren we een nieuw neuro-computationeel model van adaptieve 
toewijzing van inspanning, parallel ontwikkeld met ons empirisch onderzoek 
en deels ervan afgeleid. Dit model verheldert de controverse die bestaat 
tussen de netto-waarde en motivationele visie met betrekking tot cortico-
limbische structuren, door motivatie voor inspanning te implementeren als 
een adaptieve gedraging, die kan aangeleerd worden via beloningsleren. 
Concluderend bespreken we de implicaties van onze bevindingen voor 
toekomstig onderzoek, alsook de potentiële relevantie voor klinische 
doeleinden.  
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